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Summary 
The separate legal personality of a company is one of the cornerstones of modern 
corporate law. Nevertheless, due to the artificial nature of a company it has no inherent 
moral blameworthiness necessary to impose corporate liability. With a rise in 
corporate wrongdoing, there is a need to hold companies liable. Therefore, certain 
models of attribution have developed whereby the conduct and will of a corporate actor 
can be imputed to the company to establish corporate liability. Especially in the realm 
of corporate criminal liability, these models of attribution have played a pivotal role to 
establish corporate wrongdoing. The two broad theories underlying the models of 
attribution are the fiction and realist theories respectively. The directing minds doctrine 
or identification doctrine and the vicarious liability model are traditionally associated 
with the fiction theory, which is rooted in the abstract nature of a company.  
Whether the traditional models of attribution are suited for complex modern 
organisational structures, is explored in this thesis, whilst a more functional and 
realistic approach to corporate liability is proposed. Often the question of “what is a 
corporation” has overshadowed the determination of corporate liability, thus a more 
contextual analysis based on law and economics is proposed to ensure corporate 
liability.  
The development of the rules of attribution through case law illustrate the 
importance of a purposive approach to establishing corporate liability. Furthermore, 
the underlying relationship between the rules of attribution and the rules of agency 
indicate that the interests of risk-bearers and managers are not always aligned and 
should be redressed.  
Moreover, a realist approach as opposed to the fictional approach to attribution has 
been developed in English and Australian law. This approach focuses on the 
overarching corporate culture and identity when determining corporate fault, instead 
of individual corporate actors. These regulatory frameworks provide an alternative 
approach to the current South African model, which is based on the fiction theory. 
Lastly, the economic considerations, such as the separation of ownership and 
control and the agency problem, are evaluated to determine whether the current 
models of attribution create an economically efficient outcome or an unsustainable a 
risk-taking environment.  
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Opsomming 
Die afsonderlike regspersoonlikheid van ‘n maatskappy is een van die hoekstene 
van korporatiewe reg. Nogtans belemmer die abstrakte aard van maatskappye die 
oplegging van aanspreeklikheid, aangesien ‘n maatskappy nie oor die nodige 
afkeurenswaardigheid beskik nie. Ten einde die probleem te oorbrug, is sekere 
aanspreeklikheidsmodelle ontwikkel waarvolgens die handeling en wil van sekere 
individue aan die maatskappy toegereken word. Ten opsigte van die strafregtelike 
aanspreeklikheid van regspersone, speel die aanspreeklikheidsmodelle ‘n kern rol om 
aanspreeklikheid te vestig. Die fiksie-teorie en orgaan-teorie word as die twee 
noemenswaardige teorieë rakende die aanspreeklikheidsmodelle beskou. Die 
identifikasie-leerstuk en die middellike aanspreeklikheidsmodel word tradisioneel met 
die fiksie-teorie geassosieer, wat op die abstrakte aard van ‘n maatskappy gegrond is. 
Die vraag ontstaan of die tradisionele aanspreeklikheidsmodelle geskik is vir 
komplekse moderne organisatoriese strukture. Die oorsprong van die aard van ‘n 
regspersoon word dikwels as ‘n struikelblok tot aanspreeklikheid beskou, aangesien 
daar op die abstrakte aard van die regspersoon gefokus word. Gevolglik word ‘n 
doelmatige benadering voorgestel, wat op ‘n realistiese opvatting van regspersone 
geskoei is. Hierdie kontekstuele benadering spruit uit ‘n reg en ekonomiese analise 
tot die aard van die regspersoon.  
Die onderliggende doel van korporatiewe aanspreeklikheid word deurgaans in die 
ontwikkeling van die aanspreeklikheidsreëls beklemtoon. Weens die onderlinge 
verhouding tussen die aanspreeklikheidsreëls en verteenwoordiging is die belange 
van aandeelhouers en bestuur binne ‘n maatskappy nie noodwendig belyn nie.  
‘n Alternatiewe benadering tot aanspreeklikheid gebaseer op realisme is onlangs in 
die Engelse en Australiese reg ontwikkel. Hierdie modelle fokus op die oorkoepelende 
korporatiewe kultuur en identiteit ten einde korporatiewe skuld te vestig, in plaas van 
die wilsvorming van bepaalde individue. Hierdie breër raamwerk word as alternatief 
tot die huidige Suid-Afrikaanse model voorgestel, wat op die fiksie-teorie gebaseer is. 
Laastens word ekonomiese oorwegings, soos die verdeling tussen eienaarskap en 
beheer en die agentskap probleem, geëvalueer ten einde te bepaal of die huidige 
aanspreeklikheidsmodelle ‘n ekonomies doeltreffende uitkoms verseker of ‘n nie-
volhoubare riskante omgewing daarstel.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Background to the research problem: the directing minds doctrine and 
corporate liability 
One of the founding principles of company law is the separate legal personality of 
a company.1 Although all human beings are legal persons, meaning they have the 
capacity to acquire legal rights and incur legal obligations, a legal person is merely a 
legal concept which has no physical existence.2 As an artificial being, a company has 
no mind of its own and both the conduct and fault of certain people within the company 
need to be attributed to the company. Ultimately, a company has “no soul to damn and 
no body to kick”,3 yet section 19 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the “Companies 
Act”) provides that a company has all the legal powers and capacity of an individual, 
except where such a right is inherently human.4  Furthermore, section 8(4) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) entrenches the 
fundamental rights of juristic persons under the constitutional democracy where 
applicable. In both these instances, the premise that a company is a creation of fiction 
is upheld, which embeds the notion of attributing the conduct and will of certain 
individuals (who are often not the residual risk-bearers).5 
One of the primary models of attribution is the directing minds doctrine,6 whereby a 
company’s fault and conduct are imputed from the board of directors or those with the 
power to influence corporate policy. The economic considerations underlying 
company law, such as the separation between ownership and control and the agency 
problem have indicated that corporate rules should address these economic 
                                             
1 Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 (HL); R Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in FHI 
Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 28-65 31.  
2 Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 31.  
3 Although this statement cannot be found in any reported judgments or other primary source, it has 
often been cited in case law, for example in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 1915 
AC 705 HL 713 (“Lennard’s”); Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 
1 SA 602 (A) 606; Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2010 2 SA 167 (SCA) 
para 4. 
4 Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 31. 
5 MZ Abbasi “Legal analysis of Agency Theory: an inquiry into the nature of corporation” (2009) 51 
IJLMA 401 403. 
6 Lennard’s 713; HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd 1957 1 QB 159 172 (“HL 
Bolton”). 
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considerations.7 Being an artificial entity, a company cannot act itself; nor can it have 
a state of mind.8 However, due to its corporate personality, it is necessary for the law 
to attribute the acts and states of mind of certain natural persons to the company. The 
problem, however, is that with an increase in misbehaving corporate actors, the 
description and application of the relevant rules have become uncertain.9 Given the 
concerns relating to corporate attribution and its application in complex modern 
organisations, there is a need to revisit the rules of attribution. For this reason, the 
directing minds doctrine10 should be reconsidered and a more consistent mode of 
ascribing corporate fault and conduct should be investigated. However, the rules for 
ascribing acts or knowledge to the company would depend upon the type of liability 
and thus contractual or criminal liability could be imputed differently. In the case of 
contractual liability, the purpose is to establish authority (be it actual or ostensible), 
whereas criminal liability relates to unlawful conduct. Especially in the realm of 
corporate criminal liability, where crimes involving mens rea are concerned, a basis 
for attribution to the company as its own conduct and will is required.11 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the traditional model for attribution, including 
the application of the directing minds doctrine, in the South African context. Due to 
South African company law’s origin in English law, the common-law position will be 
used a basis to determine the similarities and differences in the application of the 
attribution rules.  Moreover, the realist model as a mode of attribution will be examined 
as possible alternative to the directing minds doctrine. Apart from the theoretical 
framework regarding attribution, the efficacy of the directing minds doctrine in 
establishing corporate criminal liability will be discussed. English law and Australian 
law have recently opted for a realist approach for certain statutory offences,12 
consequently the possibility of a similar approach in South African law will be 
examined.  In addition, an economic analysis will be made, due to the underlying 
agency problem in company law and its influence on corporate criminal liability. It will 
                                             
7 MC Jensen & WH Meckling “Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership 
structure” (1976) 3 JFE 305 305; EF Fama & MC Jensen “Agency Problems and Residual Claims” 
(1983) 26 JL&E 327 328. 
8 MS Blackman, RD Jooste & GK Everingham Commentary on the Companies Act (RS 4 2007) 4-123.  
9 S Worthington “Corporate attribution and agency: back to basics” (2017) 133 Law Q Rev 118 118. 
10 Lennard’s 713; HL Bolton 172.   
11 E Ferran “Corporate Attribution and the Directing Mind and Will” (2011) 127 Law Q Rev 239 241. 
12 The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007; Bribery Act 2010; Criminal Finances 
Act 2017.  
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be examined whether or not the traditional model creates an incentive for risk taking 
behaviour.  
2 Traditional approach:  The directing minds doctrine 
The traditional approach to corporate liability is based on individual rather than 
corporate fault. In South African company law both the individualistic and vicarious 
liability model have been followed when attributing human qualities to the artificial 
being. These theories are based on the fictional nature of the company and was 
formulated by Viscount Haldane in Lennard’s: 
“A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body 
of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of 
the corporation.” 13 
In this sense the action and will of the directing mind, be it the board of directors, 
the body of shareholders or an authorised person, will be regarded as the action and 
will of the company.14 Nevertheless, it is paramount that the person be regarded as 
an “alter ego”15 of the company.16 This method of attribution is regarded as the 
identification doctrine, because it is based on ascribing an individual’s (or a group of 
individuals’) will and actions to the company.17 Despite the fact that the Lennard’s case 
was a civil matter, the rhetoric of Viscount Haldane has been applied in both civil and 
criminal litigation.18  
Although the board of directors is traditionally associated with being the directing 
minds of a company, the inquiry with regards to attribution of will and actions remains 
a context-specific consideration.19 This contextual analysis has been confirmed in 
Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) v Mobile Telephone Networks 
                                             
13 713.  
14 713-714.  
15 This method of attribution is a manifestation of the identification doctrine, which is the primary method 
followed in English and South African company law. V Borg-Jorgensen & K Van der Linde “Corporate 
criminal liability in South Africa: time for change? (part 2)” (2011) 4 TSAR 684 684. 
16 In H L Bolton  173 it is reiterated that a company could be compared to a human body, but certain 
employees only fulfil an instrumental function, whereas others (such as the directors or managers) 
represent the directing mind and will of the company and ultimately controls its actions.  
17 Ferran (2011)  Law Q Rev 241.  
18 241.  
19 Ferran (2011)  Law Q Rev 242; El Ajou v Dollar Holdings plc 1994 2 All ER 684 (CA) 699 (“El Ajou”). 
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(Pty) Ltd,20 which stated that the directing mind and will of the company are those 
persons who have the “management and control in relation to the act in point”.21 A 
corporation therefore remains an abstract or fictional being, which lacks a substantive 
individual identity and consequently independent corporate fault.22 
2 1 The realist approach as alternative mode of attribution 
Juxtaposed to the individualistic approach, is the realist approach, which was 
originally developed by Von Gierke.23 This theory regards the company to have an 
existence in its own right, therefore it has a mind of its own.24 Especially in terms of 
criminal corporate liability, this approach has been benchmarked to be in accordance 
with intricate corporate structures. 
The following characteristics of the realist theory are accordingly discussed. Firstly, 
in terms of realist theory a company is regarded as a separate corporate entity and 
not an artificial embodiment of various individuals.25 A company is therefore awarded 
a unique legal (and possibly moral) existence.26 Affirmation of the unique attributes of 
a juristic person is found in the promotion of corporate entities of themselves as distinct 
with individualistic features,27 distinguishing them in society from the humans 
associated with them.28 Secondly, fault should be founded on the corporate culture 
within the company and not pinned on a single individual's thoughts. Bearing in mind 
the intricate organisational structures within companies, it might be more rational to 
follow a holistic approach to corporate criminal liability.29 
                                             
20 2010 3 SA 382 (SCA) paras 29, 31.  
21 Para 10 citing El Ajou 696. 
22 V Borg-Jorgensen & K Van der Linde “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: time for change? 
(Part 1)” (2011) 3 TSAR 452 453.  
23 SJ Naudé Die regsposisie van die maatskappydirekteur, met besondere verwysing na die interne 
maatskappyverband (1970) 14.  
24 Naudé Regsposisie van die maatskappydirekteur 15.  
25 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR  454.  
26 PG du Toit & GJ Pienaar “Korporatiewe identiteit as grondslag van die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 
van regspersone (1): teoretiese grondbeginsels” (2011) 14 PELJ 33 33; G Kemp, S Walker, R Palmer, 
D Baqwa, C Gevers, B Leslie & A Steynberg Criminal Law in South Africa 2 ed (2015) 215. Although a 
juristic person cannot perform inherently human acts, it still possesses its own legal personality, which 
can acquire rights and incur obligations separate from its directors or shareholders. This separate legal 
personality is enshrined in section 19(1)(b) of the Companies Act, as well as section 8(4) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
27 B Fisse & J Braithwaite “The allocation of responsibility for corporate crime: Individualism, collectivism 
and accountability” (1988) 11 Syd LR 468 476.  
28 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 454.  
29 PG du Toit & GJ Pienaar “Korporatiewe identiteit as die basis van strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van 
regspersone (2): die praktyk” (2011) 14 PELJ 98 98.  
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Corporate conduct is not merely the summation of different decisions by various 
individuals, but rather an intricate mosaic of differing decisions, institutional 
procedures and structures.30 Therefore, both the conduct and fault of the company 
should be evaluated from the perspective of the corporate culture in its entirety, rather 
than focusing on the individual pieces of the puzzle. Lederman argues that the self-
identity model of corporation is based on the assumption that it has a set of values 
and morals, which could simultaneously influence and constrain the thinking and 
behaviour of the people within its framework.31 Thus the corporate identity of a 
company is distinguishable from the individual’s embodying it; ascertaining the fault of 
juristic persons should be based on this identity rather than illogical modes as vicarious 
liability.   
2 1 1 The scope of corporate identity 
The corporate identity model is firstly founded on the principle that the unique 
identity of a juristic person would influence its adherence to legal rules.32 The King 
Code of Governance for South Africa 2016 (“King IV”) promotes responsible corporate 
citizenship and an ethical framework to promote this goal,33 whereby the unique 
corporate culture is confirmed.34 In determining the company’s identity, reference 
should be made to the control and monitoring mechanisms set in place, along with the 
general ethos and working environment within the company. These factors could 
encourage the compliance with legal rules and regulations, but on the other hand 
negligent or capricious conduct might be promoted.35 Whether adherence to the 
principles of King IV is sufficient to establish a law-abiding corporate environment 
remains uncertain; partly because the board of directors remains the focal point (and 
not the company per se) and partly due to the fact that it is regarded as soft law.   
At the core of corporate identity lies the fact that a company is governed by its 
traditions and corporate structure, thus a change in management, or even other 
                                             
30 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 34.  
31 E Lederman “Models for imposing corporate criminal liability: from adaptation and imitation toward 
aggregation and the search for self-identity” (2000-2001) 4 Buff Crim L Rev 641 686. 
32 Lederman (2000-2001) Buff Crim L Rev 690. 
33 Principles 2 and 3 affirm the importance of an ethical corporate culture and that an organisation 
should be seen as a responsible corporate citizen. 
34 Jordaan defines corporate culture as an “attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practise existing 
within the body corporate generally or in the part of the body corporate in which the relevant activities 
take place”; L Jordaan “New perspectives on the criminal liability of corporate bodies” (2003) Acta Jur 
48 64.  
35 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 697.   
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employees, would not bring about material changes in the structure of the company. 
Instead, the individuals within the company would adapt to adhere to the company’s 
goals. Their freedom is thus inhibited by the corporate policy and customs within the 
company. In contrast, the company’s identity remains constant.36 This model is in line 
with the perpetuity of companies, thus their liability should not be limited to the 
constraints of human conduct or mens rea. 
If a company endorses risk taking behaviour, employees’ reckless conduct would 
be approved, either expressly or tacitly. In the absence of a culture of compliance 
within the company, the corporate decisions taken within the company could be 
immoral or illegal.37 In this regard the individualistic model to corporate criminal liability 
hinders the accountability of a company, because a single individual’s conduct cannot 
necessarily be imputed to the company nor identified as the directing mind of the 
company.38 Thus a company could escape liability and bad decision-making by means 
of a complex organisational structure. 
2 2 Law and economics 
Economic considerations play a pivotal role in the development of modern company 
law.39 Bearing in mind the importance of economic efficiency, it should be examined 
whether or not the rules of attribution are efficient in assigning risk and potential liability 
to the company.  
In the relationship between the company and the shareholders or the directors, the 
company would be the principal and the latter act as the agents of the company.40 The 
problem that arises with this relationship, is the fact that directors often act in their own 
interest instead of furthering the interests of the company. This phenomenon is 
described as the agency problem.41 Jensen and Meckling, however, argue that given 
reasonably efficient markets and economically rational individuals, the possibility of 
agency costs will be anticipated by the various parties and reflected in the prices of 
                                             
36 Lederman (2000-2001) Buff Crim L Rev 691.  
37 C Parker “Compliance professionalism and regulatory community: the Australian trade practices 
regime” (1999) 26 J Law & Soc 215 227.  
38 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 58.  
39 KJ Hopt “Comparative company law” in M Reimann & R Zimmermann (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law (2006) 1161 1184.  
40 Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 52.  
41 R Watson & M Ezzamel “Financial structure and corporate governance” in K Keasey, S Thompson & 
M Wright (eds) Corporate Governance (2005) 54; BR Cheffins Company Law: Theory, Structure and 
Operation (1997) 45.  
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securities.42 Furthermore the underlying managerial contracts will also be altered to 
reflect a change in managerial behaviour to absorb the potential risk the agency 
problem poses.43 It has been argued that shareholders face adverse agency costs if 
the managers are not properly monitored and held accountable.44 
Coase theorised the company as a “nexus of contracts”45 – a construction that has 
been criticised as being too narrow.46 To diminish a company to a mere vehicle which 
minimises transaction costs creates a fiction that is inconsistent with the social 
reality.47 It also negates the moral responsibilities of companies, because there is no 
need to ascribe moral consciousness to such an artificial construct.48 However, this 
corporate consciousness is necessary to ensure compliance with regulation. It is vital 
to rethink the nature of the firm, because the possible negative externalities it holds 
for groups other than shareholders would instead warrant a construction of the 
company as a social institution with a wider stakeholder impact.  
2 3 Corporate criminal liability 
Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (“CPA”) provides a 
comprehensive framework designed to ensure criminal prosecution of corporations.49 
In South African law a company is held criminally liable on a derivative basis by way 
of vicarious liability.50 
However, vicarious liability in this context differs from delictual liability in the sense 
that the corporate entity is still deemed to have fault, whereas the employer’s fault is 
usually not relevant under true vicarious liability.51 This model of attribution is an 
                                             
42 Jensen & Meckling (1976) JFE 345. Agency costs are the summation of costs incurred to monitor 
that a company is managed in the shareholder’s best interests, hence they include monitoring costs, 
bonding costs and residual costs.  
43 Watson & Ezzamel “Financial structure and corporate governance” in Corporate Governance 45.  
4446.  
45 R Coase “The nature of the firm” (1937) 4 Economica  386; EF Fama “Agency problems and the 
theory of the firm” (1980) 88 J Pol Econ 288. This model entails that a firm should be regarded as a 
platform where various parties to the company agree to the terms by which they supply the firm’s inputs 
and receive remuneration accordingly.  
46 Watson & Ezzamel “Financial structure and corporate governance” in Corporate Governance 47; J 
Kay & A Silberston “Corporate Governance” (1995) NIER 84 88.   
47 J Parkinson “Models of the Company and the Employment Relationship” (2003) 41 BJIR 481 489.  
48 Parkinson (2003) BJIR 490.  
49 S v Coetzee 1997 3 SA 527 (CC) para 18.  
50 C Van der Bijl “Corporate ‘assault’: bullying and the aegis of criminal law (Part 2)” (2014) 4 TSAR 760 
760.  
51 Kemp et al Criminal Law 218.  
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entrenchment of the identification or direct model, which has been criticised by various 
academics as a legal construct not necessarily consistent with corporate reality.52 
2 3 1 The aggregation dilemma 
Section 332(1) of the CPA requires that a statutory or common-law offence, needs 
to be committed by a director or servant before a company could be held criminally 
liable. However, this does not mean that a prosecution or conviction of a natural 
person is a requisite to prosecute the juristic person. The dilemma of this requirement, 
is the fact that an individual’s conduct might not amount to meet the necessary 
standard to impose criminal liability. Consequently, neither the company, nor the 
individual could be held liable. In terms of the principle of aggregation53 the conduct of 
various actors is combined in order to prove the different elements of a crime and meet 
the standards to enforce criminal liability. This principle relates to the common purpose 
doctrine.54 However, its applicability within the section 332(1) context remains 
uncertain.55 It is argued that the actor responsible for the criminal conduct cannot be 
distinct from the person in whom the fault resides, because the unlawful act and fault 
are inextricably interwoven.56 There remains uncertainty whether different mind-sets 
could be combined to establish negligence or a particular form of intent or even the 
conduct of different individuals.57  
Originally corporate criminal liability is founded on a derivative basis, by way of the 
doctrine of identification, in other words the directing minds doctrine. Vicarious criminal 
liability only supplements the general approach with regard to certain offences. 
2 4 Concluding remarks 
Although the directing minds doctrine, as developed in the Lennard’s case, is 
considered to be the traditional method of attribution, it is necessary to question its 
                                             
52 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 98; Van der Bijl (2014) TSAR 761; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde 
(2011) TSAR 453, Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 49.   
53 E Emeseh “Corporate responsibility for crimes – thinking outside the box” (2005) 1 U Botswana LJ 
28 46. This principle (or doctrine) of aggregation therefore retracts from the notion of focusing on one 
individual whose conduct and will can be attributed to the company for purposes of liability.   
54 The common purpose doctrine seeks to impute the conduct of one member of a group to the other 
members of a group, provided that there is a shared intention among the members of the group. The 
requirements for the application of the doctrine was originally set out in S v Safatsa 1988 SA 1 868 (A) 
and confirmed in S v Mgedezi 1989 1 SA 867 (A) 705I – 706C.  
55 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 463.  
56 462.  
57 In the aftermath of S v Suid-Afrikaanse Uitsaaikorporasie 1991 2 SA 698 (W) this uncertainty became 
poignant. The court proceeded to make certain assumptions based on the evidence and facts at hand, 
despite that the particular individual who committed the unlawful conduct could not be identified.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 9 
relevance and efficacy in modern company law. Additionally, it should be deliberated 
if these rules of attribution create an economically efficient outcome or create a risk-
taking environment. Therefore, its application in criminal liability of companies in both 
South African and English law will be considered in order to explore a prospective 
realignment of the status quo.  
3 Outline of chapters 
In Chapter 2 the basic legal principles pertaining to the two conflicting theories of 
the nature of corporate personality will be discussed, as well as its influence on the 
attribution of corporate liability. Furthermore, Coase’s theorem on the nature of the 
firm and what the “nexus of contracts” entails will be discussed. Following the notion 
of contractarian thinking, an alternative model focussing on function rather than the 
nature of corporate personality will be explored.  
Chapter 3 will continue to explore the rules of attribution with reference to Meridian 
Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission,58 as well as the 
development of the directing minds doctrine. The dichotomy between the rules of 
attribution and the rules of agency will be analysed, including the uncertainty regarding 
the application of the rules in complex modern corporate structures.  
In Chapter 4, the dilemma of corporate criminal liability will be discussed, for it is in 
this field of law that the greatest doubt about the use of the directing minds doctrine 
has been raised.59 The critique against South Africa’s model for corporate criminal 
liability has long since been criticised as being unrealistic.60 Therefore the English 
realist model found in the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act will 
be examined, as well as its success in practice as an alternative model for South 
Africa. The Australian Criminal Code is regarded as the blueprint for incorporating 
corporate culture into corporate criminal liability, which will be explored as a basis for 
an alternative regulatory framework. Lastly, the influence of the deterrence theory in 
the efficacy of corporate criminal punishment will be discussed. 
                                             
58 1995 2 AC 500 (PC).  
59 Naudé Regsposisie van die maatskappydirekteur 14.  
59 15.  
59 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 454. 
59 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law  5 ed (2016) 461. 
60 Burchell Principles (2016) 461. 
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Chapter 5 will explore corporate liability from a law and economics perspective.  
Building on Coase’s theorem and the nature of the firm, the focus of this chapter will 
firstly be the agency problem, as discussed by academic authors such as Jensen, 
Meckling, Fama, Alchian and Demsetz. Moreover, the behaviour of directors will be 
examined and the influence of the agency problem on risk aversion and criminal 
liability.  
Based on these theories, it will be evaluated whether an overarching model for 
ascribing liability to companies could be developed, especially with regards to the will 
and mind of the company. However, an anthropomorphic approach to companies has 
also been criticised and one should bear in mind that the company remains an artificial 
creature of statute. 
4 Research question and research aims  
The research question addressed in this thesis is to determine whether the current 
models of attribution are efficient in establishing corporate liability. Traditionally, the 
theories of corporate personhood have dictated whether corporate liability should be 
imposed or not. The purpose is to explore these theories and their influence (or 
hindrance) in establishing corporate liability, as well as the possibility of alternative 
models of attribution. Especially in the realm of corporate criminal liability, the need 
arises to hold companies accountable for corporate wrongdoing. In light of the criticism 
raised against the identification model, the status quo of corporate criminal liability in 
South Africa is compared to the organisational theory as an alternative model, with 
specific reference to the models followed in English and Australian law.  Lastly, the 
economic justification for the current model of attribution will be explored with 
reference to the agency problem. 
Economic analysis and company law are inextricably linked.61 It is presumed that 
the agency problem inhibits economic efficiency and creates inefficient risks. In 
addition to corporate criminal liability theory, the agency problem will be discussed, by 
way of analysis of the underlying incentives for directors to act in their self-interest 
instead of promoting company’s interests, as well as efficacy of the safeguards, for 
example corporate governance and personal liability of directors.  
                                             
61 Hopt “Comparative Company Law” in Comparative Law 1184. 
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The traditional approach to attributing both will and conduct to a company is the 
direct method or directing minds doctrine. Juxtaposed to this model, is the realist 
model. The assumption is made that companies have a unique corporate culture, 
which forms the basis of the realist model and that the directing minds doctrine does 
not sufficiently address various relationships / liability whether internal or external in a 
company. The directing minds doctrine is furthermore not suitable for purposes of 
ascribing corporate criminal liability, especially in terms of determining fault and 
conduct. Based on the analogies in English and Australian law, the possibility of a 
single legal framework to attribute conduct and will to a company in light of the realist 
theory will be examined in South African law. 
5 Methodology 
As a point of departure, the directing minds doctrine will be analysed in the South 
African context, with reference to its origin in common law. This will be done by 
studying primary sources (specifically case law) and secondary sources (academic 
journals and text books in particular). 
Due to South African company law’s origin in English law, these two jurisdictions 
will be compared with one another. However, this will not be an all-encompassing 
comparative study, but merely an allusion to the similarities between the application 
of the attribution rules, as well as the difference in application between the systems.62 
English law follows a realist approach to corporate criminal liability with regards to 
certain statutory offences, whereas South African law focusses on vicarious liability.  
Owing to the underlying agency problem in company law, especially in terms of 
director’s incentives, an economic analysis of the law will also be followed. The 
question arises whether the current rules of attribution are sufficient in absorbing the 
unnecessary risk that the principal-agent relationship poses for the company, in 
particular shareholders’ interests. In this regard, academic writings of Coase, Alchian, 
Demsetz, Fama, Jensen, Meckling and Posner (among others) will be analysed.  
Recent developments in English law to follow a realist approach for certain statutory 
offences,63 necessitates an enquiry whether a similar approach could be followed in 
South African law. Reference will be made to both legislation and case law, as well as 
                                             
62 Compare the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 to s 332 of the CPA. 
63 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007; Bribery Act 2010.  
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academic journals. Additionally, the realist theory will be contrasted to the vicarious 
liability method followed under the CPA as a viable alternative. Examples from other 
jurisdictions, e.g. Australia, will also be alluded to in order to enhance the 
understanding of the realist model. 
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Chapter 2: Corporate personality 
1 Introduction 
According to Cassim the separate legal personality of a company is one of the 
cornerstones of company law.64 All human beings are regarded as legal persons, 
meaning they have the capacity to be the bearer of rights and to incur obligations. In 
contrast, a juristic person is a mere legal construction, which has no physical 
existence.65 In the late nineteenth century Lord Chancellor Baron Thurlow stated that 
corporations have “no soul to be damned, no body to kick”.66 Due to its artificial nature, 
a company cannot perform acts which are inherently human, for example entering into 
a marriage or appearing in court in person.67 Despite the fact that a company remains 
a legal construct without a physical existence, it possesses separate legal personality, 
whereby it can be the bearer of certain rights and incur obligations.68 
Section 19 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”) governs the legal 
status of companies, which states that from the date and time that the incorporation of 
a company is registered, it is a juristic person with all the legal powers and capacity of 
an individual, except to the extent that (1) a juristic person is incapable of exercising 
any such power or having such capacity or (2) the company’s memorandum of 
incorporation provides otherwise.69 Furthermore, the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (the “Constitution”) provides that a juristic person is entitled to the 
same protection awarded to an individual under a constitutional democracy. Section 
8(4) of the Constitution specifically states that a juristic person enjoys the same 
                                             
64 R Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 ed 
(2012) 28-65 31.  
65 Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 31.  
66 Although this statement cannot be found in any reported judgments or other primary source, it has 
often been cited in case law, for example in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 1915 
AC 705 HL 713 (“Lennard’s”); Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 
1 SA 602 (A) 606; Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2010 2 SA 167 (SCA) 
para 4 (“Manong”).  
67 In Yates Investments (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for Inland Revenue 1956 1 SA 364 (A) the court 
stated that a company may only be represented in court proceedings through legal counsel acting on 
its behalf. However, this rule was extended to non-legal representation in Manong para 10, where the 
Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the court has a residual discretion to allow non-legal 
representation if it ensures the administration of justice.   
68 ML Benade “Verontagsaming van die selfstandigheid van die maatskappy-regspersoon” (1967) 30 
THRHR 213 213.  
69 This is specifically stated in section 19(1)(b).  
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fundamental rights (specifically those stated in the Bill of Rights) as natural persons 
insofar as these rights may be exercised by a juristic person.70  
A company is a separate legal entity, distinct from the board of directors managing 
it or the shareholders who are seen as its owners. The limited liability flowing from 
separate legal personality is a fundamental principle of company law and modern-day 
business as a whole.71 Nevertheless, the limited liability is enjoyed by the shareholders 
and not the company, which will normally be held liable for its debts. It furthermore 
creates an incentive to invest capital into a business venture, because the risk of 
potential liability is minimised to the original investment, which in turn generates 
economic growth and employment opportunities.72 In Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp 
Municipal Council73 the Appellate Division held that the separate legal personality of a 
company is not merely an artificial or technical concept, but a “matter of substance”.74 
When the separate legal personality of a company is established, the purpose 
thereof should be borne in mind, for the specific juridical origin and aetiology should 
not be mistaken for a self-generated abstraction. Thus, a purposive approach to 
separate legal personality is necessary.75 If a jurist is confronted with the question if a 
                                             
70 Although a juristic person has a right to be treated equally to other persons and may sue for 
defamation, as found in Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 945 (A); Caxton Ltd v Reeva 
Forman (Pty) Ltd 1990 3 SA 547 (A); and Financial Mail (Pty) Ltd v Sage Holdings Ltd  1993 2 SA 451 
(A) (“Financial Mail”) respectively, this right is not on par with the personal nature of an individual’s 
claim. A juristic person may protect its right to privacy, which was held in Financial Mail 462; 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd; In re 
Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 1 SA 545 (CC) para 17 (“Hyundai”); Platinum 
Asset Management (Pty) Ltd v Financial Services Board; Anglo Rand Capital House (Pty) Ltd v 
Financial Services Board 2006 4 SA 73 (W) 106-7. However, in Hyundai para 18, the Constitutional 
Court reiterated that the context within which these rights operate, may differ and should not be equated 
to one another, for privacy as a right “becomes more intense the closer it moves to the intimate personal 
sphere of the life of human beings”. The underlying rationale for this reasoning is found in the principle 
that juristic persons are not bearers of human dignity, which is the underlying value protected by the 
right to privacy. Therefore the extent to which a natural or juristic person might enjoy a fundamental 
right, might differ. Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 32.  
71 In Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd 1897 AC 22 (HL) (“Salomon”) the separate legal personality of a 
company was established as a fundamental principle in company law. As a general rule, the 
shareholders of a company can therefore not be held liable for the debts and liabilities of the company, 
even if the company could be seen as the alter ego of the sole shareholder. In the absence of gross 
abuse of the separate juristic personality, the company remains a legal person in its own right. In 
describing the legal principle, Lord Macnaghten (50-51) stated the following: “The company is at law a 
different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; and, though it may be that after 
incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, 
and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or a 
trustee for them.” Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 33-35.   
72 Cassim “Legal Concept” in Contemporary 35.  
73 1920 AD 530.  
74 550.  
75 Benade (1967) THRHR 215.  
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particular problem should be solved with sole reference to the separate persona of the 
juristic person without considering the composition thereof, the purpose of the 
provision should be ascertained. Benade emphasises that clarity regarding the various 
considerations should exist.76 On the one hand, a jurist might regard the nature of the 
juristic person as a pre-requisite for further inquiry or a first stepping-stone to solve the 
problem.77 Therefore, it is necessary to define the juristic person, in other words the 
company, properly. Otherwise a more fitting approach, as Benade proposes, might be 
to accept the existence of a juristic person as a matter of fact and merely evaluate the 
purpose of the particular rules or provisions in question.78 In this sense the confusion 
regarding the nature of the corporation is eliminated and a more functional approach 
is followed, whereby the efficacy of the rules is examined. If the need for defining the 
nature of a corporation is ignored, the dilemma of finding a suitable theory is 
eliminated. 
Determining the nature of corporate personality has been the concern of many 
academic writers, especially in the realm of corporate criminal liability.79 Two opposing 
theories seem to dominate the debate regarding the true nature of corporate 
personality.  A company is often described as a “metaphysical entity”, which is a clear 
rhetoric of the organic theory. In contrast, the traditional fiction theorists will steer clear 
of attributing human qualities to artificial beings.80 Neither the organic theory nor the 
fiction theory can be seen as the correct approach to corporate personality, for a 
simple question such as “what is a corporation?” leads to many complexities. 
Therefore, in order to understand the need to hold company’s criminally liable, these 
opposing theories should be explored. 
1 1 Confronting the question of “what is a corporation?” 
Foster states that it is necessary to address the fundamental issue, or as he calls 
it, the “semantic question” when exploring corporate theory. This question can either 
be expressed by asking “What is the corporation?” or by rephrasing it to enquire what 
is meant by using the word “corporation”.81 According to Hart, our approach to defining 
                                             
76 Benade (1967) THRHR 215. 
77 (1967) THRHR 220. 
78 215.  
79 L Jordaan “New perspectives on the criminal liability of corporate bodies” (2003)  Acta Jur 48 63.  
80 MS Blackman The fiduciary doctrine and its application to directors of companies LLD Thesis 
University of Cape Town (1970) 8.  
81 NHD Foster “Perception, Language and “Reality” in Corporate Law Theory” (2006) 17 KCLJ 299 299.  
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what corporate personality entails leads to an anomalous situation.82 He argues that 
the common mode of definition is not suited for legal analysis and often complicates 
the exposition.83 The request for definitions in analytical jurisprudence has led to a 
divorce between jurisprudence and the study of law; based on the notion that certain 
fundamental principles cannot be explained without referring to a philosophical 
argument. However, Hart suggests that legal notions can be interpreted by methods 
which are adapted to their special character.84  
The semantic question at hand has great ambiguity, for it could demand a definition, 
a purpose, justification or the origin of the legal institution.85 In order to free this 
question from its risk of confusion, Hart states that it should be rephrased to clarify the 
need for a definition.86 Instead of asking what a corporation is, the request should be 
phrased as “What is the meaning of the word ‘corporation’?”.87 Hart rephrases the 
statement that a company is a separate entity from its aggregate of members to: “The 
name of a limited company is used in conclusions of law which apply legal rules in 
special circumstances in a manner distinct from though analogous to those in which 
such rules are applied to individuals apart from such circumstances.”88 Hart states that 
this restatement shows that companies are not fictitious or anomalous entities, but as 
new use of legal rules emerges, as well as the expressions involved in the use of these 
rules, though it might be analogous, it is still different.89 
                                             
82 HLA Hart “Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence” (1954) 70 Law Q Rev 37 38.  
83 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 37.  
84 37.  
85 37. 
86 Hart states that the approach to the definition is wrong, for the search for the definition of certain 
fundamental legal notions have led to theories of juristic thought which are often irreconcilable. Hart 
(1954) Law Q Rev 37; 39.  
87 The reason for the anomalous interpretation of “What is a corporation?” is that the common use of 
the words are known, but the meaning in a legal context differs from that of most ordinary words. 
Moreover, in defining what the word “corporation” means, a clear connection to ordinary words and their 
factual meaning seems to fade. In other words, one could say that words fail to give meaning to the 
question of what a corporation is or should be. Although a corresponding relationship between these 
legal words and other definite attributes, such as kinds of persons, things, qualities and material or 
psychological processes are identified, they are not a precise equivalent, but a mere connection to the 
legal word. Hart uses the example of describing a corporation as something which is not an aggregate 
of persons. The notion that fundamental corporate theory is based on the definition of a corporation 
leads unnecessary complexity. The triad of theories known as the fiction, realist and concession theory 
contradict each other, but provide no clearer indication of what is understood by a corporation. Hart 
(1954) Law Q Rev 38-41.  
88 53.  
89 53.  
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The traditional theories of corporate personality fail to accurately describe the 
meaning of expressions associated with or used for corporate bodies. Despite a 
mutual hostility among the traditional theories, it is assumed that these expressions 
should describe something or embody a particular meaning.90 Separate and 
incompatible accounts of its peculiarity are then given as a complex, recondite or 
fictitious entity. The peculiarity, however, lies in the “distinctive characteristics of 
expressions used in the enunciation and application of rules”.91  
Although the extent of legal rules and thus the scope of corporate legal personality 
is of importance, it is the moral existence of corporate entities that often perplexes 
most.92 Instead of over-stating the semantic question, “What is a corporation?” Hart 
enquires under what circumstances the law should ascribe liabilities on companies.93  
This might clarify which factors judges consider when legal rules imposed on 
individuals are extended to corporate entities, for example criminal liability for crimes 
involving a particular intent or knowledge on the part of the wrongdoer.94 The 
predominant analogy used to extend liability to corporate bodies, is that of an individual 
held liable for the conduct of her servant during the course of employment, in other 
words vicarious liability. According to Hart, this analogy of vicarious liability was used 
to extend the liability of companies from contract to ordinary torts and ultimately to 
torts involving malice.95 In English law the vicarious liability model has not been used 
to govern corporate criminal liability. In contrast, section 332 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act 51 of 1977 creates a comprehensive legislative framework which governs 
corporate criminal liability in South Africa based on the vicarious liability analogy.96  
Hart criticises the vicarious liability analogy as a means to impose criminal liability 
on companies, especially for crimes involving knowledge and intention, this analogy 
is “useless”.97 In the development of corporate criminal liability in English law, judges 
have sought an alternative option: the conduct and mental states of those substantially 
                                             
90 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 55.  
91 55.  
92 55.  
93 56.  
94 56-57.  
95 Therefore the law of principal and agent has been developed to incorporate limited companies. Hart 
(1954) Law Q Rev 57.  
96 The South African position regarding delicts, however, is not necessarily derived from the vicarious 
liability analogy, but focuses on the identification doctrine of the directing mind and will.  
97 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 57.  
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carrying on the work of the company can be imputed to it. The crux of the alternative 
source of analogy, is the question if a company “can” be held liable for crimes requiring 
a particular mens rea. However, the corporate criminal liability has often been 
overshadowed by the question of what a company is. Often the semantic question has 
been seen as an instrumental inquiry to deduce if corporate criminal liability should be 
imposed. Courts have reverted to statements such as “A company is a mere 
abstraction, a fiction, a metaphysical entity” or “A company has no mind and therefore 
cannot intend”.98 To a certain extent, the debate regarding the nature of the firm has 
safeguarded the company from criminal prosecution. Moreover, these statements 
seem to be eternal dicta on the nature of corporations given by using definitions and 
they suggest that any legal statements regarding corporations must be in line with its 
“nature”, otherwise it is logically inconsistent.99 Hart suggests that something greater 
than the analogies used to impose corporate rights and duties, which have originally 
been granted to individuals limits or restricts its application. Both the fiction and realist 
theories pose irrelevant barriers which could inhibit the application of corporate rights 
and duties.100  
1 2 The corporation as an organisational structure 
Hansmann and Kraakman explain that a corporation has five core structural 
characteristics, namely: (1) legal personality, (2) limited liability, (3) transferable 
shares, (4) delegated management under a board structure, and (5) shared ownership 
by the contributors of capital (typically the shareholders).101 The combination of these 
characteristics is highly complementary, for they provide an optimal organizational 
structure for production.102 At the same time, these characteristics could create 
                                             
98 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 57. 
99 57.  
100 In a strict application the fiction theory holds that a company cannot be found guilty of a crime, for it 
has no mind or conscience. According to the realist theory a company cannot be bound by an 
agreement which empowers another company to direct its business and employ personnel, because it 
would negate the company to a tool and disregard its real will. 
101 J Armour, H Hansmann, RR Kraakman & M Pargendler “What is Corporate Law” in J Armour, RR 
Kraakman, P Davies, L Enriques, H Hansmann, G Hertig, KJ Hopt, H Kanda, M Pargendler, W-R Ringe 
& EB Rock (eds) The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach 3 ed (2017) 
1-28 1;5.  
102 These characteristics are not necessarily commonplace in all corporate structures. Certain corporate 
legislation might be more flexible and firms could opt-out of the structure to address specific needs, for 
example non-profit companies or personal liability companies. Armour et al “Corporate Law” in Anatomy 
1;5.  
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tensions and trade-offs which contribute to the agency problems which corporate law 
seeks to address.103  
Ultimately, a pluralist approach to the foundation of a corporation offers a more 
efficient outcome whereby social welfare is maximised. The interests of shareholders 
are the predominant interest in most systems of company law, however, shareholder 
primacy has been criticised and the following suggestions have been made: (1) to 
redistribute the risks and benefits of business activities among those involved in the 
enterprise; (2) to ensure a reduction in the harmful impacts on the environment and 
society as a result of company behaviour; (3) a broadening of participation in corporate 
decision-making to incorporate democratic principles; and (4) greater 
accountability.104 Recognising a wider range of interests, or promoting the so-called 
stakeholder theory, is based on the premise of efficient wealth creation.105 According 
to Kelly and Parkinson, the current corporate governance structure seeks to solely 
promote the interests of the shareholders and to manage the appointment of the 
board.106 In addition, it tries to ensure the appropriate allocation of power between 
shareholders and the board of directors.107 In the aftermath of the Enron scandal and 
the 2007-2008 financial crisis, however, the need to evolve corporate governance 
beyond the shareholder theory has emerged.108  
Furthermore, the normative goal of corporate law is to purportedly serve the 
interests of society as a whole.109 Given the importance of corporate social 
responsibility and the shareholder-stakeholder debate, one could argue that an 
appropriate goal of corporate law would be to advance aggregate welfare of the both 
the firm’s shareholders and other stakeholders, such as its employees, creditors, 
                                             
103 Ownership and management of assets are separated in corporations, therefore management could 
abuse its fiduciary position. In order to ensure that management act in the interest of shareholders in 
an honest manner, agency costs arise. Foster (2006) KCLJ 302.  
104 G Kelly & J Parkinson “The Conceptual Foundations of the Company: a Pluralist Approach” in J 
Parkinson, A Gamble & G Kelly (eds) The Political Economy of the Company (2000) 113-139 113.  
105 RE Freeman & DL Reed “Stockholders and Stakeholders: A New Perspective on Corporate 
Governance” (1983) 25 Cal Mgmt Rev 88 88; T Donaldson & LE Preston “The Stakeholder Theory of 
the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications” (1995) 20 Acad Manage Rev 65.  
106 Kelly & Parkinson “Conceptual Foundations” in Political Economy 113.  
107 JG Hill “The Rising Tension between Shareholder and Director Power in the Common Law World” 
(2010) 18 CGIR 344 345. 
108 BR Cheffins “The Corporate Governance Movement, Banks, and the Financial Crisis” (2015) 16 
Theoretical Inquiries L 1 5; Hill (2010) CGIR 344.  
109 Armour et al “Corporate Law” in Anatomy 22.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 20 
customers and (possibly) the social and natural environment.110 If corporate law could 
be structured in such a way as to achieve this goal, a socially efficient outcome would 
be reached.  
In contrast, however, the goal of corporate law could be defined more narrowly, 
whereby shareholder primacy is the directive.111 The reasoning behind a restricted 
approach is that the pursuit of wealth maximisation would have a ripple effect which 
would ultimately lead to advancing social welfare.112 
Whether these goals of corporate law (be it the narrow interpretation focusing on 
wealth maximisation or the pursuit of aggregate social welfare) is achieved, should be 
explored. Easterbrook and Fischel emphasise the question of what the goal(s) of 
corporations should be.113 Is the primary objective to make a profit or to maximise 
social welfare?114 If wealth maximisation is pursued, should the profit be long-term or 
short-term? The writers argue that these questions are irrelevant, for it is the 
contractual freedom of the original corporate investors to determine the objectives of 
the corporation.115   
If the corporation deviates from its original purpose, a complaint for breach of 
contract will arise and not some derogation from an ideal of corporate governance.116 
The role of corporate law is the adoption of certain default rules, which will govern the 
internal and external relationships, unless it is altered by the shareholders.  
Normally the expectation exists that residual risk-bearers contract for a promise to 
maximise the long-term financial wealth of the firm, which in turn would increase their 
initial shareholding investment. Apart from the shareholders who receive variable 
returns, other participants contract for fixed pay-outs, for example salaries and 
interest. As opposed to the shareholders as residual risk-bearers, these other 
participants do not bear the risk on the margin. In their relationship with the company, 
                                             
110 According to Armour, Hansmann, Kraakman and Pargendler, it is difficult to define the term 
“aggregate welfare”, for it is both pecuniary and non-pecuniary in nature. Armour et al “Corporate Law” 
in Anatomy 22-23.  
111 Armour et al “Corporate Law” in Anatomy 23. 
112 If other stakeholders contract with the corporation, they will enter negotiations based on the premise 
that the will be better off themselves as a result. Therefore, it is in the best interest of a corporation (and 
ultimately the shareholders) that corporate transactions are beneficial to all parties involved. Armour et 
al “Corporate Law” in Anatomy 23. 
113 FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel The Economic Structure of Corporate Law (1991) 35.  
114 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 36.  
115 36.  
116 36.  
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the shareholders (or investors) should accept the structure of risk inherently built into 
the firm.117 
If political society wishes to alter corporate behaviour, the choice of maximand is 
important.118 If wealth is a maximand, corporate conduct could be change by imposing 
monetary penalties. Due to the fact that a company’s wealth will decrease, managers 
will ultimately attempt to avoid conduct which could lead to monetary penalties. 
Easterbrook and Fischer illustrate this incentive scheme by way of a pollution tax: if 
companies are taxed based on their emissions, they will emit less in order to save 
costs.119 Simultaneously, companies will behave as if other stakeholders’ interests are 
incorporated into company decision-making. Society, therefore, takes advantage of 
the wealth-maximising incentives inherent to the firm in order to change its behaviour 
in a cost-effective way. Although this might lead to an increase in societal wealth, 
Easterbrook and Fischer argue that this approach does not presuppose that political 
society should attempt to alter firm behaviour to account for the welfare of non-
participants. They argue that it is merely a positive externality flowing from the firm’s 
original incentive to be wealth-maximising.120 Moreover, society has a choice to either 
conscript to the firm’s strength and primary goal of maximising wealth by changing the 
prices it confronts or by changing its structure so that wealth maximisation is less 
likely.121 
Either way, an agency problem is imminent; a manager serving two masters 
(shareholders on the one hand and society on the other) has been freed of both and 
is answerable to none.122 The manager is faced with a demand from both groups, but 
could ultimately serve the interests of only one group.123 In the case of wealth 
maximisation the shareholders’ interests will prevail, which would cause a rise in 
agency costs and a decrease in social welfare.  
                                             
117 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 37.  
118 37. 
119 Although this argument seems like an easy solution to ensure lower carbon emissions, the tax 
burden will ultimately be borne by consumers and not corporations. 
120 However, Easterbrook and Fischel do not address the optimal ways to deal with pollution, bribery, 
plant closings, and other decisions that affect people who are non-participants to the corporate contract. 
Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 37-38.  
121 Structural change is deemed to be less appropriate, for the negative outcomes are greater than the 
positive impact on society. A price change might yield a greater positive outcome that a structural one. 
Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 38.  
122 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 38.  
123 38. 
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A change in incentives might be a better solution to address other stakeholders’ 
interests. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that certain rules should be established that 
attach an additional cost to certain acts, for example pollution and layoffs, while 
managers are free to maximise the wealth of shareholders subject to social 
constraints.124 According to Adam Smith’s invisible hand theory, by maximising the 
wealth of equity holders, other constituencies will automatically be benefitted.125 These 
other participants’ roles should be seen as complementary rather than antagonistic.126 
Another option is to establish property rights, so that social costs are regarded as 
private ones by the firm.127  
2 The Theory of the Firm 
In conceptualizing corporations, be it through the traditional models or alternative 
models, the rights and obligations assigned to corporate entities are defined more 
clearly.128 Accordingly, Petrin illustrates the varying outcomes each theory (be it the 
traditional or the modern alternative) has on corporate rights and duties.129  
Understanding the precise legal nature of corporations has long since been a 
contentious issue.130 It is not uncommon that a particular school of thought on 
corporate personality will criticise an opposing theory as being illogical and unrealistic, 
for it is not aligned with basic legal principles.131  It is held that “the juristic controversy 
over the nature of corporate personality is dead”;132 however, Hart views it as an 
opportunity to learn the different ways of its development.133 Instead of determining 
                                             
124 Economic Structure 38.  
125 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 38.  
126 According to Easterbrook and Fischel, each party to a transaction in a market economy would be 
better off, because a successful firm provides job security for workers and goods and services for 
consumers. If the consumers’ demand rises, the firm’s profit will also increase and in turn higher 
employment rates will ensue. Greater prosperity for shareholders, employees and communities are a 
positive externality flowing from better consumer goods and services. Moreover the increased firm 
wealth, could lead to better working conditions, investing in cleaner production methods and reducing 
pollution, for environmental concerns are often neglected in the pursuit of maximising productivity. 
Economic Structure 38-39.  
127 Easterbrook & Fischel Economic Structure 39.  
128 Benade (1967) THRHR 213; M Petrin “A Balancing Approach to Corporate Rights and Duties” in B 
Choudhury & M Petrin (eds) Understanding the Company: Corporate Governance and Theory (2017) 
232-250 232. 
129 Petrin “Balancing Approach” in Understanding the Company 232. 
130 Benade (1967) THRHR 213.  
131 Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 9.  
132 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 49.  
133 Hart tries to describe the difficulty in the development of corporate personality theory, by using an 
example of an “intelligent lawyer innocent of theories of corporate personality” who was educated in a 
legal system where only individuals are ascribed rights and duties and all legal theory is banned. He 
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the nature of the firm, the focus shifts towards the question if the particular nature is 
at all capable of juristic formulation and in the case where such a juristic formulation 
is present, what its legal significance would be.134 These theories are characterised to 
determine whether or not certain rights and duties should be extended to corporate 
actors. Moreover, the method of ascribing these rights and duties are explored. Unlike 
Hart suggests, the debate regarding the legal nature of corporate personality is not 
dead, but remains alive.  
According to Blackman, the nature of the relationship between the board of 
directors (or director) and the company is the foundation of ascertaining the nature of 
corporate personality.135 
Developing a single theory, which could account for the foundation of corporate 
personality seems far-fetched, however, each developed legal system seems to 
favour a particular school of thought.136 In South Africa, the predominant theory seems 
to be the fiction theory due to its strong roots in English law.137 Given its importance 
in South African law, as well as its influence on the traditional theories regarding the 
nature of the firm, the fiction theory should be explained. In addition, the aggregate 
theory, which has similar reasoning as the fiction theory, will be explored.  
2 1 Fiction theory 
The nature of juristic persons and whether their status within a broader legal 
framework could be “scientifically” explained, became a prevalent topic among legal 
scholars in the nineteenth century.138 One of the predominant theories developed in 
this time, is the so-called fiction theory. This theory is deemed to be the most orthodox 
approach to the nature of corporate personality,139 and is rooted in Roman law, where 
the artificial character of legal entities is emphasised.140  The legal scholar, Carl 
                                             
would then be introduced to a legal system (in Hart’s example the English legal system) which shows 
how rights and duties are imposed on certain corporate bodies in practice. According to Hart, the 
observer will learn that a one-person company is awarded certain rights with consequences which are 
partly similar and partly different from the individual comprising the one-person company. Hart (1954) 
Law Q Rev 49-50. 
134 It would seem that determining the nature of a company is judicially irrelevant when determining 
corporate conduct. Benade (1967) THRHR 216.  
135 Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 8.  
136 Benade (1967) THRHR 216.  
137 216.  
138 M Petrin “Reconceptualising the Theory of the Firm” (2013) 118 Penn St L Rev 1 5; 9.  
139 Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 9. 
140 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 5. 
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Friedrich von Savigny, who is regarded as the most renowned proponent of this theory, 
firmly believed that the juristic person is a creature of statute and can have no 
independent existence other than that which is created by legislation.141 Accordingly, 
in establishing the scope of legal personality, the legislative framework will be the crux 
of the inquiry. Being a product of law, a corporation can have no autonomous conduct 
apart from the acts of the individuals constituting the collective and whose acts are 
attributed to the corporation by way of a further fiction.142 Legal capacity (and the 
recognised rights and duties associated therewith) is therefore extended to juristic 
persons only by way of pure fiction.143 
Given the artificial nature of corporate personality, Von Savigny argued that these 
rights and duties are limited primarily to property.144 A further consequence of the 
fiction theory, is the fact that a corporation cannot incur civil or criminal liability.145  The 
underlying reasoning is that a fictional will is imputed by the law, therefore any unlawful 
conduct will not be sanctioned by statute, particularly in the case of crimes requiring a 
particular state of mind, either negligence or intent.146 
In both English and American corporate law, the fiction theory has been popularised 
in the early twentieth century.147 In Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward148 
Chief Justice Marshall characterised a corporation as an “artificial being, invisible, 
intangible and existing only in contemplation of law”. Therefore, as a creature of law, 
a corporation could only possess those properties which its founding document 
conferred upon it.149 The belief that incorporation should be regarded as a privilege, 
thus the state has the liberty to impose the necessary restrictions to regulate corporate 
behaviour, forms the foundation of the concession theory, which is deemed to be a 
derivative of the fiction theory. The view that a corporation is an “abstraction” was 
reiterated in Lennard’s, where Viscount Haldane stated the following: 
                                             
141 Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 9-10. 
142 9.  
143 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 5-6. 
144 FC von Savigny System des heutigen römischen Rechts (1840) Vol II 238-239, 314, as stated in 
Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 6. 
145 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 6.  
146 Hart (1954) Law Q Rev 58; Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 12; Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 6.  
147 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 5. 
148 17 US (1 Wheat) 518  (1819) 636. 
149 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 9.  
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“A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a 
body of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the 
person of somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is 
really the directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the 
personality of the corporation.”150 
Geldart and Maitland both opined that the fiction theory could not be seen as the 
point of departure in English corporate law, for they identified many company law rules 
which could not be aligned with the fiction theory.151 However, the courts differed from 
Geldart and Maitland’s opinion and relied on the dicta of the Salomon case. In other 
words, the separate existence of a company from its members was reiterated. This 
statement in Salomon was originally based on Lord Coke’s decision in the Case of 
Sutton’s Hospital152 which regarded a company as an abstract and fictional entity. Due 
to the fact that it is a construct of law, it cannot commit treason, nor be outlawed or 
excommunicated, for it has no soul.153  
The notion of a company as an abstract being, a core principle of the fiction theory, 
was generally accepted as the status quo. However, due to its unrealistic 
consequences, courts and legislatures developed certain exceptions to the original 
strict application of the fiction theory. Especially in the realm of criminal law (as well 
as the law of delict) the need to hold companies accountable for wrongful conduct 
became apparent.154 In order to determine the wrongfulness of a company, a directing 
mind of the company had to be identified, whereby a particular director’s or high 
managerial officer’s will could be attributed to the company in particular 
circumstances. Although English law has opted for judicial development to hold 
companies liable in criminal law, the South African legislature imposes criminal liability 
for any wrongdoing by the company where its interests are furthered.155 According to 
                                             
150 713.  
151 Benade (1967) THRHR 216-217.  
152 (1612) 77 Eng Rep 960.  
153 Benade (1967) THRHR 217.  
154 217.  
155 Section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, particularly ss 1 states the particular persons 
whose conduct can be imputed, as well as the relevant circumstances under which corporate criminal 
liability arises. This provision is broader than the potential scope of the directing minds doctrine, 
because any employee’s conduct (or even a third party’s conduct) can be imputed to the company. Not 
only should the employee be acting within the scope of her employment, if the interests of the company 
are furthered, liability can also be imposed.  
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Benade, the application of the directing mind doctrine is based on the realist theory 
and not the fiction theory, which denies the separate existence of a company.156 
Benade questions whether South African company law is at all founded on 
philosophical legal theory about the nature of the legal person.157 With reference to 
scholars such as Nékám, Hart, Wedderburn, and others, Benade states that the 
searching in the uncertain realm of metaphysics is irrelevant when dealing with 
concrete legal problems.158 In Nékám’s seminal work on corporate personality theory 
The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity,159 the author argues that any entity 
can be awarded legal personality if the community views the entity as worthy of legal 
recognition. Therefore, public policy dictates whether an entity should be awarded 
legal personality, irrespective of its (lack of) physical existence or abstract nature. 
However, if human characteristics or metaphors, such as a company has no body to 
kick or soul to be damned is used, an abstract being can only be viewed in two ways: 
the entity is compared to its human equivalent and treated accordingly or it is solely a 
creature of statute with no separate existence apart from its abstract nature and rights 
granted in terms of the law. Although both views have led to different theories, namely 
the realist and fiction theories, the fundamental assumption of both theories is the 
comparison to the human being.160 
The need to define a corporation, company or entity as a thing, has been negated 
by certain legal scholars. In Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co v Pierson et al Judge Bijur 
states the following: 
“The concrete import of these views is that a corporation is more nearly a method than 
a thing, and that the law in dealing with a corporation has no need of defining it as a 
person or an entity, or even useful and usual collection of jural relations, each one of 
which must in every instance be ascertained, analysed and assigned to its appropriate 
place according to the circumstances of the particular case, having due regard to the 
purpose to be achieved. A confirmation of the accurate of this analysis of the corporate 
form is found in the fact that the word “corporation” has a variable, not a constant, 
meaning” 161 
                                             
156 (1967) THRHR 218.  
157 219.  
158 221.  
159 A Nékám The Personality Conception of the Legal Entity (1938). 
160 Benade (1967) THRHR 221-222. 
161 222 NYS 532 1927.  
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With reference to the abovementioned quotation, Benade states that there are no 
set criteria to determine the characteristics of a juristic person. Accordingly, there can 
be no sound definition of a company. Instead, the distinguishing factors are governed 
by societal needs and can only be assessed after the fact and not predetermined 
criteria.162 However, by eliminating the question of “what is a corporation” it is possible 
to accommodate the juristic person in the legal framework, by determining the purpose 
of assigning certain rights or duties to a company. A shift from the rigid system of 
definition towards a flexible, purposive approach is made.163  
2 2 The aggregate or ‘contractualist’ theory 
During the nineteenth century a competing theory was developed in England, which 
became more dominant in the United States during the latter half of the century. The 
aggregate theory stated that corporations were aggregations of the human individuals 
whose relationships were structured in a particular way in terms of mutual agreements. 
Accordingly, the rights and duties of the corporation were indirectly or derivatively 
those of the individuals comprising the legal entity.164 
In Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad Co165 the aggregate view of the 
corporation was accepted as the foundation for corporate theory in the United 
States.166 The notion of the company as an artificial entity was rejected and instead 
the focus shifted towards the underlying proprietary rights of the shareholders. Thus, 
a corporation was merely an association of individuals.167  
Based on policy considerations, such as fairness, regarding a company as an 
aggregate of individuals comprising it is more acceptable than following the realist 
notion of viewing a company as a separate entity.168 Whether the overemphasis on 
the shareholders instead of the corporation itself can be aligned with basic principle of 
separate juristic personality of a company is unclear.  
                                             
162 Benade (1967) THRHR 222.  
163 223.  
164 Thus in order to determine the content of these rights and duties, the particular individual’s rights 
and duties had to be defined and attributed to the corporation. Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 9.  
165 118 US 394 (1886).  
166 SJ Padfield “Corporate Social Responsibility and Concession Theory” (2015) 6 Wm & Mary Bus L 
Rev 1 26.  
167 Padfield (2015) Wm & Mary Bus L Rev 27.  
168 Benade (1967) THRHR 224.  
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The premise of this theory is individualism. According to methodological 
individualism, only individuals act and thus only individuals are responsible. Corporate 
action or corporate responsibility is nothing more than the aggregate of its individual 
actors.169 Hayek, as the proponent of methodological individualism, stated that there 
is no other way to understand “social phenomena”, except by relying on individual 
actions directed towards others and which is guided by their expected behaviour.170 
Deduced from Hayek’s understanding of methodological individualism, is that only 
individuals are “real” in a social construct, whereby social phenomena such as 
corporations remain abstractions which can only be observed indirectly.171 Therefore, 
when dealing with a corporations, its “realness” is reliant on the individuals’ attributes 
which comprise it.  
Nevertheless, the notion that only individuals are real beings, whilst corporations 
are legal fictions is false. Certain attributes of a company are observable, for example 
its assets and decision-making procedures, while an individual’s personality and 
conscience are not. Therefore, Fisse and Braithwaite argue that individuals and 
companies are both abstract and real.172 They argue that methodological individualism 
cannot account for the “corporateness” of both corporate action and responsibility, 
especially in the realm of corporate crime.173 
In contrast to methodological individualism, is the theory of methodological holism 
based on collectivism, whereby the collective will of society is not limited to the 
consciousness of society’s individuals, but rather the individual is influenced by the 
“evolutionary social forces”.174 Fisse and Braithwaite argue that neither theory, be it 
methodological individualism or methodological holism are persuasive, but state that 
corporations and individuals have a mutual influence on one another.175 Moreover, a 
company cannot be reduced to an aggregation of individuals, but is system which 
consists of various expectations of how different problems should be resolved.176 
                                             
169 B Fisse & J Braithwaite “The allocation of responsibility for corporate crime: individualism, 
collectivism and accountability” (1988) 11 Syd LR 468 475.  
170 FA Hayek Individualism and the Economic Order (1948) 6.  
171 Fisse & Braithwaite (1988) Syd LR 476.  
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173 B Fisse & J Braithwaite Corporations, Crime and Accountability (1993) 19.  
174 Fisse & Braithwaite (1988) Syd LR 477. 
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Dodd reiterated that a company should be more than a mere aggregate of 
individuals.177 Traditionally, the law regards a company as a separate legal entity. 
However, it is believed that its entity character is conferred to it by the state, which 
“magically produces a e pluribus unum”.178 Even in Viscount Haldane’s rhetoric on the 
nature of a corporation, it is found that a company is referred to as an abstraction and 
a creature of statute. These idiosyncrasies of a company as a fiction have been 
criticised by legal scholars such as Dodd, who argue that a company should be viewed 
as it really is. From the nature of the company, it is more than a mere aggregate of 
individuals, and not merely a fiction of law. Thus, it is a real entity with an essence 
different from the individuals comprising it.179 
2 3 Modern organic theory 
Due to the shortcomings found in the fiction theory, particularly in holding 
corporations liable for unlawful acts (either for criminal transgressions or delicts), an 
alternative theory of corporate personality was developed in the late nineteenth 
century.180 The modern organic (or real entity) theory is based on the premise that 
legal entities are not fictions, but should be regarded as “real” beings. Otto von Gierke, 
one of the leading advocates of the modern organic theory, was strongly opposed to 
the Roman theory of the persona ficta, and rather opted for the old Germanic concept 
of the reality of the collective entity.181 In contrast to the fictionists, who denied the 
reality of collective or corporate will,182 Von Gierke argued that the “reale 
Gesammtperson” is capable of forming an independent will and conduct.183 Maitland, 
who translated Von Gierke’s works into English and introduced these realist thoughts 
to the Anglophone world, stated the following regarding the real entity theory:184 
“[The corporation] is no fiction, no symbol [...] no collective name for individuals, but 
a living organism and a real person, with body and members and a will of its own. 
Itself can will, itself can act [...] It is not a fictitious person [...] It is a group-person, 
and its will is a group-will.”  
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Therefore, both Maitland and Von Gierke argue that corporations are real beings 
capable of real volition.185 The writings of these scholars are regarded as the first 
generation of entity theory. A second generation of entity theorists opposed the notion 
of a “supra-individual geist”.186 It was argued that the corporate entity is not a rational 
being and could have no will.187 This reasoning is similar to the premise of the orthodox 
fiction theory, that the proposition “A corporation is a person” is either a metaphor or 
legal fiction.188 However, Machen elaborates further that despite corporate personality 
being a legal fiction, the entity itself is not.189 In this sense, Machen concedes to the 
reality of corporate entities, but denies that the entity has personality.190 While 
Machen’s statement that personification is a mere metaphor, it did not accommodate 
the view that certain autonomous powers and rights vested in corporations.191 Machen 
commented that guilt is personal, thus it is impossible for a corporate body to be 
associated with it. Furthermore, though rights are attributed to the company, the 
company is merely a vehicle to ultimately assign those rights to the humans 
comprising the company.192 Mark argues that Machen’s assertion is rooted in the 
partnership analogy, which regarded a corporation as nothing more than its 
corporators and their benefit.193 Similarly to the reasoning of the partnership analogy, 
the proposal that personification of a company is solely a metaphor is flawed.194  
Many scholars have viewed corporate personality as the legal relationships which 
are generated by the material operations of the company.195 This proposed a less 
anthropomorphic analysis of a corporation by looking at the corporation’s structure, 
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especially its management, to determine corporate will.196 According to Mark, the real 
entity theory was legitimated and strengthened by the ascendance of management.197 
By virtue of the fact that a corporation is distinct from its members, it should be 
recognised that its mind is distinct from the minds of its members.198 Practically, the 
mind of the company is seated at the top of the hierarchical structure, namely the 
board of directors and senior management.199 Although the real entity theory was not 
as successful in common law countries as in continental jurisdictions, courts in 
England and Wales and the United States increasingly incorporated the theory into 
their judgments. In the landmark Salomon case, which upheld the separate legal 
personality and limited liability of a company as the cornerstone of corporate law, the 
House of Lords found the company’s existence to be “real”, thus rejecting the notion 
that it was nothing more than a myth or fiction.200 Salomon has been described as a 
“watershed decision” that changed the course of the way English jurists thought about 
a company.201 Even in the South African context, the Salomon case is fundamental to 
the structure of company law, therefore it is imperative that the development of the 
modern organic theory remains relevant in the study of corporate personality.   
Once it was accepted that a company was a real entity rather than a legal fiction, it 
was consequently asked what animated the company and how the company was 
controlled.202 Furthermore, due to the departure from the fictional or artificial nature of 
a company, the modern organic theory offered the possibility to hold a company 
(criminally or delictually) liable for unlawful conduct.203 
The modern organic theory describes the relationship between the board of 
directors and the general meeting as a structural one, for these two bodies are 
regarded as the “organs” of the company.204 In its relationship to the general meeting, 
                                             
196 Mark (1987) U Chi L Rev 1474.  
197 Freund describes the “notion of undivided control over property within a corporation” as the essential 
function of management in a corporation. Due to the nature of corporate relationships, the usual link 
between ownership and control does not exist, for the shareholder renounces control over corporate 
property and is freed from the responsibility of how control is exercised. In its place, one finds 
management. Mark (1987) U Chi L Rev 1474.  
198 HJ Laski “The Personality of Associations” (1916) 29 Harv L Rev 404 415. 
199 Mark (1987) U Chi L Rev 1475.  
200 As per Lord Halsbury at 30.  
201 S Watson ”How the company became an entity: a new understanding of corporate law” (2015) 2 JBL 
120 136. 
202 Watson (2015) JBL 136. 
203 Petrin (2013) Penn St L Rev 12.  
204 Blackman Fiduciary doctrine 2.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 32 
the board functions as a federation rather than a subordinate or superior, however, 
the board is the primary organ of the company.205 If a director assumes office, she 
becomes part of the structure of the company, which in turn gives rise to the fiduciary 
duty.206 Therefore a director or the board is given certain powers to act on behalf of 
the company, because an undertaking to act has been made.207 According to 
Blackman, it is necessary that these powers are exercised for the benefit of the 
company. However, he argues that such reconciliation is only found if the organic 
theories are prevalent.208  
The idea that a corporation is distinct from its members encourages a similar 
reasoning that its mind is distinct from the minds of its members.209 The corporate 
mind is normally found in the management hierarchy and not in the shareholders. 
Shareholders merely invested in a corporation and subscribed to the unity of a single 
corporate mind. Regarding the management hierarchy as the corporate mind is found 
on the principle of representation as a basis for all corporate action. Due to the 
development of large modern entities, the continuing joint control of corporate property 
became impossible. As a solution, the shareholder majority appointed representatives 
to manage the affairs of a company. The human beings in a corporation merely act as 
its instruments, acting in pursuit of the corporation’s purpose and determining how to 
interpret its purpose. It has been held that a change in management structure would 
not necessarily effect a change in operations. Likewise, a change in shareholders 
would not change the entire structure of the entity.210  
Although the organic theory acknowledges the “real” existence of a company by 
likening it to a living organism, it does not adequately address the dilemma that a 
company cannot act by itself.211 The acts of certain high-ranking individuals within the 
company were attributed to the company, which resulted therein that corporate 
criminal liability could be imposed. Nevertheless, because a legal entity could only act 
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through its organs, it solely relied on the unlawful conduct of said organs. As a result, 
the conduct of lower-level employees was insufficient to ascribe corporate criminal 
liability, because they were not considered to be organs.212 Due to the importance of 
the seniority of the person committing the offence, the real entity theory was still an 
inefficient model of corporate personality to impose corporate criminal liability. 
3 From nature to function 
According to Petrin the century old theories relating to the nature of the firm still 
pervade important areas of contemporary company law.213 Moreover, a renaissance 
in the traditional theories suggest that the principles, specifically of the real entity 
theory, are well suited to address contemporary legal problems.214  
However, the trichotomy of the reality-fiction-aggregate debate in both civil and 
common law jurisdictions, has led to some scholars arguing for a different theoretical 
approach.215 It is argued that the traditional theories of the firm should incorporate the 
economic aspects and functions of legal entities, instead of focusing solely on the 
nature of the firm. Therefore, the debate surrounding the nature of the firm was partly 
silenced by a functional approach to corporate entity theory in the 1970s.216 The most 
notable theory to emerge from this period is the nexus of contracts theory of 
corporations, which was originally theorised by Ronald Coase in his seminal work The 
Nature of the Firm.217 Jensen and Meckling further developed the image of a firm as 
a nexus of contracts.218 The nexus of contracts theory  states that a firm is an economic 
entity, which serves as a single contracting party that coordinates the activities of 
suppliers of inputs and the consumers of products and services.219 Although the nexus 
of contracts theory is regarded as a step towards a functional approach in corporate 
law theory, it still shows elements of both the traditional fiction and aggregate 
theories.220 The remnants of the traditional theories are evident in the references to a 
firm as a construct of explicit and implicit contracts between its constituencies, as well 
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as its portrayal as an aggregate of various inputs producing goods and services 
collectively.221 Furthermore, the view of a legal entity as a fiction is centralised by this 
theory, for the fiction is the nexus, which is at the core of the interwoven explicit and 
implicit contracts.222  
Petrin argues that the modern theories of the firm focus exclusively on corporate 
governance issues which arise between shareholders and directors.223 These theories 
assume that non-corporate laws will govern corporate responsibility with other 
stakeholder groups, for example employees, creditors and the environment. 
Accordingly, these modern theories, particularly the nexus of contracts, fall silent 
regarding to corporations’ rights and duties.224 However, the nexus of contracts does 
voice an alternative to the general silence with regards to the beneficiaries of corporate 
activities. Shareholders are regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the corporation 
and directors’ (and managers’) prerogative should be to maximise shareholders’ 
wealth, unless they are given a different directive from shareholders. The 
contractarians advance the shareholder primacy model, whereby other stakeholders’ 
interests are disregarded. Moreover. corporate social responsibility and other moral 
duties are often denied by contractarians, due to the fictional nature of the firm which 
precludes any such obligations.225 However, if defined rights and duties were 
attributed to legal entities in terms of the nexus of contracts model, it would be 
unsustainable. The reason being, that the nexus itself is nothing more than the web of 
interconnected individuals based on their contractual relationships and any additional 
rights or liabilities cannot be imposed on the nexus.226 Any rights and duties are borne 
by the individuals or constituencies who form part of the nexus, which reiterates the 
contractarian model’s reliance on the traditional fiction and aggregate theory.227  
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The problem with the nexus of contracts theory is that it disregards the complexities 
of a company.  The contract is reduced to nothing more than a sophisticated contract, 
which is “descriptively inaccurate and intellectually incoherent.”228 
3 1 Theoretical influence on corporate rights and duties 
Although South African company law is deeply rooted in English law, the influence 
of the United States should not be undermined.229 With regards to the development of 
the theory of corporate personality, adherence should be given to the Anglo-American 
view of the corporate entity. 
The traditional theories of corporate law, namely the fiction, aggregate and reality 
theory, have a strong hold on modern day corporate law.230  In the realm of 
constitutional law, the United States Supreme Court has in various cases held, that a 
corporation was akin to a real person and should therefore be warranted certain 
constitutional rights.231  Recently in Citizens United v Federal Election Commission,232 
(“Citizens United”) the Supreme Court opted to strike down the legislative provisions 
relating to corporate election contributions based on the modern organic and 
aggregate theories. It was held that a corporation is also entitled to political speech 
rights, stating that a corporation could be regarded as an association of individuals, 
thus emphasising that a corporation is akin to an individual in this regard.233 In Burwell 
v Hobby Lobby Stores Inc234 the scope of a corporation’s religious rights had to be 
determined. Following a similar reasoning to Citizens United, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that corporations are legal fictions, for it is merely an organisational form 
used by individuals to achieve a desired purpose. Therefore, the purpose of imposing 
constitutional rights on a corporation is to protect the individuals comprising it.235 This 
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reasoning, however, seems fundamentally flawed, for it disregards one of the 
principles of company law, namely separate legal personality and limited liability.  
Petrin argues that the need for corporate social responsibility is based on the real 
entity theory.236 This notion that the fiction theory is incapable of advocating corporate 
social responsibility originated in the scholar Merrick Dodd’s writings.237 In order to 
address the disparities in the shareholder primacy model, directors or managers could 
depart from maximising shareholder wealth and pursue a broader societal interest. 
Although this idea seems to be in conflict with the original nexus of contracts theory, 
England has sought legislative reform to incorporate a broader stakeholder approach. 
The Companies Act 2006 includes a statutory duty of directors to also promote the 
success of the company. This includes an obligation to have due regard for the impact 
of the company’s activities on employees, the local community and the 
environment.238 Although this is an innovative legislative step, the application of these 
broader fiduciary duties seems to be unclear. 
3 2 Contemplating a balancing approach? 
Due to the inconsistent application of the fiction-aggregate-reality trichotomy, as 
well as the inefficiency of the modern approach, Petrin envisages a novel functional 
approach to corporate personality.239 The traditional approaches have often led to a 
debate about nothing, for the nature of the firm cannot be thoroughly explained in any 
theory. Therefore, the question “what is a corporation,” has proven to be one of 
endless discussion and little certainty. Although legislators, courts and academics 
seem to use this question as point of departure, the outcome is often inconsistent. The 
underlying values and policies of these traditional theories are regarded as arbitrary.240 
A new approach to conceptualising a firm is proposed; a balanced or functional 
approach which focuses on the function of a firm instead of its nature. It is argued that 
this approach is more flexible and suitable to determine corporate rights and duties 
than the traditional theories.  
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As a point of departure, the approach is still rooted in economic considerations, 
however, a broader social view is incorporated. Moreover, how the theory of the firm  
developed should not be exclusively applied in corporate law.241 Determining the rights 
and duties of a legal entity in relation to external parties should not be dictated by the 
“real” or “fictional” nature of the firm, nor the internal contractual relationship (as 
described by the nexus of contracts), instead the focus of the inquiry should be the 
broader economic and social function, purpose, and effects of the corporation.242 The 
functional approach is partially found in the realm of legal pragmatism or realism, for 
the scholar John Dewey advocated that a legal entity should be defined in terms of its 
consequences and the notion that it is a “right-and-duty-bearing-unit” constructed by 
law.243 The “law”, however, does not determine rights and duties in isolation and as a 
result, the functional approach goes further to identify specific elements and 
considerations used to conceptualise the firm.  In conceptualising the firm, the 
functional approach requires a two-stage inquiry: firstly, the economic function and 
secondly the social function of a firm needs to be determined.244  
3 2 1 Economic aspects 
In terms of the economic function of a firm, it is firstly an asset partitioning function, 
245 for the assets of the firm are separate from those of its shareholders and creditors. 
Secondly, it reiterates the limited liability which a company provides, or in other words 
the liability partitioning function. In this sense the shareholders are not liable for the 
debts of the company over and above the capital they originally invested.246 These 
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abovementioned attributes ensure that a company serves its economic function to 
maximise the wealth of shareholders by pursuing a profit-making goal.247 
Apart from these core economic attributes, Petrin argues that a company’s rights 
(whether constitutional, statutory common law based) should reflect the core 
economic function and purpose of the company.248 If a company is awarded a 
constitutional right, for example a right to privacy, freedom of expression or freedom 
of religion, a sufficiently strong link to its economic function should exist.249  However, 
in the absence of such an economic link, specific non-economic rights could also be 
awarded to companies based on its social function and purpose.250 
Although a company enjoys certain rights, its corresponding duties should also be 
assessed. Economic analysis has suggested that it would be efficient to hold 
corporations liable for their criminal and delictual acts.251 According to Petrin, if 
companies are held liable for their criminal or delictual conduct, it would enhance loss 
prevention, lead to cost-internalisation and facilitate efficient risk-allocation.252 
Economic theory proposes that in order to reach optimal production capacity, goods 
and services should reflect their true cost on society. Thus, there should be an 
internalisation of business risks, whereby third-party liability (especially in the case of 
criminal offences or delicts) could be accounted for in the price structure of goods and 
services, so that unnecessary risks could be minimised to ensure cost-efficiency.253  
Moreover, corporate liability for crimes and delicts should not be limited to the 
conduct and will of senior management, but should be attributed from employees at 
all hierarchical levels of the company.254  In this sense economic theory is broader 
than real entity theory, because it does not distinguish between the status or seniority 
of a particular individual responsible for the wrongful conduct. The only matter of 
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importance is that the costs of all crimes and delicts are internalised.255 However, 
contemporary legal rules governing corporate criminal liability, as well as tortious 
(delictual) liability, are primarily based on the notion that a senior corporate official’s 
wrongful conduct is necessary to impose liability, which is rooted in both the fiction 
and real entity models.256  The reliance on the traditional models of attribution has led 
to legal scholars seeking judicial reform, because of inefficient mechanisms to hold 
corporations liable for either delictual or criminal conduct.257 If a functional approach 
instead of the traditional models is followed, the economic considerations (particularly 
the loss internalisation) would ensure a different methodology which would account 
for criminal and tortious conduct throughout the organisational structure is 
implemented.258 Although the economic considerations provide a mechanism to 
ensure that a cost structure is developed which would account for the total costs of 
torts (delicts) and crimes, the question arises if this model is sufficient to incentivise a 
behavioural change. Petrin argues that economic considerations are an important 
aspect of the firm, but should not be the exclusive function of the firm; its social function 
and purpose should not be underestimated.259    
3 2 2 Social aspects 
The social function is purported to serve the wider societal needs, while the 
economic function is focussed on the shareholder’s role in the company. In 
combination with the economic function, the social function forms an integral part of 
the inquiry to characterise the company.  Societal effects, which may be connected to 
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economic consequences, could either be positive or negative.260 Certain companies 
may have a broader impact on society, for example non-profit companies, therefore 
their primary purpose is to pursue non-economic interests. In the case of profit 
companies, the social function of a company is less evident for it does not relate to the 
company’s core purpose.  
The question of whether companies should have societal duties remains a 
contested issue. The functional approach does not endorse either side of the debate 
directly, however, with the increasing impact that large corporations have on society, 
the idea that social considerations should be included in corporate decision-making 
becomes apparent.261 The functional approach also encourages the notion of a 
minimum standard of corporate behaviour in relation to the public, as envisaged by 
Milton Friedman. Although Friedman stated that the only social responsibility a 
company bears is to increase profits, reiterating wealth maximisation as primary 
objective of the company, it also had to conform to the basic rules of society, whether 
it is regulated through law or ethical custom.262 
A broader approach to corporate duties has been advanced in certain jurisdictions. 
In Canada, the Supreme Court has held that directors may have an obligation to 
consider the impact on corporate stakeholders during decision-making.263 Directors 
should also act in the best interest of the corporation viewed as a good corporate 
citizen.264 In English law a statutory fiduciary duty rests on directors to promote the 
success of the company.265 An obligation to consider the impact of corporate conduct 
on a company’s employees, the community and the environment is included in this 
duty, which is a clear indication of the underlying influence of the stakeholder theory. 
South African legislation provides for the partial codification of the common-law 
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fiduciary duties in sections 75 and 76 of the Companies Act, although the primary 
beneficiary of these duties is the company.266 
3 2 3 Towards a balancing approach  
In determining the ultimate economic and social function of the company, a 
balancing approach is needed. It is important to bear in mind that the role of the 
functional approach is not to determine the nature of the firm, but instead its role or 
function in the wider societal context. Although economic considerations are the 
starting point of the analysis, the social function of a firm should not be undermined. 
The primary objective of the economic function is to protect a company’s economic 
rights, namely the liability and asset partitioning function, as well as the internalisation 
of business risks. On the other hand, the social function of a company is to incorporate 
a social dimension in the definition of corporate rights and duties.267  
The purpose of the functional approach is not to give clear-cut solutions to the legal 
problems, which academic writers, courts and legislators opt to solve by looking at the 
nature of the firm. This approach is not a solution in itself, but rather a more appropriate 
legal framework to analyse these problems.268  In criminal law, the functional approach 
would free courts and legislators from the restrictions of both the fiction theory and the 
real entity theory.269 Due to the reliance on the economic consideration to internalise 
the total cost of business activities and social considerations of public health and 
safety and environmental protection, a framework is created by which companies 
could be held liable for the misconduct of employees at all hierarchical levels.270 
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Especially in terms of crimes requiring mens rea, the functional approach would be an 
efficient means to ensure corporate criminal liability. In contrast to the traditional 
organisational theory, a company’s state of mind is independent from the collective 
state of mind of those individuals comprising the company if the functional approach 
is implemented.271 The approach offers the possibility to aggregate the states of minds 
of various corporate actors to determine the company’s own knowledge.272 Contrary 
to the traditional models of attribution which sought to hold a company vicariously 
liable for criminal conduct, the modern approaches offer an alternative for imposing 
corporate criminal liability directly. This alternative approach is deemed to be on par 
with modern corporate environments, as well as the complex decision-making 
structures within these entities. Previously, the intricate corporate structures in large 
companies made it impossible to pin-point a responsible individual whose misconduct 
could be attributed to the company.273 By establishing a model where the company’s 
own knowledge is used to impose criminal liability, the burden of establishing 
corporate mens rea is lightened. 
Petrin argues that a paradigm shift is needed to incorporate direct liability and 
accommodate the reality of modern corporate structures and decision-making.274 The 
inefficiency of the traditional theories stems from the fact that both the fiction theory 
and real entity theory are based on the assumption that corporations act through 
individual organs or agents, whilst the functional approach is not bound to these 
orthodox theories. Instead, the functional approach advocates the idea that a company 
should bear responsibility for the harm associated with its business activity, which is 
independent of individual misconduct and the notion that corporations are incapable 
of possessing mens rea.275  
In his concluding remarks, Petrin states that the economic and social factors 
comprising the functional approach are more concrete than the abstract theories 
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relating to the nature of the firm.276 In turn, this results in a more goal-orientated and 
transparent approach.  
4 Conclusion 
A company is awarded separate legal personality and is thus the bearer of rights 
and obligations. Although this is one of the cornerstones of company law, the specific 
juridical origin should not be negated for a self-generated abstraction. A purposive 
approach is necessary to determine the function of upholding the separate legal 
personality in a particular instance. Too often the separate persona or artificial nature 
of a company prevents the imposition of corporate liability.  
Following the rhetoric of case law, however, the theory of corporate personality 
remains relevant when determining corporate liability. The semantic question of “what 
is a corporation” is often regarded as the gatekeeper to ascertain whether corporate 
liability should be imposed. Nevertheless, the theories of corporate personality which 
underpin this question have led to unsustainable anomalies. Especially in the realm of 
corporate criminal liability, the corporate personhood theories have prevented efficient 
corporate punishment.  
Hart suggests that the focus should not be on the definition of a corporation, but 
rather what is meant by corporate personhood, thereby reiterating the possibility of a 
purposive or functional approach to corporate personality. If one shifts the focus from 
the nature of a company to rather identify under which circumstances corporate liability 
should be ascribed, the outcome may be more efficient. 
The most orthodox corporate personality is the fiction theory, which is premised on 
the artificial character of a company. Therefore, the will and conduct of a company can 
only be established by means of attribution. Traditionally, the fiction theory “protected” 
companies from corporate criminal liability, due to their absence of an inherent 
blameworthiness normally required for criminal liability. A further development in the 
abstract theory of corporate personhood, was the aggregation theory. Although this 
theory is dominant in the United States, a company cannot be reduced to an 
aggregation of individuals. There is a need for a holistic approach which addresses 
                                             
276 (2013) Penn St L Rev 53.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 44 
intricate modern organisational structures. Proponents of the realist theory argue that 
companies are moral agents with social and ethical responsibilities. 
Due to the fiction-aggregate-realist trichotomy, a purposive approach has been 
suggested which diverts from the nature of the firm to the function of the firm. Law and 
economics scholars have proposed that a company is a “nexus of contracts”, whereby 
the internal and external relationships are governed. Although this is a departure from 
the orthodox theory, the remnants thereof are still evident through reference to “legal 
fictions”.277  
A true departure from the limitations of the nature of the company analysis, is a 
functional approach which incorporates economic and social considerations, whereby 
corporate criminal liability could be imposed on a company.  As Petrin proposes, a 
functional approach will overcome the need to identify a responsible individual whose 
conduct and will can be attributed to the company. Nevertheless, the current legal 
framework suggests that attribution rules are integral in corporate liability. Whether 
these rules are still relevant will be explored in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 3: The corporate attribution rules revisited 
1 Introduction 
Due to the abstract nature of a company, it lacks the required actus reus and mens 
rea necessary to incur criminal or delictual liability. Nevertheless, there is a need to 
hold a company liable for its unlawful conduct.278 In order to address this dilemma of 
a company’s artificial nature, corporate law creates a legal framework by which the 
will and conduct of natural persons can be deemed to be that of the company. 
Typically, the conduct and will of a company are attributed by means of legal 
fictions.279 In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 
(“Meridian”)280 Lord Hoffmann emphasised the rules of attribution as a means to 
ascribe conduct and will to the company as follows:  
“A company exists because there is a rule (usually in a statute) which says that a 
persona ficta shall be deemed to exist and to have certain of the powers, rights and 
duties of a natural person. But there would be little sense in deeming such a persona 
ficta to exist unless there were also rules to tell one what acts were to count as the 
acts of the company. It is therefore a necessary part of corporate personality that 
there should be rules by which acts are attributed to the company. These may be 
called ‘the rules of attribution.’ The company’s primary rules of attribution will 
generally be found in its constitution, typically the articles of association [or 
Memorandum of Incorporation (“MOI”)]” [own insertion]281 
These persons whose conduct and will are attributed to the company do not act on 
behalf of the company in an agency relationship, but their conduct and will are that of 
the company itself. This mode of attribution is known as the directing mind or alter ego 
doctrine. Although the doctrine was initially developed in a civil law context,282 it has 
application in both civil and criminal jurisdictions.283 Especially where criminal or 
delictual liability requires a particular state of mind (mens rea, negligence, knowledge), 
the doctrine will be relevant. In the realm of corporate knowledge, the distinctions 
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between actual knowledge, constructed knowledge and imputed knowledge could be 
problematic.284  
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the rules of attribution 
and the relevance thereof in modern corporate law. 
2 Critique on the corporate attribution rules 
According to Worthington, there is a presumption that the rules of corporate 
attribution and agency are undisputed.285 The problem, however, is that with an 
increase in misbehaving corporate actors, the description and application of the 
relevant rules have become uncertain. Worthington states, that three problems with 
corporate attribution has arisen.286 Firstly, the so-called poignant issue of corporate 
attribution itself, particularly whose acts could be contributed to the company and for 
what purposes can those acts be deemed to be the company’s. For example, would 
an illegitimate purpose negate the attribution of an agent’s conduct to the company or 
would it be paramount in attributing corporate criminal liability? Secondly, the issue of 
actual authority creates uncertainty regarding the attribution rules. Lastly, the problem 
relating to ostensible authority and the appropriate legal response thereto if 
unauthorised employees intimate to third parties that a corporate contract has been 
properly concluded.  
Worthington argues that the main reason for uncertainty stems from the failure to 
address corporate form and to create a concise legal context for corporate attribution 
rules.287 With regards to the rules of attribution, Lord Hoffmann’s judgment in 
Meridian288 is paramount in classifying the rules of attribution as primary, general and 
special, as well as determining a company’s directing mind and will.289  
The crux of Worthington’s exposition of Meridian is found in the question of whose 
conduct or knowledge should be imputed to the company “for this purpose”.290 
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In answering this question, due regard should be given to the company’s separate 
legal personality, as well as the vital qualifier of “for this purpose”. Worthington states 
that the court’s reasoning in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liquidation) v Moore Stephens (A 
Firm) (“Stone & Rolls”)291 illustrates the importance of these questions in determining 
the directing mind and will of a company.292 
In the Stone & Rolls case, the company had a sole shareholder who was also the 
sole director of the company. The company was set up with the sole purpose of 
defrauding banks. Once the fraud had been discovered, both the money and the 
shareholder/director had disappeared. After the company was put into liquidation, the 
liquidator sued the auditors, Moore Stephens, for their negligent failure to discover the 
fraud earlier. In their defence, Moore Stephens relied on the ex turpi causa illegality 
defence, claiming that the company could not benefit from its own illegal conduct, 
namely the fraud committed prior to liquidation.293  
The key question was whether Stone & Rolls had the intention to benefit from its 
own illegal conduct. The House of Lords held that the question was difficult and the 
final decision that the company could not sue its auditors was decided by a 3:2 split.  
The majority’s conclusion has been criticised for being a “perverse result”,294 as the 
auditors could escape liability for negligence to the detriment of the defrauded 
company and ultimately its creditors. Furthermore, Worthington states that it is 
impossible to discern a coherent ratio from the case. The focus of her analysis, 
however, is firstly how the court failed to recognise the framework issues relating to 
corporate attribution, namely upholding the company’s separate legal personality and 
secondly to give due regard to Lord Hoffmann’s vital qualification of “for this purpose” 
when applying the attribution rules.295 
2 1 Separate legal personality of companies 
The separate legal personality developed in the seminal case of Salomon v 
Salomon & Co Ltd (“Salomon”)296 is one of the cornerstones of modern company law. 
In turn, corporate attribution is the method of ascribing acts, knowledge and intention 
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to companies, therefore it demands due regard to the separate juristic existence of a 
company when imputing these attributes.297 
In the Stone & Rolls case, Worthington argues that the House of Lords neglected 
to appreciate the importance of separate legal personality in three instances: firstly, a 
special status had been ascribed to one man companies; secondly, considering the 
role and duties of auditors in such companies; lastly, determining the particular harm 
suffered as a consequence of the auditors.  
In the first instance, the question in Stone & Rolls was whether the company itself 
was seeking to benefit from its own illegal conduct. Reference to the attribution rules 
is necessary to answer this question, however, the rules would not change depending 
on the wrongdoing of those owning or controlling the company.298 Worthington argues, 
that if there were innocent directors or shareholders, the result would still be that the 
company could be held directly responsible for its own illegal conduct and could thus 
seek to litigate to its own advantage.299 Irrespective of this reasoning, the court still 
concluded that only a one man company should be precluded from litigating, as it is 
only in these type of companies who would be benefitting from their own illegal 
conduct. 
Ultimately, this reasoning is misaligned with the principles set out in the Salomon 
case, for a one man company does not equate to one man. Nor is the decision in 
Stone & Rolls one of piercing the corporate veil, but one of corporate attribution. The 
purpose of the attribution rules is to ascribe independent corporate acts to the 
company.300  
Secondly, the court’s disregard for the Salomon principle is found in its analysis of 
the auditors’ liability. In determining whether the company could sue the auditors for 
their breach of their duty of care and skill in both contract and tort, the court failed to 
draw a clear distinction between the company and the individuals comprising it. 
Inevitably, the court held that the company could not sue for the losses accumulated 
as a result of the auditors’ failure to adhere to their duty of care.301 
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Thirdly, the misappropriation of the separate legal personality lies in the 
assumptions made about the claim instituted by the company. The multiple frauds 
were reduced to a single “pipeline” fraud and thus the accepted notion was created 
that the company based its claim against the auditors on the original fraud against 
third party banks.302 The failure to regard the fraud as separate instances, led to the 
wrong emphasis, for the court considered the funds coming into the company and 
those flowing out to be the same fraud. This is not correct. The company claimed that 
the auditors failed to detect the fraud of the funds going out of the company and not 
those coming into the company. Following this reasoning, it is clear that the company 
was the innocent victim of the fraud and not the instigator of the corporate fraud, for 
there was no corporate benefit. 
It is evident, that the separate corporate personality should be upheld when 
applying the rules of attribution, thus the distinction between the company itself and 
the corporate actors should be maintained.  
Worthington continues her critique on the court’s decision in Stone & Rolls, by 
contextualising the rules of attribution to “for this purpose”, as originally qualified by 
Lord Hoffmann in Meridian.303 
2 1 1 Context and the rules of attribution 
As mention above, one of the key qualifiers for the rules of attribution, is for which 
purpose should a natural person’s conduct, knowledge and will be attributed to the 
company. Although a managing director might have broad knowledge within the 
company structure, for the purpose of a particular transaction, her knowledge might 
not be sufficient to be attributed to the company. Therefore, Worthington states that 
generalisations are impossible and the contextual analysis is pivotal.304  
However, in Stone & Rolls the emphasis fell on a generalisation of the rules of 
attribution and the context sensitivity of the rules ignored. The court held that the sole 
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director and shareholder was the directing mind and will of the company and 
accordingly his fraud could be regarded as the company’s fraud.  
Although there is a distinction between the primary, general and special rules of 
attribution, there is no “magic hierarchy”: they merely describe various way to identify 
a person whose acts would be attributed to the company within a specific context.305 
Furthermore, the liability which flows from attribution is a direct liability, thus it is 
different from its alternative, namely vicarious liability.306 
In addition, the Hampshire Land principle307 states that the knowledge of an agent 
is not attributable to the principal, if the knowledge relates to the agent’s own breach 
of duty to the principal.308 In Stone & Rolls the argument was made that the initial fraud 
could not be attributed to the company due to the Hampshire Land principle and thus 
the ex turpi defence raised by the auditors would not hold. This argument is flawed, 
as the purpose of the rules of attribution is that knowledge and will, irrespective of their 
legality, could be attributed to a company to ensure its compliance with the mens rea 
requirement.309 Simultaneously, if a person is being sued by their companies, they 
cannot escape liability by claiming that their own conduct, knowledge and will 
attributed to the company resulted in the company waiving liability.310 In Bilta, the court 
stated the following to this effect: 
“It is self-evidently impossible that the officer should be able to argue that the 
company either committed or knew about the breach of duty, simply because the 
officer committed or knew about it. This is so even though the officer is the directing 
mind and will of the company […] Any other conclusion would ignore the separate 
legal identity of the company, empty the concept of duty of content and enable the 
company’s affairs to be conducted in fraud of creditors”311  
2 2 Attribution versus authority 
The rules of attribution address the framework within which companies operate, 
whilst authority determines the finer mechanisms of the broad structure. Nevertheless, 
the central question for both attribution and authority remains the same, namely whose 
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acts are imputed to the company for that particular purpose. With regards to the latter, 
authority governs validity of contracting with third parties.  
Worthington raises the issue if a corporate actor would have actual authority to act 
in conflict with the company’s interests.312 According to the principles set out in 
Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties (Mangal) Ltd,313 a third party must 
rely on ostensible authority grounds and not actual authority. This is referred to as the 
orthodox or “no actual authority” approach.314  
In Hopkins v TL Dallas Group Ltd315 Lightman J held that if an act carried out by an 
agent is contrary to the interests of her principal, then the act will not fall within the 
ambit and purpose of the express or implied actual authority. As a result, the 
transaction will be void, unless the third party can rely on ostensible authority.316 
An alternative to the orthodox approach, is the “abuse of actual authority” approach. 
According to this approach, the act of an agent would not cease to bind a principal, 
even if the said conduct was fraudulent or in the agent’s self-interest, be it in 
accordance with actual or ostensible authority.317 
The problem with the orthodox approach, is that it creates a dichotomy between the 
internal and external relationships of the company. In the case of the internal 
relationships, the orthodox approach might hold, as there is a breach of duty between 
the principal and the agent. The dilemma stems from the question of whose conduct 
will be regarded as that of the company.318 Similarly to committing unlawful acts, 
companies may conclude contracts which are not in their best interest, and to which 
they will be legally bound.  
If the “abuse of actual authority” approach is followed, the confusion between the 
internal and external relationships may be solved.319 In terms of the external 
relationships, the question regarding authority will be limited to the scope of the 
individual’s role within the company.320 If the conduct is beyond the scope of the 
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individual’s authority, ostensible authority will be relevant. If the conduct is within the 
scope of an individual’s authority, but an abuse thereof, the company may seek to 
reprimand the individual internally.321  
The third problem Worthington addresses in her article, is that of ostensible 
authority.322 Recently, the dilemma of ostensible authority has also been relevant in 
South African law: first with the partial codification of the Turquand rule in section 20(7) 
of the Act, followed by two cases on the application of ostensible authority and 
estoppel, namely One Stop Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Neffensaan Ontwikkelings 
(Pty) Ltd (The CRL Trust as Intervening Creditor)323 and Makate v Vodacom (Pty) 
Ltd.324 These developments, however, are beyond the scope of this thesis and will 
therefore not be discussed in detail. 
3 Rules of attribution versus the rules of conferring authority and the rules 
of agency 
Being an artificial entity, a company cannot act itself; nor can it have a state of 
mind.325 However, due to its corporate personality, it is necessary for the law to 
attribute the acts and states of mind of certain natural persons to the company. The 
rules of attribution should be distinguished from the rules conferring authority and rules 
of agency. The relationship of a director to the company is quite similar to that of an 
agent.326 The most renowned example is the fact that a director acts for the benefit of 
another person, whether it be the company itself, its shareholders or other 
stakeholders, and not for the benefit of herself. However, if a director acts beyond her 
authority, she will incur liability.327 The analogy between a director and agent is not as 
strong in the current Companies Act, as presumed under the 1973 Act. Previously, a 
director enjoyed no original powers to act, but was confined to those powers conferred 
on her.328 Section 66(1) of the current Companies Act provides directors with original 
                                             
321 Worthington (2017) Law Q Rev 138.  
322 139.  
323 2015 4 SA 623 (WCC). 
324 2016 4 SA 121 (CC).  
325 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 4 2007) 4-123. 
326 R Cassim “Governance and the Board of Directors” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company 
Law 2 ed (2012) 400 412.  
327 Cassim “Governance” in Contemporary 412.  
328 412.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 53 
powers and duties, changing the position of the director in relation to the company 
considerably. 
According to section 66(1) of the Companies Act, the business and affairs of the 
company must be managed by or under the auspices of the board of directors. In turn, 
the board of directors has the authority to exercise all of the powers, as well as conduct 
any of the functions of the company, except to the extent that the Act or the 
memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise. Furthermore, a company has the 
same capacity as an individual, as stated in section 19(1) of the Companies Act, 
unless the memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise. Since the enactment of 
the Companies Act, the doctrine of constructed notice has been abolished, except to 
the extent that it applies to ring-fenced companies or personal liability companies. 
Therefore, one can assume that in the normal course of business, a company’s 
capacity will not be restricted. From this reasoning, one can deduce that the board of 
directors has the necessary power and authority to conduct the affairs of the company, 
due to the provisions in the relevant legislation.  
The company may also conclude service contracts with other employees to conduct 
certain transaction, and if duly authorised, their conduct will legally bind the 
company.329 In this instance, it might be difficult to determine whether it is an agent 
acting on behalf of the company or whether it is the company itself acting. However, 
under normal circumstances, the question would be irrelevant: if the person is acting 
as an agent, the principal (the company) will be bound, due to the law of agency and 
if the conduct is perceived as that of the company, it will be bound as it has the 
necessary contractual capacity.330 
Given these two theories regarding the nature of the acts of these persons, be it in 
a principal-agent relationship or as direct attribution, the result will not always be the 
same. In certain circumstances, the company will only incur liability if the acts of certain 
people are regarded to be that of the company.331 Especially in the case of corporate 
criminal liability, this distinction becomes relevant. According to Blackman, the 
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doctrine of vicarious liability has no place in criminal law.332 Thus, if the principal-agent 
theory is followed in the context of criminal law, the company will not incur criminal 
liability for the acts committed when acting within the scope of the company’s business 
affairs. Similarly, a principal will not be held vicariously liable for the delicts committed 
by its agents. In this sense, the agency theory fails to ensure that companies are held 
liable for their unlawful conduct. Lastly, if the law specifically provides that a person 
will only be contractually bound if she concludes the contract herself, a company will 
not be bound based on the agency theory.333 
The leading case on attribution rules, is Meridian, where Lord Hoffmann states the 
following: 
“The company’s primary rules of attribution will generally be found in its constitution, 
typically the articles of association, and will say things such as ‘for the purposes of 
appointing members of the board, a majority vote of shareholders shall be a decision 
of the company’ or ‘the decisions of the board in managing the company’s business 
shall be the decisions of the company’. There are also primary rules of attribution 
which are not expressly stated in the articles but implied in company law, such as 
‘the unanimous decision of all the shareholders in a solvent company about anything 
which the company under its memorandum of association has power to do shall be 
the decision of the company’.” 334 
However, Blackman concludes that the dicta of Lord Hoffmann is not correct.335 
Lord Hoffmann is confusing the fundamental question of whether a company should 
be bound by a transaction, thus if the company has the authority and capacity to enter 
a contract, with whether the acts of those persons acting to be attributed to the 
company itself, thus should there be a direct mode of attribution or are they acting 
according to the agency theory. There is a nuanced difference between the primary 
rules of attribution to which Lord Hoffmann refers and the direct rules of attribution. 
The rules of a company’s constitutional documents are power-conferring rules and not 
rules of attribution.336 
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Furthermore, the common law doctrine of ‘unanimous assent’337 is another example 
of a power-conferring rule. According to the unanimous assent rule, if all shareholders 
agree to something that the majority could have decided upon formally in a general 
meeting, by passing an ordinary resolution to that effect, their unanimous assent would 
be binding on the company. Having the same effect as an ordinary resolution passed 
at a general meeting, it is important to note that these resolutions to not constitute acts 
or states of mind, but are merely binding decisions on the company in an informal 
manner.338 Nevertheless, the unanimous assent rule is often confused with the 
directing minds doctrine. Especially in Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Co v 
Multinational Gas and Petrochemical Services Ltd (“Multinational Gas”),339 the court 
held that if shareholders unanimously assent to a matter, a state of mind is attributed 
to the company, thereby the company itself gives consent.340 This notion is in conflict 
with the separation of powers provided for in a company’s constitutional documents, 
as well as section 66(1) of the Companies Act, which provides that the business and 
affairs of the company are managed by the board of directors. In this instance, it is the 
rules governing the powers of a company and not the acts or state of mind of the 
company that is in question.341 
3 1 The rules of attribution versus the rules of agency explained: 
To illustrate the confusion between the rules of attribution and those of agency, it is 
necessary to refer to Meridian once more: 
“These primary rules of attribution are obviously not enough to enable a company to 
go out into the world and do business. Not every act on behalf of the company could 
be expected to be the subject of a resolution of the board or a unanimous decision 
of shareholders. The company therefore builds upon the primary rules of attribution 
by using general rules of attribution which are equally available to natural persons, 
namely, the principles of agency. It will appoint servants and agents whose acts, by 
a combination of the general principles of agency and the company’s primary rules 
of attribution, count as the acts of the company. And having done so, it will also 
make itself subject to the general rules by which liability for the acts of others can be 
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attributed to natural persons, such as estoppel or ostensible authority in contract and 
vicarious liability in tort.” 342 
Although the primary rules of attribution are supplemented by the general rules of 
attribution, such as the law of agency, estoppel, ostensible authority and vicarious 
liability which apply to natural and juristic persons, it might be necessary for special 
rules of attribution in exceptional cases if the primary and general rules do not amount 
to imposing liability on corporations.343 Especially in the realm of criminal law, there is 
a need for special rules of attribution,344 but as stated in Meridian, the special rules 
are a matter of “construction rather than metaphysics”.345  
In Meridian, the Privy Council was overly cautious in emphasizing the need for 
interpretation and that liability would not extend beyond the directing mind and will of 
the company: 
“…[we] would wish to guard [ourselves] against being understood to mean than 
wherever a servant of a company has authority to do an act on its behalf, knowledge 
of that act will for all purposes be attributed to the company. It is a question of 
construction in each case as to whether the particular rule requires that the 
knowledge that an act has been done, or the state of mind with which it was done, 
should be attributed to the company”346 
Especially in the case of regulatory offences, there is a need to attributed the state 
of mind of a lower level employee who is authorised to act for the company will be 
readily attributed to the company for the purposes of criminal liability.347  
A company always has the authority to appoint an agent to act on its behalf, and if 
the agent acts within the scope of her authority, the company will be bound.348 The 
question as to whether the act should be regarded as an act of the company itself or 
that of an agent, is a completely different matter. As a rule of thumb, the acts of an 
agent are not attributed to the company. However, a company may incur vicarious 
liability, based on the principle whereby knowledge is imputed to the company by 
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means of the rules of agency and not the directing mind doctrine.349 This would occur, 
where an agent has a duty to acquire the knowledge in question for the company. 
Vicarious liability could also arise by way of delictual acts committed by employees 
during the scope of their employment, even if it was the employee’s sole benefit.350 
Despite Blackman’s view that vicarious liability in criminal law is impossible, section 
332 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that, for the purposes of holding a 
company criminally liable, an act committed with or without a particular intent by either 
a director or servant of such a company in the scope of their employment or in 
furthering or endeavouring the interests of the company, must be deemed to have 
been the conduct (with the same intent, or lack thereof) of the company itself.  
4 The application of the directing mind doctrine 
The question of when to apply the directing minds doctrine is not always clear. 
According to the dicta of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian, the rules of attribution will only 
apply if there is rule which applies to a natural person and the state of mind of that 
person. In criminal law, where the actus reus and mens rea of the defendant herself 
is relevant, these rules of attribution will apply.351 
Deduced from the judgment in Meridian, is that as a general rule, the board of 
directors and the managing director act as the representatives of the company and 
only if the company cannot be held liable under this theory, the rules of attribution will 
be invoked to hold the company liable.352 By following this approach, the impression 
is given that the judiciary has the first opportunity to decide whether a company should 
be liable or not. If it is decided that a company should be held liable, a court will first 
consider the rules of agency, where after the rules of attribution will be considered.  
According to Blackman, it is submitted that the rules of attribution be applied if the 
conditions set for their application are present.353 Whenever the acts and states of 
mind are those of the directing mind of the company, the rules of attribution should be 
applied. Therefore, the rules of attribution should not be a default alternative 
mechanism if the rules of agency do not amount to corporate liability. If directors 
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transact on behalf of the company, the company itself should be regarded as the 
transacting party, whereby the agency theory is abandoned altogether for purposes of 
determining company liability.354 Although the result of holding the company liable will 
be the same, the rules of attribution offer a more consistent theory of determining 
corporate liability. In order to understand is mechanism of imposing corporate liability, 
one could once again refer to the dicta of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian: 
“One possibility is that the court may come to the conclusion that the rule was not 
intended to apply to companies at all: for example, a law which created an offence 
for which the only penalty was community service. Another possibility is that the 
court might interpret the law as meaning that it could apply to a company only on the 
basis of its primary rules of attribution, i.e. if the act giving rise to liability was 
specifically authorised by a resolution of the board or a unanimous agreement of the 
shareholders. But there will be many cases in which neither of these solutions is 
satisfactory; in which the court considers that the law was intended to apply to 
companies and that, although it excludes ordinary vicarious liability, insistence on 
the primary rules of attribution would in practice defeat that intention. In such a case, 
the court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular substantive rule. 
This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was intended to apply to a 
company, how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or knowledge, or state of mind) 
was for this purpose intended to count as the act etc of the company? One finds the 
answer to this question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into 
account the language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy.”355 
Conduct or will should only be attributed to the company when legislation expressly 
or implicitly requires a court to do so. Hence, the question should not be one for 
company law at all. Blackman argues that no company law doctrine of the directing 
mind exists, for the rules of company law that impose liability on the company are 
based on the rules of agency, thus contractual and delictual liability are imposed on 
the company if, according to the rules of agency, one person is liable for the acts of 
another.356 
Despite Lord Hoffmann’s attempt to create certainty regarding when to apply the 
rules of attribution, the legal application thereof remains precarious.357 Firstly, the 
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doctrine described by Lord Hoffmann is contrary to authority on the matter.358 
Furthermore, the position is unclear if there is no statute to interpret, as well as if the 
company has committed a delict or common-law crime. Moreover, where the directors 
themselves commit the crime, it is uncertain if the company should still be held liable, 
as their conduct would not have been authorised. Would it then be necessary to 
determine legal disciplines other than company law, to determine whether these acts 
and states of mind could be attributed to the company?359 
The rules of attribution apply to a company’s external relationships, thus in the 
company’s dealings with third parties. In the case of internal relationships, the doctrine 
relating to the rules of attribution will not be relevant. In R v Gomez,360 the court held, 
that where a company is accused of a crime, it is the conduct and will of those who 
are deemed to be the directing minds of the company, whose will and conduct are 
attributed to the company. In the case where those acting as the directing mind and 
will of the company are accused of criminal conduct, there is a distinction between 
their conduct and that of the company. Similarly, a person cannot circumvent fraud 
charges, based on the assumption that if such a person acts as the directing mind and 
will of a company, the company will be deemed to have full knowledge of the relevant 
facts and it could thus not be deceived.361  
In Multinational Gas the directors of the company entered into certain contracts with 
the approval and consent of all shareholders. However, as a result of those contracts, 
the company suffered immense losses and was consequently placed in liquidation. Its 
liquidator sought to hold the directors liable for the losses suffered on the basis that 
they had been negligent in entering into the contracts. The Court of Appeal held that 
due to the shareholders consent and approval of the contracts, the shareholders had 
made the acts of the directors the company’s own conduct and thus nullified the 
company’s action.  
                                             
358 For example, the dicta of Viscount Haldane in Lennard’s on what the doctrine of the directing mind 
and will entails. 
359 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-129.  
360 1993 All ER 1 (HL) 40.   
361 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-129.  
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5 Determining the doctrine of the directing mind and will 
When determining the directing mind and will of a company, courts seek to identify 
the person or body who is in de facto control of the relevant operations of the 
company.362 Moreover, the directing mind and will of a company has to be a lawful 
directing mind and will.363   Implicit in this, is that the relevant legal rules should be 
adhered to. In terms of the previous Companies Act 61 of 1973, a company had to be 
formed for a lawful purpose.364  In English law, section 7(2) of the Companies Act 2006 
provides that a company may not be formed for an unlawful purpose.365 Although the 
current Companies Act does not explicitly have the same wording, the general purpose 
provision found in section 7 of the Companies Act, states that company law legislation 
should promote compliance with the Bill of Rights found in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996.366 One could interpret this provision to include that a 
company may only be formed and operate for a lawful purpose. Axiomatically, only a 
lawfully appointed board of directors can delegate authority to persons who will act as 
the controlling and directing minds of the company.367 
Servants or agents of a company would not normally be regarded as the company’s 
alter ego. It is usually the board of directors, managing directors or certain senior 
officials within the company, those involved in policy decisions and management 
functions, who are deemed to be the alter ego of the company.368 Lower-level 
employees merely act out instructions from above and if they are given some measure 
of discretion in performing their duties, the impact would be too trivial to regard them 
as the directing mind and will of the company.369 Normally, the directing mind and will 
can be found in a sub-committee of the board,370 as well as the managing director.371 
                                             
362 As stated in Lennard’s 705 713; Levy v Central Mining & Investment Corporation Ltd 1955 1 SA 141 
(A) 150. 
363 Gainsford NO v Gulliver’s Travel (Bruma) (Pty) Ltd 2009 JDR 0570 (GSJ); 2009 JOL 23787 (W) 
(“Gainsford NO”) para 90. 
364 B Galgut, JA Kunst, P Delport & Q Vorster Henochsberg on the Companies Act 61 of 1973 Vol 1 
Chapter IV 5 ed (SI 33 2011) 53. 
365 D French Mayson, French and Ryan on Company Law 34 ed (2017) 49.  
366 S 7(a).  
367 Gainsford NO para 90. 
368 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass 1972 AC 153 171; 1971 2 All ER 127 (HL) 132.  
369 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-130.  
370 According to the authors of Commentary, citing Secretary for Inland Revenue v Trust Bank of Africa 
Ltd 1975 2 SA 652 (A) and CIR v Nedbank Ltd 1986 3 SA 591 (A).  
371 Oatorian Properties (Pty) Ltd v Maroun 1973 3 SA 779 (A) 787; El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings plc 
1994 2 All ER 685 (CA) 705 (“El Ajou”); Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Mobile 
Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd and another 2010 3 SA 382 (SCA) 393 (“CNA”). 
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An ordinary director is typically not regarded as the directing mind, because she has 
no comprehensive power or authority.372  
Although certain positions are more susceptible to be regarded as the directing 
mind of a company, the directing mind need not always be that of the person or 
persons involved in general management and control of the company.373 Ultimately, 
the application of the directing mind doctrine calls for a contextual analysis of the 
circumstances. Blackman reiterates that the directing mind doctrine could be applied 
to different persons in respect of different activities.374 In CNA, the Supreme Court of 
Appeal referred to the decision in El Ajou and applied the decision in Canadian Dredge 
and Dock Co Ltd v R375 regarding who could be regarded as the directing mind and 
will of a company. It has been emphasised that the directing mind doctrine is not 
limited to a director of a company, but could be extended to any natural person who 
has the management and control in relation to the act or omission in question.376 
Therefore the person who has control and management at a particular point in time 
could be the directing mind for that specific purpose.377 
In Canadian Dredge the court held: 
“The act will be considered to be that of the directing mind as long as it is performed 
by the person in question within the sector of the company operation assigned to 
him by the company, which sector may be functional or geographic, or be the entire 
undertaking of the company. No formal delegation is necessary, nor does it matter 
that the directors are unaware of the activity in question nor, in fact, that the conduct 
had been expressly prohibited by the company.” 378 
In El Ajou Rose LJ broadened the scope of the directing minds doctrine, by stating 
the following: 
“First, the directors of a company are, prima facie, likely to be regarded as its directing 
mind and will whereas particular circumstances may confer that status on non-
                                             
372 El Ajou 705; CNA 393. 
373 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-130.  
374 4-130.  
375 1985 19 DLR (4th) 314 (SCC) (“Canadian Dredge”). 
376 CNA para 30.  
377 Simon NO v Mitsui and Co Ltd 1997 2 SA 475 (W) 526I-531A; CNA para 29; N Locke “The Approach 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal to the Enterprise Reality in Company Groups [Discussion of 
Consolidated News Agencies (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) v Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd and 
another 2010 3 SA 382 (SCA)]” (2012) 23 Stell LR 476 481.  
378 330-331. 
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directors. Secondly, a company’s directing mind and will may be found in different 
persons for different activities of the company.” 379  
These cases, however, should be read in context,380 for the different courts strive 
to determine whether it was the company which has spoken or acted to a particular 
effect through the voice or conduct of its human agents and should therefore be held 
liable or whether the conduct of the human agent was too far removed to be fairly 
attributed to the company. 
Following the judgment in El Ajou, it might be possible for a non-executive director 
to be regarded as the directing mind of the company, even though such a director is 
not typically involved in the day-to-day business of the company.381 Furthermore, if the 
act was beyond the authority of the person in question, it might still be regarded as the 
conduct of the directing mind,382 provided that the act is performed by the person in 
question within the sector of company operation assigned to that person, albeit 
functional or geographic, or the entire undertaking of the company.383 
Although the identification of the directing mind is primarily a constitutional question 
depending on the conferral of power by the memorandum of incorporation, 
determining the directing mind is not a purely formal analysis constricted to the 
founding documents of the company.384 The crux of the analysis, is to identify the 
person who is in actual control of the operations of the company or the relevant part 
thereof.385 Furthermore, although the company’s memorandum of incorporation could 
confer powers, it is necessary to determine how those powers are delegated and who 
ultimately exercises those powers. Therefore, it is possible that the directing mind and 
will of a company is not found in the director, but rather a senior manager or other 
employee who has control over a certain part of the company’s operations.386  
                                             
379 El Ajou 699. Hoffmann LJ at 706 reiterated the notion that different persons may be regarded as the 
directing mind and will of the company for different activities.  
380 CNA para 31.  
381 El Ajou 696.  
382 Canadian Dredge 331. 
383 Canadian Dredge 330.  
384 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-131.  
385 In MCI WorldCom International Inc v Primus Telecommunications Inc 2004 1 BCLC 42 (QBD) 58, 
the court referred to the “ultimate decision-taker” in ascertaining the directing mind of the company.  
386 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-131.  
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Once knowledge has been attributed to the company, it remains the knowledge of 
the company in subsequent stages of the transaction, even if the person originally 
identified as the directing mind is no longer part of the company.387 
The writers of Commentary argue that the conclusion of the decision in Meridian, is 
that the directing mind doctrine does not form part of company law, however, it has 
been submitted that the question before the court was much narrower, namely to 
which hierarchical level does the doctrine apply.388 In company law, the doctrine does 
not permit one to focus on lower-level employees. Nevertheless, if a particular statute 
provides for a broader analysis, it would be possible for a court to pursue broader 
application of the doctrine.  
In Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) (no 15): Morris 
v Bank of India (“Re Bank”)389 the court approached the rules of attribution in a slightly 
different manner, by stating that the question of attribution should be justified by an 
interpretation of the statutory provision in question, in other words the primary rules of 
attribution. Once these primary rules of attribution would defeat the policy behind the 
provision, the attribution would be applied according to the facts on a case by case 
basis.  
The court proceeded to list certain factors to ascertain if a person could be regarded 
as the directing mind and will.390 Firstly, the natural person’s importance or seniority 
in the hierarchy of the company; it is easier to attribute a senior managerial officer’s 
will and conduct than a low-level employee. Secondly, if there is a freedom to act 
according to the natural person’s own discretion in the context of a particular 
transaction and not the board’s, attribution is easier. Thirdly, the degree to which the 
board is informed, as well as the extent to which it was put on enquiry. The court stated 
that “the greater the grounds for suspicion or even concern or questioning, the easier 
it is to attribute, if questions were not raised or answers were too readily accepted by 
the board.”391 If there is a series of transactions, it would be easier to impute a person’s 
conduct and will as the directing mind of the company.  
                                             
387 El Ajou 706; Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-132.  
388 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-132.  
389 2005 2 BCLC 328 (CA) 360-1.  
390 Re Bank 361.  
391 Re Bank 361.  
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These factors stated in Re Bank were incorporated by the Supreme Court of Appeal 
in the CNA judgment, to determine whether certain employees could be regarded as 
the directing mind and will of the company.392  
Ultimately, the court in Re Bank identified an individual who had a large measure 
of responsibility within the company transactions, as well as independent discretion to 
determine whether to continue with a transaction or not.  With respect to the relevant 
transaction, the individual was the “relevant decision-maker,” as the board of directors 
had delegated the supervision of the transactions, as well as the final decision to 
proceed with a transaction to the individual in question. Thus, the board delegation 
was not a mere instruction to conclude a transaction, but greater responsibility and 
discretion.393 
Prior to Meridian, it seemed possible to reach an identical result by relying on 
company law principles in applying the doctrine of attribution. In addition thereto, by 
applying justice and common sense, in contrast to the policy of the provision in 
question, justice and good sense relied on in Re Bank.394 The confusion regarding the 
company law principles relating to the rules of attribution might stem from vagueness 
relating to these principles. For example, if the directing mind ceases to act in the best 
interest of the company, those acts cannot be attributed to the company. Accordingly, 
the doctrine does not apply if the relevant conduct is in conflict with the interests of the 
company and any benefit of the person is irrelevant. Similarly, if the person identified 
as the directing mind acts solely for personal benefit, the rules of attribution will not 
apply, even in the absence of any intentional harm.  
In Canadian Dredge, the court explained when the doctrine will not be applied: 
“Where the directing mind conceives and designs a plan and then executes it whereby 
the corporation is intentionally defrauded, and when this is the substantial part of the 
regular activities of the directing mind in his office, then it is unrealistic in the extreme 
to consider that the manager is the directing mind of the corporation, his entire energies 
are, in such a case, directed to the destruction of the undertaking of the corporation. 
                                             
392 Para 31.  
393 As determine by the court a quo, Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA (in liquidation) 
(no 15): Morris v Bank of India 2005 2 BCLC 328 (ChD) 351.  
394 Blackman et al Commentary (RS 3 2006) 4-133.  
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When he crosses that line he ceases to be the directing mind and the doctrine of 
identification ceases to operate.”395 
6 Conclusion 
The legal nature of the corporation, as well as the fundamental principle of separate 
legal personality must be maintained when applying the rules of attribution.396 As one 
of the cornerstones of company law, the distinction between the individual and the 
individual’s company should be maintained. Furthermore, there is no hierarchy among 
the primary, general and special rules of attribution as developed by Lord Hoffmann 
in Meridian. The fundamental question underlying these rules, is whose acts should 
be attributed to the company for the particular purpose? Ultimately, a contextual 
analysis should be followed when applying the rules of attribution. Corporate 
attribution seeks to identify whose acts should be imputed to the company; whether 
those acts are in breach of a person’s duty to the company is a separate question.397 
The rules of attribution are key to the operational structure of a company; thus, it is 
imperative that the basic principles are clearly understood and applied in case law. 
Moreover, the role of corporate attribution and agency rules should not be undermined 
in corporate regulation.
                                             
395 Canadian Dredge 351.  
396 Worthington (2017) Law Q Rev 142.  
397 143.  
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Chapter 4: Corporate criminal liability 
1 Introduction 
The need for corporate criminal liability has increased with an increase  in corporate 
crime.398 Whether it is to address corruption, environmental offences, tax evasion, 
collusion or corporate homicide, as a creature of statute there should be a means to 
regulate corporate entities.399 According to Wells, corporate criminal liability is 
characterised by three features: corporate personality, corporate responsibility and 
corporate culture.400 Firstly, corporate personality flows from the assumption that a 
company has a separate legal existence, thus acts as a legal person.401 Secondly 
corporate responsibility could be characterised as role responsibility, capacity 
responsibility, causal responsibility and liability responsibility.402 Finally corporate 
culture is indicative of a company as an autonomous actor in its own right, which 
transcends individuals’ contributions.403 
As a point of departure, companies are awarded legal personality. It should, 
however, be borne in mind that this construct remains an artificial one.404 Therefore, it 
can normally only act through authorised people, for example the board of directors. 
However, if a company commits a crime (which would not be authorised conduct), it 
becomes problematic to attribute will and conduct to the company.405 Moreover, as 
                                             
398 JM Burchell Principles of Criminal Law  5 ed (2016) 458. 
399 In South African law a complex regulatory regime has been developed whereby various corporate 
crimes are addressed, for example s 73A of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 imposes liability for 
collusion, s 24 of the National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998 (which address 
environmental authorization for property development), s 24 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 
85 of 1993 (which relates to injuries in the workplace and corporate homicide) and s 3 of the Prevention 
and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004.  
400 C Wells “Corporate Criminal Liability in England and Wales” in M Pieth & R Ivory (eds) Ius Gentium: 
Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 9 (2011) 91 94.  
401 The various theories supporting the construction of legal personality have been discussed in Chapter 
2.  
402 Role responsibility relates to the various roles that individuals play within an organisation, as well as 
the accompanying duties these roles impose. Capacity responsibility refers to the attributes necessary 
to deem a person a responsible agent, which could be problematic in corporate responsibility, for it 
assumes human consciousness. Causal responsibility is the link between role and capacity 
responsibility on the one hand and liability on the other. Liability responsibility is described as the raison 
d’etre for establishing the previously mentioned responsibilities. Wells “Corporate Criminal Liability” in 
Ius Gentium 95-96 
403 Wells “Corporate Criminal Liability” in Ius Gentium 96.  
404 R Cassim “The Legal Concept of a Company” in FHI Cassim (ed) Contemporary Company Law 2 
ed (2012) 28 31. 
405 F McAuley  & JP McCutcheon Criminal Liability (2000) 379. 
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creatures of statute, it would not be the intention of the legislature to permit criminal 
conduct. Nevertheless, the fault and conduct of its directors or employees are 
traditionally ascribed to the company to determine corporate criminal liability.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, there are two broad theories for corporate personality, 
namely the fiction theory and the realist theory. South Africa follows a derivative model 
of vicarious liability, which forms part of the individualist theory, whereby fault and 
conduct are imputed to ascribe criminal liability to a company, rather than a realist one. 
The derivative model is clearly illustrated in section 332 of the Criminal Procedure Act 
51 of 1977 (“CPA”), which generally governs corporate criminal liability in South Africa. 
This model has, however, been criticised as being too abstract and not catering for 
the intricate organisational structures of large modern corporations.406  
The identification model is the primary model of attribution in English law. The 
foundation of this model lies in the directing minds doctrine, whereby the corporation’s 
fault and conduct are imputed from the board of directors or those with the power to 
set corporate policy (for example prescribed officers).407  In this regard it is paramount 
that the person be regarded as an “alter ego” of the company.408 
This chapter will explore the various models of corporate criminal liability, with 
special reference to both the individualist and realist theory underlying corporate 
liability. The question to be answered is whether the South African model is on par 
with international trends and whether reform to a non-derivative model is needed. 
Moreover, the constitutionality of section 332(1) of the CPA will be analysed, following 
a similar rational to the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in S v Coetzee. 409 
The alternative models based on corporate fault found in English and Australian law 
will be discussed as viable alternatives for South Africa. These jurisdictions have opted 
                                             
406 L Jordaan “New perspectives on the criminal liability of corporate bodies” (2003) Acta Jur 48 48; PG 
du Toit & GJ Pienaar “Korporatiewe identiteit as die basis van strafregtelike aanspreek likheid van 
regspersone (2): die praktyk” (2011) 14 PELJ 98 98; Burchell Principles 461.  
407 A “director” is described in s 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (“Companies Act”). A “prescribed 
officer” is defined in s 1 of the Companies Act, read in conjunction with regulation 38, GN R 351 in GG 
34239 of 26-04-2011.   
408 In H L Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v T J Graham & Sons Ltd 1956 All ER 624; 1957 1 QB 159 at 
173 (“HL Bolton”) it is reiterated that a company could be compared to a human body, but certain 
employees only fulfil an instrumental function, whereas others (such as the directors or managers) 
represent the directing mind and will of the company and ultimately controls its actions.  
409 1997 3 SA 527 (CC) (“S v Coetzee”). 
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for an organisational model, focusing on corporate culture rather than the identification 
of specific individuals to ascribe liability onto the company.410  
Lastly, the deterrence theory will briefly be explored with reference to the efficacy 
of sanctions on corporate actors. 
2 Historical background to corporate criminal liability 
In a modern company, the board bears responsibility for policy decisions, as well 
as the general administration of the company. In South African law, section 66(1) of 
the Companies Act sets out the broad competencies of the board as follows: 
“The business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction 
of its board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of 
the functions of the company, except to the extent that this Act or the company’s 
Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise” 
Moreover, the memorandum of incorporation (“MOI”) of a company will provide for 
the appointment of a board of directors, set out the various powers vested in the board 
and usually confers the company’s capacity and authority to the board of directors.  
The day-to-day management, however, is usually delegated to the managing 
director or directors, either by way of board resolution or the MOI. According to Pinto 
and Evans411 these organs within a company are important for holding a company 
criminally liable. If one were to identify the acts of the company itself, these organs’ 
conduct will necessarily be attributed to the company.  
It is argued, that the recognition of a company as a legal person with rights and 
obligations led to the need for corporate criminal liability.412 Traditionally the maxim 
societas delinquere non potest413 precluded companies from being held criminally 
liable.414 This maxim was predominant in continental jurisdictions and influenced the 
South African scholars De Wet and Swanepoel. Since the late twentieth century, 
                                             
410 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 115.  
411 A Pinto & M Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 2 ed (2008) 14.  
412 Pinto & Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 15.  
413 Meaning “a legal entity cannot be blameworthy” according to EB Diskant “Comparative Corporate 
Liability: Exploring the Uniquely American Doctrine Through Comparative Criminal Procedure” (2008) 
Yale LJ 126 129.   
414 This notion that a company is incapable of bearing criminal responsibility was upheld by Von Savigny 
in System des heutigen römischen Rechts Vol II (1840). In South African law, De Wet did not support 
the idea of corporate criminal liability. Instead he followed the rhetoric of Von Savigny and argued that 
criminal liability should be restricted to individuals only. JC De Wet & Hl Swanepoel Strafreg 4 ed (1985) 
53-62.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 69 
continental jurisdictions, such as the Netherlands, Belgium and France, have 
incorporated the notion of corporate criminal liability.415 Nevertheless, the maxim is 
still upheld in contemporary German law. 416 On the other hand, in common law 
jurisdictions, the original rejection of corporate criminal liability was founded on the 
principle that a corporation is incapable of forming a will and acting accordingly. In the 
late 1800s, case law held that a company cannot act of its own accord, for it has no 
independent person; it is reliant on directors, who are the agents of the company.417 
Lord Chancellor Baron Thurlow described the dilemma as a lack of a “body to be 
kicked” or a “soul to be damned”.418 Holding a company criminally liable is 
challenging.419  Partly, due to the fact that a company remains an abstraction or 
metaphysical entity,420 and accordingly lacks the necessary guilty conscience 
necessary to commit a crime. This notion is in conflict with criminal law’s emphasis on 
an individualistic model of responsibility and punishment.421 Therefore, the required 
inherent blameworthiness which forms the cornerstone of criminal responsibility 
remains problematic in the case of corporate criminal liability.422  
Originally corporate criminal liability had limited application, extending to cases of 
public nuisance, criminal libel and a breach of statutory duty. The reason for the limited 
scope of corporate liability, was the rationale that a master should not be held 
criminally liable for the conduct of his servants, unless he sanctioned the conduct or 
aided and abetted the criminal acts. In R v Stephens423 Bramwell B stated that he 
                                             
415 PG du Toit  Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid en straftoemeting aan regspersone LLD Thesis 
Northwest University Potchefstroom (2010) 61. 
 
417 As stated in Ferguson v Wilson 1866 LR 2 Ch App 77 89 and quoted in Pinto & Evans Corporate 
Criminal Liability 17.  
418 As quoted in Burchell Principles 460.  
419 A company is awarded rights and duties in terms of private law, as stated in section 8(4) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”), but it lacks the necessary moral 
faculties needed for criminal liability. 
420 As stated in Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd 1915 AC 705 713 (“Lennard’s”) 
and The Pharmaceutical Society v London & Provincial Supply Association Ltd 1880 5 App Cas 857 
(HL) respectively.  
421 Traditionally, criminal law centralises around personal guilt. If the accused’s mental state cannot be 
determined, it seems that no criminal responsibility can arise. M Pieth & R Ivory “Emergence and 
Convergence: Corporate Criminal Liability Principles in Overview” in M Pieth & R Ivory (eds) Ius 
Gentium: Comparative Perspectives on Law and Justice 9 (2011) 3 4; Pinto & Evans Corporate Criminal 
Liability 18.  
422 Kemp et al Criminal Law 242. 
423 1886 LR 1 QB 702. 
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wanted to refrain from diverting from the general rule that a principal could not be held 
criminally responsible for the act of his agents.  
However, a need to develop corporate criminal liability beyond its limited application 
became apparent. Bearing the assumption that a company cannot think nor act for 
itself in mind, a method was sought by which the actus reus and mens rea of a 
company could be ascertained.424 Therefore, the courts developed various models to 
overcome the hurdle of an inapt moral compass.  
3 Two opposing theoretical views: the individualist versus the realist 
Originally, criminal law developed as a countermeasure to individual wrongdoing. 
Accordingly, the assumption is made that perpetrators are human in nature and can 
be held accountable for their immoral or illegal conduct.425 Consequently, the abstract 
nature of corporations is not in accordance with the basic principles of criminal law, 
which seek to reprimand blameworthy individuals.426 Due to the rapid development of 
corporate entities and the pivotal role they play in modern day society, the need arises 
to also hold them accountable. In the absence of a moral conscience, it is easier for 
such an entity to commit an offence, since in itself it has no knowledge of right or 
wrong. Therefore, in developing corporate criminal liability, due regard has been given 
to the various theoretical approaches to corporate personality.427  
The approaches to corporate criminal liability are found on a spectrum which varies 
from the nominalist or individualistic approach on the one hand, to the realist’s 
approach on the other hand.428 In terms of individualist theory, a company is merely 
constituted by individuals and their fault and conduct should consequently be imputed 
to the juristic person before any corporate criminal liability could arise. For this 
purpose, either the identification doctrine (also known as the directing mind principle) 
                                             
424 This view of corporate personality is known as the nominalist or fiction theory of corporate 
personality, which is founded on the principle that a company is nothing more than a legal construct. 
Von Savigny explains that juristic persons are merely products of law for legal purposes. It remains a 
collective of the individuals comprising the company and nothing more. If the company acts, it does so 
by way of human representation. Pieth & Ivory “Emergence and Convergence” in Ius Gentium 6.  
425 Kemp et al Criminal Law  241; Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 48.  
426 V Borg-Jorgensen & K Van der Linde “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: time for change? 
(Part 1)” (2011) 3 TSAR 452 453.  
427 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 453.  
428 Pieth & Ivory “Emergence and Convergence” in Ius Gentium 48-49; Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 48ff; 
Burchell Principles 460.  
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or vicarious liability as model is traditionally followed.429 A corporation remains an 
abstract or fictional being, which lacks a substantive individual identity and 
consequently independent corporate fault.430 
In terms of realist theory a company is regarded as a separate corporate entity and 
not an artificial embodiment of different individuals.431 Therefore a company has a 
unique legal (and possibly moral) existence.432 Affirmation of the unique attributes of 
a juristic person, is found in the promotion of corporate entities of themselves as 
distinct with individualistic features and distinguishing them in society from the humans 
associated with them.433 Fault should be founded on the corporate culture within the 
company and not pinned on a single individual's thoughts. Bearing in mind the intricate 
organisational structures within companies, it might be more rational to follow a holistic 
approach to corporate criminal liability.434 
Moreover, Foerschler is of the opinion that a corporation should be regarded as an 
intentional agent in its own right.435 In realising the corporate entity as an intentional 
agent of own accord, criminal liability should be based on a proper understanding of 
the nature of the decision-making process, as well as the internal structure within a 
particular entity.436 Once the organisational theory is considered, it becomes clear that 
the aggregation of individuals’ conduct and fault cannot amount to corporate criminal 
liability. Corporate conduct is not merely the summation of different decisions by 
various individuals, but rather an intricate mosaic of differing decisions, institutional 
                                             
429 These modes of attribution are known as the derivative models of corporate criminal liability. Jordaan 
(2003) Acta Jur 49; DM Farisani “The regulation of corporate criminal liability in South Africa: a close 
look (Part 1)” (2006) Obiter 263 265-266.  
430 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 50; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 453.  
431 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR  454.  
432 McAuley & McCutcheon Criminal Liability 379; PG du Toit & GJ Pienaar “Korporatiewe identiteit as 
grondslag van die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van regspersone (1): teoretiese grondbeginsels” 
(2011) 14 PELJ 33 33.  
433 Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 108; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 454.  
434 Fisse and Braithwaite argue that the two obstacles faced if one holds large modern corporations 
liable is firstly, that the individual accountability are undermined by prosecuting corporations rather than 
the individual wrongdoers. Secondly, in theory the sanctioning methods employed presupposes that 
corporations will use internal disciplinary systems to ensure individual accountability. Whether these 
mechanisms are sufficient to ensure its retributive effect is uncertain. Therefore, by merely paying a 
fine as means of a sanction does not warrant accountability or responsibility; it is an easy way out. B 
Fisse & J Braithwaite “The allocation of responsibility for corporate crime: individualism, collectivism 
and accountability” (1988) 11 Syd LR 468 468-469, B Fisse & J Braithwaite Corporations, Crime and 
Accountability (1993) 1-2; Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 107 
435 A Foerschler “Corporate criminal intent: toward a better understanding of corporate misconduct” 
(1990) Cal L Rev 1287 1302. 
436 Foerschler (1990) Cal L Rev 1302.  
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procedures and structures.437 Therefore, both the conduct and fault of the company 
should be evaluated from the perspective of the corporate culture in its entirety, rather 
than focussing on the individual pieces of the puzzle.  
Although the corporate conduct is imputed with reference to individual decision-
making, this should not be the sole consideration in determining liability. A corporation 
should be regarded as a collective entity and liability should be ascribed similar to the 
common purpose doctrine. Moreover, systemic failure rather than the default of 
individuals are often the causes of harm.438 
As mentioned above, a company has separate juristic personality;439 hence by 
ascribing criminal liability with reference to individual contribution and mind-set, the 
purpose of the separation is hindered. Lederman argues that the self-identity model of 
a corporation is based on the assumption that it has a set of values and morals, which 
could simultaneously influence and constrain the thinking and behaviour of the people 
within its framework.440 Thus the corporate identity of a company is distinguishable 
from the individuals’ embodying it; ascertaining the fault of juristic persons should be 
based on this identity rather than illogical modes such as vicarious liability.   
In applying the realist theory, it is necessary to determine what the corporate identity 
or corporate culture of a company is.  
3 1 The scope of corporate identity 
The corporate identity model is firstly founded on the principle that the unique 
identity of a juristic person would influence its adherence to legal rules.441 The King 
Code of Governance for South Africa 2016 (“King IV”) encourages responsible 
                                             
437 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 34.  
438 McAuley & McCutcheon Criminal Liability 379.  
439 s 19(1)(b) of the Companies Act.  
440 E Lederman “Models for imposing corporate  criminal liability: from adaptation and imitation toward 
aggregation and the search for self-identity” (2000-2001) 4 Buff Crim L Rev 641 686; Du Toit 
Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 114. 
441 Lederman (2000-2001) Buff Crim L Rev 690. 
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corporate citizenship442 and an ethical framework to promote this goal,443 whereby the 
unique corporate culture is confirmed. Even section 7 of the Companies Act, which 
relates to the objectives of the Companies Act, states that a company should promote 
adherence to the Bill of Rights, as entrenched in the Constitution.  In determining the 
company’s identity, reference should be made to the control and monitoring 
mechanisms set in place, along with the general ethos and working environment within 
the company.444 These factors could encourage the compliance with legal rules and 
regulations, but on the other hand negligent or capricious conduct might be promoted 
if the control mechanisms are not properly implemented. Whether adherence to the 
principles of King IV is sufficient to establish a law-abiding corporate environment 
remains uncertain; partly because the board of directors remains the focal point (and 
not the company per se) and partly due to the fact that it is regarded as soft law.445 
Corporate identity or culture is thus not found in the aggregation of the will and 
conduct of various individuals, but rather the unique attributes found in the internal 
structure of the company. This culture forms the core of the company and remains 
constant irrespective of any personnel changes: rather it shapes the frame of mind 
and conduct of its members. A company’s corporate identity can be determined with 
reference to the written or unwritten policy documents, custom, goals of the company, 
monitoring systems to ensure compliance and whether unlawful conduct is rewarded 
by the company. Furthermore, corporate decisions cannot be attributed by a directing 
mind, but are made in collaboration with differing levels of decision-making within the 
company.446 Often an offence is the likely result of a failure in the corporate structure 
in more than one section, which makes it impossible to pin the conduct on a specific 
                                             
442 King IV defines corporate citizenship as the recognition that an organisation plays an integral role in 
the broader society in which it operates, which on the one hand provides it standing as a separate 
juristic person with certain rights, but simultaneously it also has obligations and responsibilities. It also 
entrenches the fact that the broader society acts as a licensor of the organisation. By defining corporate 
citizenship, King IV builds on the King Code of Corporate Governance 2009 (“King III”), which stated 
that responsible corporate citizenship implies an ethical relationship between the company and its 
environment (including the socio-economic sphere). Although the underlying philosophy of King IV 
remains the same, it concretises this ethical relationship into rights and obligations.  
443 Principles 1-3. 
444 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 36.  
445 Soft law refers to the fact that King IV is not legislation, but merely a guideline to ensure proper 
corporate behaviour. Only if a company is listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, (“JSE”), do the 
rules of the JSE necessitate adherence to the principles of the King Code.  
446 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 57.  
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individual.447 Thus a systemic approach based on realism, would ensure that a 
company can be held liable.  
The identity of the juristic person could be determined and corporate behaviour of 
the entity is predictable. The model is analogous to an individual, since the entity 
chooses to conduct itself in a certain way, whilst being aware of possible liability. 
According to Lederman, the juristic person should still be susceptible to change – be 
it in altering its behaviour and conduct or attitude.448 
At the core of this model lies the fact that a company is governed by its traditions 
and corporate structure and not the constant influx of people. A change in 
management, or even other employees, would not bring about material changes in the 
structure of the company. Instead, the individuals within the company would adapt to 
adhere to the company’s goals. Their freedom is thus inhibited by the corporate policy 
and customs within the company. In contrast, the company’s identity remains 
constant.449 This approach is in line with the perpetuity of companies, thus their liability 
should not be limited to the constraints of human conduct or mens rea. 
If corporate criminal liability is founded in the realm of its organisational structure, 
the actors within the company would be encouraged to function within the legal 
framework.450 Furthermore, it clarifies what the company’s stance towards being a 
morally sound citizen is; one could argue that the ground-rules are laid down. Where 
these rules promote the disregard for legal order and regulations, the employees are 
expected to commit crimes in promotion of the interests of the company. One could 
argue that by fostering a culture of non-compliance, the company tacitly concedes to 
criminal behaviour of their employees. Therefore, the corporate culture is inextricably 
linked to an individual employee’s criminal conduct.451 If a company endorses risk 
loving behaviour, employees’ reckless conduct would be sanctioned, either expressly 
or tacitly. Due to the lack of personal responsibility within the company, the corporate 
decisions taken within the company could be immoral or illegal.452 In this regard the 
                                             
447 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 455.  
448 Lederman (2000-2001) Buff Crim L Rev 690. 
449 Lederman (2000-2001) Buff Crim L Rev 691.  
450 SM Kriesberg “Decision-making models and the control of corporate crime” (1976) Yale LJ 1091 
1100.  
451 Du Toit & Pienaar (2011) PELJ 37.  
452 C Parker “Compliance professionalism and regulatory community: the Australian trade practices 
regime” (1999) 26 J Law & Soc 215 227.  
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individualistic approach to corporate criminal liability hinders the accountability of a 
company, because a single individual’s conduct can neither be imputed to the 
company nor identified as the directing mind of the company. A company could escape 
liability and bad decision-making by means of a complex organisational structure.  
A further development in terms of realist theory, is the notion of reactive corporate 
fault.453 This stems from the idea that a company sanctions criminal behaviour, by 
failing to adopt reasonable remedial procedures in response to the acts or omissions 
of individuals within the company.454 Thus if the company fails to adopt any 
preventative or corrective measures, it could be deemed to reward the actus reus and 
as a result have reactive fault. Structural reform, internal disciplinary procedures and 
compensation are factors to consider in determining the reactive fault of a company.  
This approach requires a departure from the fundamental principles of criminal law 
and could result in uncertainty pertaining to which remedial procedures would be 
sufficient to escape liability.455 Despite the possible uncertainty, it might prove to 
supplement the current derivative approach to corporate criminal liability, as prevalent 
in South African law. 
4 Models of attribution 
There are two derivative models which form part of the realm of the individualist 
model, namely vicarious liability and the doctrine of identification.456 In order to 
understand the need to supplement the individualist model with the realist theory, 
these two derivative models will accordingly be discussed.  
4 1 Vicarious liability 
Although there remains a general rule that a person cannot be held liable for the 
crimes of another unless she authorised the commission or participated in some 
manner,457 South African law has opted for a general vicarious liability model to 
                                             
453 Fisse & Braithwaite (1988) Syd LR 511-522; Fisse & Braithwaite Corporations 47-49, 210-213.  
454 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 455.  
455 455.  
456 Pinto & Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 19.  
457 If one considers common law crimes, it would be irrational to impose vicarious liability for common 
law crimes, if a person was not party to the crime nor had any culpability. Therefore vicarious liability is 
restricted to statutory crimes, where the legislature expressly or by necessary implication imposes 
criminal liability on certain categories of people if they stand in a certain relationship, typically the 
employer-employee relationship. The only requirement is that the criminal conduct should fall within the 
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impose corporate criminal liability.458 This model is found in section 332 of the CPA, 
which provides a comprehensive framework designed to prosecute corporate 
offenders.459  
The rationale for imposing vicarious liability is that an employer will be encouraged 
to ensure that her employees’ conduct is compliant.460 Especially if an employer (in 
this case a company) were to benefit financially, it cannot hide behind an employee’s 
actions and not be prosecuted. Due to the risk it poses if responsibility is delegated, 
the conduct of employees should ultimately be imputed to the employer.461 As a juristic 
person, however, authority needs to be delegated to the board or other employees, 
but this would imply that lawful conduct is sanctioned and not necessarily criminal 
behaviour.   
By using vicarious liability as a derivative model of attribution, the obstacle of finding 
fault in an artificial being is removed.462 Section 332 of the CPA uses this model to 
attribute criminal conduct and will to companies.  
4 1 1 The South African solution: section 332 of the CPA 
If one considers the wording of section 332 of the CPA (especially subsection (1)), 
the vicarious liability approach is confirmed. It reads as follows: 
(1) For the purpose of imposing upon a corporate body criminal liability for any 
offence, whether under any law or at common law- 
(a) any act performed, with or without a particular intent, by or on instructions or 
with permission, express or implied, given by a director or servant of that 
corporate body; and 
                                             
scope of employment or further the interests of the employer. This would safeguard an employer from 
criminal liability for a rogue employee. CR Snyman Criminal Law  6 ed (2014) 242.  
458 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 49; CN Nana “Corporate Criminal Liability in South Africa: The Need to 
Look Beyond Vicarious Liability” (2011) 55 JAL 86 86; C Van der Bijl “Corporate ‘assault’: bullying and 
the aegis of criminal law (Part 2)” (2014) 4 TSAR 760 760. 
459 S v Coetzee  para 18. 
460 Snyman Criminal Law 242.  
461 Burchell argues that vicarious liability is a principle which is sound in the law of delict, but its 
application in criminal law is a “fundamental negation of the principle that criminal liability is based on 
individual fault (mens rea)”. Therefore, the same policy considerations for imposing vicarious liability 
should not apply. JM Burchell South African Criminal Law and Procedure Vol I: General principles of 
criminal law 4 ed (2011) 406.  
462 Burchell Principles 64, 464. According to Jordaan, the legislature follows the premise that a juristic 
person per se lacks both the mental (blameworthy) and physical attributes necessary to commit a crime 
(2003) Acta Jur 50.  
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(b) the omission, with or without a particular intent, of any act which ought to have 
been but was not performed by or on instructions given by a director or servant 
of that corporate body, 
in the exercise of his powers or in the performance of his duties as such director or 
servant or in furthering or endeavouring to further the interests of that corporate 
body, shall be deemed to have been performed (and with the same intent, if any) by 
that corporate body or, as the case may be, to have been an omission (and with the 
same intent, if any) on the part of that corporate body.” 
It is apparent in the formulation of section 332(1), that the legislature presupposed 
that a legal person cannot commit the criminal act itself, nor is it capable of having the 
required fault.463 A fiction is formulated, whereby certain individuals’ conduct and fault 
are attributed to the company in certain circumstances.464 Only if that conduct and 
fault would amount to criminal liability, could the company be held liable.  
The corporate body is thus held liable for the acts of the servant or director during 
the course of their employment or where the interests of the company are furthered. 
The unlawful conduct and mens rea are ascribed to be that of the company, similarly 
to the doctrine of vicarious liability in the law of delict.465 However, vicarious liability in 
this context differs from delictual liability in the sense that the corporate entity is still 
deemed to have fault, whereas the employer’s fault is usually not relevant under true 
vicarious liability.466 As a result, the concept of corporate criminal liability is a legal 
construct which is not necessarily consistent with the corporate reality.467 
The scope of section 332(1) extends to both crimes requiring fault (referring to both 
intent and negligence) alongside strict liability.468 This broad interpretation was 
emphasised in Ex parte Minister van Justisie: In re S v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie (“SAUK”),469 where the Supreme Court of Appeal held that on a 
proper understanding of the wording of section 332(1), a juristic person can be held 
liable for crimes of negligence committed by its directors or officers.470 By reaching 
                                             
463 I Du Plessis “Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid van regspersone: ‘n mensliker benadering” (1991) 
4 TSAR 635 639.  
464 Burchell Principles 464.  
465 Van der Bijl (2014) TSAR 760.  
466 Kemp et al Criminal Law 244; Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 48. 
467 Van der Bijl (2014) TSAR 761.  
468 Kemp et al Criminal Law 244; Burchell Principles 464; Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 637.  
469 1992 4 SA 804 (A).  
470 In SAUK the Minister of Justice brought an ex parte application seeking to clarify whether section 
332(1) firstly applied to crimes of negligence and secondly if the decision in R v Bennet & Co (Pty) Ltd 
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this conclusion, the court confirmed the decision in R v Bennett & Co (Pty) Ltd.471 
Furthermore, it shows that a company could be convicted of a crime requiring 
negligence despite the possibility of it having a due diligence defence.472 
Moreover the company may be held liable for not only the positive acts by its 
employees, but also the omissions committed by employees or possibly authorised 
third parties, if the interests of the company are furthered.473 Additionally criminal 
liability would arise for both statutory transgressions and common-law offences.474 
Whether this should only relate to offences for which a corporate body could in actual 
fact be held liable, is uncertain.475 One could assume that a company should only be 
found guilty as an accomplice to rape and not be held personally liable.476  
                                             
1941 TPD 194 (“Bennet”) was wrong in law. In the aftermath of the S v Suid-Afrikaanse 
Uitsaaikorporasie 1991 2 SA 698 (W) (“Uitsaaikorporasie”) a legal uncertainty arose as to the scope of 
section 332(1) in respect of crimes requiring culpa. The majority of the court found that on a proper 
interpretation of section 332(1) it cannot be found that the legislature attempted to extend the scope of 
the fiction to include negligence for crimes requiring culpability, due to the express mention of “particular 
intent”. Accordingly the majority rejected the Bennet decision. Grosskopf AJ criticised this literal 
interpretation, because it negates the essence of culpa as a form of mens rea (as stated at 808A). By 
quoting S v Ngubane 1985 3 SA 677 (A) at 686E-G (“Ngubane”), Grosskopf AJ states that dolus implies 
“no volitional state of mind”, while culpa may entail “no state of mind”. However, in Ngubane at 687E it 
is argued that culpa refers to no state of mind, but instead conduct which fails to meet a reasonable 
standard. In essence, the inquiry is an object one, compared to the subjective nature of determining 
dolus. Therefore in determining the negligence of a company, the subjective state of mind of a natural 
actor should not be attributed to the company, but rather the conduct itself should be measured against 
an objective standard. This method is similar to the wrongfulness inquiry, whereby the conduct of the 
particular person is objectively compared to a reasonable standard and not directly attributed to the 
company. Finally Grosskopf concludes (809C-H) that crimes of negligence should be included in the 
scope of section 332(1): firstly because it is improbable that the legislature would include strict liability 
and intent, but omit negligence and secondly for historical consistency.  
471 1941 TPD 194. Despite the fact that this case considered section 384(1) of the Criminal Procedure 
and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 as amended by section 117 of Act 23 of 1939, it is held the wording is 
similar to section 332(1) of the current CPA.   
472 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 53.  
473 In terms of section 332(1) the omissio and commissio will only be attributed under certain 
circumstances. If a director or servant commits the offence, it should be done in the course of 
employment and not in a private capacity. Although it originally seems to be a proper restriction, this 
limitation is watered down by attributing conduct if the interests of the company are furthered. Therefore, 
the scope of criminal liability of a company is wider than its civil liability, as stated by Burchell Principles 
65. See Bennet; R v Booth Road Trading Co (Pty) Ltd 1947 1 SA 34 (N); R v Philips Diary (Pty) Ltd 
1955 4 SA 120, S v Banur Investments (Pty) Ltd 1969 1 SA 231 (T) and SA Metal and Machine Co 
(Pty) Ltd v S 2010 2 SACR 413 (SCA) (“SA Metal”) as examples of acts committed in furthering or 
endeavouring to further the interests of a company as required in section 332(1).  
474 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 636; Van der Bijl (2014) TSAR 763.  
475 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 637; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 457; Burchell 
Principles 466; S v Coetzee para 214.  This principle was applied in S v Sutherland 1972 3 SA 385 (N), 
where it is held that only a natural person is able to hold a liquor licence in terms of legislation and not 
a company. Therefore, if a company sells liquor in contravention of the licence it cannot be held liable. 
476 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 637; Burchell Principles 466; J Clough & C Mulhern The Prosecution of 
Corporations (2002) 170. If a company knowingly fosters a work environment in which the sexual 
assault of its employees is facilitated, or where the risk of sexual assault is not mitigated or prevented, 
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Even though corporate criminal liability is statutorily governed, it is necessary to 
assess whether the current legislation is adequate in holding companies liable. If these 
measures and the underlying theoretical framework prove to be inadequate, judicial 
reform might be needed.477 Burchell argues that a realistic form of corporate 
responsibility should be sought, because equating the corporation’s guilt to that of a 
natural person is naïve.478 
It is evident that the company could be held liable not merely for intra vires acts or 
omissions by directors or employees, but also for ultra vires acts or omissions, if these 
endeavours would promote the interests of the company.479 However, knowledge on 
the part of the company is not needed to determine corporate criminal liability.480 This 
could be detrimental to the company, casting the possible net of liability too wide.  
Those individuals whose conduct and fault can be attributed to the company, are 
firstly a director, a servant or a person acting on instruction or with consent of such a 
director or servant.481 The term “director” is furthermore defined in section 332(10) of 
the CPA and refers to those persons controlling or governing the company, or who is 
a member of such a body.482 In the absence of a definition for “servant”, the court held 
in R v Murray and Stewart483 that it refers to any person who is employed by the 
company and performs his or her work under the supervision or control of the 
company. Although the act refers to those persons acting under instruction or 
permission (whether directly or indirectly), it has been found that this section should 
be interpreted narrowly: necessitating a degree of control by the company.484  
                                             
the company could be held criminally liable as an accomplice to rape due to the failure to ensure a safe 
corporate environment and consciously associating itself with the risk of sexual assault.  
477 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 452.  
478 Burchell Principles 461, 463; Farisani (2006) Obiter 273.  
479 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 640; Nana (2011) JAL 94.  
480 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 456.  
481 ss 332(1)(a)-(b).  
482 Therefore reference is made to the controlling bodies of the company, albeit de jure or de facto. 
According to Du Plessis “control” is a broad term, which could include partial independent control or 
influence of a third party. This principle is also confirmed in S v Marks 1965 3 SA 834 (W) 842. Du 
Plessis (1991) TSAR 639.   
483 1950 1 SA 194 (C) 199.  
484 A literal interpretation of this provision would mean that any independent contractor or third party 
who acts under instruction or with the necessary consent would be included, even in circumstances 
where the company had no control over the person. Due to the risk of unlimited corporate criminal 
liability, a restrictive interpretation is followed. Scott argues that the courts could use vicarious liability 
as found in private law as authority for this interpretation. WE Scott Die strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 
van regspersone (1979) 16-17 inaugural lecture held at the Potchefstroomse Universiteit vir Christelike 
Hoër Onderwys (North West University, Potchefstroom Campus), 29-09-1978 (available at 
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4 1 2 Would section 332(1) survive constitutional scrutiny? 
According to Du Plessis the wording of section 332(1) is too broad and general to 
allow a narrow interpretation.485 Therefore, Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde are of 
the opinion that section 332(1) requires constitutional scrutiny, because the mode of 
ascribing criminal liability could be in contravention of the constitutionally enshrined 
presumption of innocence.486  
Section 8(4) of the Constitution awards protection to juristic persons with regards 
to the bill of rights, which includes the presumption of innocence found in section 
35(3)(h). In S v Coetzee section 332(5) of the CPA was declared unconstitutional, 
because it was inconsistent with a director’s or employee’s presumption of innocence. 
Similarly, section 332(1) is broadly formulated, casting the potential liability of juristic 
persons too wide.  
Despite having preventative measures in place to restrict criminal conduct within 
the company and the exercise of due diligence, a company could still be held 
vicariously liable.487 A defence of due diligence is not considered when determining 
criminal liability, which seems out of touch with the presumption of innocence. 
Regardless of the fact that reasonable doubt might exist as to the blameworthiness of 
the corporation, it could still be held vicariously liable in the absence of fault on the 
premise that an individual is guilty.488 Normally if the state fails to lift its burden of proof 
beyond reasonable doubt, an accused would be acquitted. Therefore, holding a 
person, juristic or natural, liable despite the presence of reasonable doubt, infringes 
on the right to a fair trial. 
If one argues that only a natural person can be presumed to be innocent, one 
presupposes the traditional assumption that a juristic person is not capable of acting 
with moral blameworthiness, but is constructed by individuals who determine the 
                                             
https://repository.nwu.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10394/10996/Scott_WE.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y); 
Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 640;  Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 457.  
485 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 645.  
486 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 457.  
487 Burchell argues that the existence of an effective due diligence programme within a company should 
not preclude it from criminal prosecution, because a deviation from their standards is possible. 
Therefore Burchell cites BJ Pollack “Time to Stop Living Vicariously: A Better Approach to Corporate 
Criminal Liability” (2009) 46 Am Crim L Rev 1393 1409, who states that due diligence is only a 
consideration in determining collective intent and a mitigating factor. Burchell elaborates on Pollack’s 
suggestion, by including collective negligence. Burchell Principles 465.  
488 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 458.  
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existence of the company.489 Nevertheless, a juristic person may be capable of being 
awarded the right to a fair trial. Doctrinal theory regarding legal personality should not 
be the reason for a limitation on such a fundamental right. A general approach should 
be followed, unless it is self-evident that a right is inapplicable to a company. 
Moreover, as a person, a company enjoys the same constitutional rights as natural 
persons insofar as these rights may be exercised by a juristic person, which would 
include the right to a fair trial.490 
A juristic person can be the bearer of rights and obligations; therefore, the state has 
a duty to protect these rights in its administration of justice. The question arises, 
however, whether the limitation on the right to a fair trial may be justified in terms of 
section 36 of the Constitution? The state would have to prove the purpose of the 
infringement and a rational relation between the infringement and this purpose. 
Although it might be needed to combat high levels of crime, the seriousness of the 
violation would not necessarily validate the infringement. Rather, it would seem 
unjustifiable and unreasonable.491 
In analysing the unconstitutionality of section 332(1), the court’s analysis of section 
332(5) in S v Coetzee could be used as a guideline. Previously a director or servant 
of a company could be held liable of committing any offence on behalf of the company. 
However, the section still allowed for a defence: if it could be proven that the director 
or employer had no part to play in the committing of the offence or had taken 
preventative measures.492 Nevertheless, it was held that the reverse onus violated the 
right to a fair trial (specifically the presumption of innocence), because a director or 
employee could still be found guilty despite the existence of reasonable doubt. Seeing 
that the inverse of section 332(1) was declared unconstitutional, it might lead to an 
anomaly if the latter is still applied in its entirety.   
Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde argue that section 332(1) might survive judicial 
scrutiny and possible unconstitutionality, if its ambit is limited.493 If the section is only 
applied to regulatory offences and directors, it might award an appropriate application.  
                                             
489 458.  
490 S 8(4) of the Constitution.  
491 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 459.  
492 459.  
493 460.  
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With regards to limiting the scope of section 332(1) to regulatory offences, the 
purpose of the legislature might be undermined. Surely fraud and theft are important 
crimes, which often occur in the corporate sphere and companies should henceforth 
be held criminally liable. Otherwise it would only encourage a rise in criminal activity 
by way of clever corporate construction. Moreover, it is uncertain what the precise 
meaning of regulatory offences should be.  
In S v Coetzee, the state argued that in the context of regulatory offences the 
presumption of innocence applies to a lesser extent.494 Therefore they contended that 
section 332(5) should in essence refer to regulatory offences. Companies seek to take 
part in regulated activities and consequently have a responsibility towards the public 
to adhere to the relevant conditions. If they defer from this responsibility, they should 
be held liable.495 Notwithstanding the fact that certain foreign jurisdictions have drawn 
a distinction between various categories of offences, Langa J held that the ambit of 
section 332(5) is too wide and such a variety cannot be deemed to be regulatory.496  
In his minority judgment, Kentridge AJ held that directors should be held liable for 
regulatory offences, based on the directing mind and will doctrine. Even in the absence 
of fault, they have chosen to manage the company and should therefore bear the 
inherent risks involved in these activities.497 His reasoning is firstly based on the public 
interest involved in preventing anti-social or immoral behaviour, secondly the purpose 
of the legislation would be undermined if the state bore the burden to prove intent or 
negligence and thirdly, it will ensure that the necessary safeguards are in place to 
prevent criminal conduct.498 
Although one could use this reasoning to limit the ambit of section 332(1) this would 
inhibit the proper application of the act, as mentioned previously. The question would 
then arise, whether a separate regulatory framework is needed to govern the common 
law crimes, for example fraud and theft?499 Excluding these offences, for which 
companies are typically prosecuted, would fall short of the purpose of the provision: to 
hold companies criminally liable. Therefore, such a limitation is not envisioned by 
                                             
494 Paras 32, 210-212.  
495 Para 95.  
496 Para 42.  
497 Para 98.  
498 Para 97.  
499 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 461. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 83 
Borg-Jorgensen and Van der Linde, instead a more robust theoretical approach to 
corporate criminal liability is sought.500  
Another limitation to section 332(1) could be found therein, that servants are 
excluded from the provision. It was held in S v Coetzee501 that the inclusion of servants 
in the extent of liability was unjustified, therefore a similar reading down of section 
332(1) could remedy its unconstitutionality. Instead of following the individualistic 
model of vicarious liability, one should rather apply the directing mind and will doctrine. 
As a result, liability will only be imputed by those organs which constitute the directing 
will of the company, in other words the directors or senior management. This restriction 
would satisfy the need for corporate criminal liability without imposing an arbitrary 
burden on corporation. On the contrary, it might bridge the gap between corporations 
as abstract beings and natural persons.502  
The abovementioned reasoning seems to be too esoteric and could be criticised 
with reference to the organisational theory. In large corporations, responsibilities are 
often delegated to lower levels of management.503 Although the criminogenic decision 
is made by senior management or the board of directors, its enactment could be 
dispersed throughout various command chains.504 In light of the doctrine of directing 
minds, their fault and conduct would not readily be ascribed to the company. Failure 
to hold large corporations criminally liable would not purport the legislature’s intention, 
but rather negate it.  
By virtue of the fact that a company cannot raise a defence, section 332(1) would 
still be deemed to be unconstitutional, despite the possible limitations on its ambit. 
Due to the onerous implication of vicarious liability, this section should be scrutinised. 
A departure from the fault requirement cannot be absolute and a company should be 
granted to show that it acted with due diligence and implemented certain safeguards 
to prevent criminal conduct.505 
                                             
500 461. 
501 Paras 26, 55, 73, 101, 111 and 184.  
502 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 461.  
503 Nana (2011) JAL 100. 
504 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 55. 
505 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 462.  
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4 2 The identification doctrine 
Common-law jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, were the first to implore 
ethical corporate behaviour and hold corporations criminally accountable. Therefore, 
the deterrent effect of sanctions on company behaviour was explored.506 Due to the 
influence of the industrial revolution, courts were urged to apply the civil law doctrine 
of vicarious liability in criminal cases. Although this method continued in the United 
States, it was limited to regulatory offences in England and Wales.507 
The primary model of attribution in English law is the doctrine of identification. 
According to the authors of Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law, vicarious 
liability in criminal law is regarded with caution, especially in respect of serious crimes 
involving mens rea.508 A model of direct liability is rather followed, whereby the acts 
and state of mind of certain officers or employees are regarded as those of the 
company.509 
In terms of the rules of attribution the question of “who” becomes relevant, in other 
words whether these rules should be limited to those regarded as the directing mind 
and will of the company or whether other (lower level) employees are also included.510 
This dilemma is easily determined in the case of regulatory offences based on strict 
liability, where the legislature intended to attribute the acts of lower level employees 
to the business of the company.511 Beyond the scope of regulatory offences, imposing 
criminal liability is governed according to the traditional model of the identification 
doctrine.  
                                             
506 Pieth & Ivory “Emergence and Convergence” in Ius Gentium 7.  
507 8.  
508 PL Davies & S Worthington Gower’s Principles of Modern Company Law 10 ed (2016) 181.  
509 Whether there remains a difference between vicarious and direct liability, depends upon the 
interpretation of direct liability. If the criteria for direct liability is broadly set, it could amount to vicarious 
liability, while a narrow interpretation might lead to companies escaping criminal liability.  
510 SJ Naudé Die regsposisie van die maatskappydirekteur, met besondere verwysing na die interne 
maatskappyverband (1970) 39. 
511 The leniency of courts to follow this broader interpretation can originally be found in Moussell 
Brothers Ltd v London & North Western Railway Co 1917 2 KB 836 and later in R v British Steel plc 
1995 ICR 586 CA, where the Court of Appeal applied this approach to so-called hybrid offences where 
a due diligence defence restricted the strict liability. The fact that the company’s senior management 
had taken precautionary measures to prevent a breach of the statutory duty was insufficient, because 
those parties in charge of the dangerous operation had to take reasonable care. Therefore, even if 
junior employees acted contrary to their instruction, the company would not readily have a defence. 
Davies & Worthington Gower 181.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 85 
Originally, the identification doctrine was applied in the area of statutory civil liability 
and later transplanted to criminal law. In Lennard’s Viscount Haldane problematised 
the difficulty of holding a company liable: 
“A corporation is an abstraction. It has no mind of its own any more than it has a body 
of its own; its active and directing will must consequently be sought in the person of 
somebody who for some purposes may be called an agent, but who is really the 
directing mind and will of the corporation, the very ego and centre of the personality of 
the corporation.”512 
In the aftermath of this decision the doctrine of identification as opposed to vicarious 
liability was followed as a model for holding a company liable.513 As seen in the quoted 
passage, the identification model is based on the directing minds doctrine, where a 
certain individual needs to be identified before liability could arise. 514 This is a clear 
affirmation of the fiction or nominalist theory of corporate personality, whereby a 
company acts through human representatives and remains an artificial construct.515 
These human representatives can either be the “organs” of the company (in other 
words the operational staff) or the “brains”, which would be senior management and 
directors.516 Although this model of attribution is often characterised as being 
anthropomorphic,517 it is reliant on identifying the alter ego within the company.518 
                                             
512 713.  
513 Davies & Worthington Gower 181.  
514 The writers of Gower argue that Lord Haldane was influenced by German law, where a distinction is 
drawn between agents and organs within a company. Davies & Worthington Gower 182.  
515 Only if it can be proven that an individual acting as the directing mind and will had the necessary 
guilt to be attributed, can the company be said to have criminal guilt. Pieth & Ivory “Emergence and 
Convergence” in Ius Gentium 6.  
516 In HL Bolton 630 Lord Denning stated that “[a] company may in many ways be likened to a human 
body. They have a brain and a nerve centre which controls what they do. They also have hands which 
hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the centre. Some of the people in the company 
are mere servants and agents who are nothing more than hands to do the work and cannot said to 
represent the mind or will. Others are directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will 
of the company, and control what they do. The state of mind of these managers is the state of mind of 
the company and is treated by the law as such [...]”. This passage is regarded as the cornerstone for 
describing the anthropomorphic nature of companies in English law. McAuley & McCutcheon Criminal 
Liability 382-383.  
517 Davies & Worthington Gower 182; Pieth & Ivory “Emergence and Convergence” in Ius Gentium 6; 
Wells “Corporate Criminal Liability” in Ius Gentium 93.  
518 In terms of the organic theory, the anthropomorphic imagery used by Lord Denning in HL Bolton, 
was criticised by Von Gierke, who argued for a more robust realist theory. M Keeley “Realism in 
Organisational Theory: A Reassessment” (1983) 6 Symbolic Interaction 279 280 referring to O von 
Gierke Political Theories of the Middle Age (1900).  
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In order to understand the application of the identification doctrine, the role of the 
directing mind and will doctrine is of paramount importance, as well as its development 
in case law.  
4 2 1 The development of the directing mind and will 
The beginning of the general application of the identification doctrine in criminal law 
cases where a particular state of mind was required, was marked by the case of 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd and another.519 
However, the application of the directing minds doctrine was largely developed in 
Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass (“Tesco”).520 
In Tesco the House of Lords determined who would constitute the directing mind 
and will of a company.521 It had been trite law that only the top level senior officers of 
the company, in other words the board or other senior officers, could act as the mind 
of the company.522 Managers or lower-level employees were excluded from the rules 
of attribution pertaining to non-regulatory fault-based offences.523 In this case, 
however, the question arose as to whether persons to whom the board delegated their 
powers could also be regarded as constituting the directing mind and will.524 The court 
refined the theoretical foundation of the directing mind and will, by describing it as the 
hierarchical management structure.525 
                                             
519 1944 KB 146. D Kershaw Company Law in Context 2 ed (2012) 157.  
520 1972 AC 153.  
521 Tesco Supermarkets was held liable in terms of the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 which allowed for 
a defence, if the company could prove that reasonable steps had been taken to prevent the criminal 
conduct of its employees.  
522 The court reiterated that the individual does not act on behalf of the company, but instead becomes 
an “embodiment of the company [...] his mind is the mind of the company” at 154. Therefore, one should 
distinguish it from the rules of vicarious liability. However, according to Pinto and Evans, if the class of 
persons identified as the “brains” of the company is limited to only to those entrusted with the exercise 
of the company’s powers, be it by way of delegation from the board of directors, by the company in 
general meeting or the memorandum and articles of association, it would limit the efficacy of corporate 
criminal liability. It would lead to the anomalous situation where only small companies can be held liable, 
because the board of directors is more readily involved in day-to-day management. Big corporate actors 
with intricate organograms would be unlikely to incur liability, because the board of directors is deemed 
to be too far removed from the daily operation of the company and in the absence of criminal conduct 
by a director or the like. Pinto & Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 53-54.  
523 Wells “Corporate Criminal Liability” in Ius Gentium 98.  
524 Although it is possible to include persons to whom the board delegated certain powers, the court 
held that the employee was a lower level employee and therefore an investigation as to what board 
delegation entailed was not made. Lord Reid argued that responsibility for a certain area of the 
company’s business should be included, while Lord Diplock stated that board delegation in itself proved 
sufficient. Davies and Worthington Gower 182.  
525 V Borg-Jorgensen & K Van der Linde “Corporate criminal liability in South Africa: time for change? 
(Part 2)” (2011) 4 TSAR 684 685. 
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Due to the seemingly exhaustive list that Tesco provides, Gobert stresses its 
problematic outcome: 
“One of the ironies of [Tesco] is that it propounds a theory of corporate liability which 
works best in cases where it is needed least and works least in cases where it is 
needed most.”526 
It is argued that the focus of the court in Tesco was on the identity of the company 
officers and not the aim of the relevant statutory provision.527 Moreover, Lord Reid 
conceded that he prefers to think of the relevant officer identified as the directing mind 
and will of the company in terms of the Lennard’s case as the ego of the corporation 
rather than its alter.528 Not only did this narrow interpretation lead to sharp criticism, 
but its focus on the top echelon of senior company officers created an incentive to 
decentralise responsibilities in order to escape criminal liability.529 
In Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission 
(“Meridian”)530 a partial breakthrough with regards to the definition of who constituted 
the directing mind and will was made.531 The case involved imposing administrative 
penalties for a breach of the securities legislation. Although this case involved a 
regulatory offence, the vicarious liability model was not available. In the absence of 
conduct from the constitutional bodies, the question of “who” constituted the company 
was of importance.532 According to Davies and Worthington, the identification doctrine 
as developed by Lord Haldane in Lennard’s did not describe the correct overarching 
approach.533 Therefore, Lord Hoffmann sought to analyse the relevant rule in question 
and not the company’s internal decision-making structure, thus side-stepping the 
                                             
526 J Gobert “Corporate Criminal Liability: four models of fault” (1994) 14 LS 393 401.   
527 In this case, the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 was a piece of consumer protection legislation aimed 
at regulating a specific area of business activity. The store manager in question failed to prevent an 
offence from being committed in his store and was therefore found to be negligent. However, due to 
the company’s control over the activities of its store managers, the court held that the manager’s 
conduct could not be attributed to the company. Accordingly, the company could not be held criminally 
liable for the unlawful conduct of its employees. This application of the identification doctrine in Tesco 
has been questioned, especially since its system to prevent the commission of such offences had failed. 
Pinto & Evans Corporate Criminal Liability 54-55.  
528 Tesco 171; McAuley & McCutcheon Criminal Liability 382.  
529 E Ferran “Corporate Attribution and the Directing Mind and Will” (2011) 127 Law Q Rev 239 242.   
530 1995 2 AC 500.  
531 Davies & Worthington Gower 183.  
532 183.  
533 183.  
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identification doctrine.534 This alternative method is described as special rules of 
attribution of acts and states of minds to a company, which differs from the primary 
rules where the constitutional allocation of power and responsibility is involved 
(whether it is found in the articles of association, board resolution, shareholders’ 
resolutions and other binding shareholders’ decisions).535 Lord Hoffmann formulated 
the special rules of attribution as follows: 
“This is always a matter of interpretation: given that [the substantive rule] was intended 
to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? ... One finds the answer to this 
question by applying the usual canons of interpretation, taking into account the 
language of the rule (if it is a statute) and its content and policy”536 
According to Ferran, Lord Hoffmann opted for an interpretation in Meridian in which 
contextualisation or construction, rather than anthropomorphic imagery of corporate 
personality, is the key to attribution.537 In this sense, Lord Denning’s judgment in HL 
Bolton, which followed a metaphysical approach, is challenged.538 This critique of the 
metaphysical understanding of corporate personality is deemed to be influenced by 
Hart, who held that these anthropomorphisms can obscure the essence of corporate 
rights, obligations and liabilities.539  
Although there is a shift from the notion of attributing a creature of statute with 
human characteristics in Meridian, it seems that Lord Hoffmann’s remedial effect of an 
over-reliance on these metaphysical concepts was short lived.540 Although the House 
of Lords in Stone & Rolls Ltd (In Liquidation) v Moore Stephens (A Firm)541 confirmed 
                                             
534 Accordingly, the construction of the statute or the relevant rule of law had to be analysed to determine 
who should regarded as the company for purposes of the identification doctrine. If this reasoning is 
followed, it would be possible to identify a lower-level employee as the directing mind or will. Thus the 
scope of the identification doctrine is widened to include individuals who were not originally envisaged 
by Lord Haldane. In Meridian the two individuals identified to constitute the company, where senior 
investment managers who were not members of the board. However, in considering the purpose of the 
statute to disclose substantial shareholdings timeously, the court held that these individuals could be 
regarded as the directing minds. Davies & Worthington Gower 183; Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 243.  
535 In Tesco Lord Diplock reiterated the role of the primary or general rules of attribution, by referring to 
the importance of a constitutional approach focusing on the articles of association, board resolutions 
and shareholders’ resolution. Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 243.  
536 Meridian 507.  
537 Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 239. This approach’s consistency with organisational realities of modern 
companies was laudable, especially if compared to the hierarchical approach adopted in Tesco.   
538 Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 239-240.  
539 See HLA Hart “Definition and Theory of Jurisprudence” (1954) 70 Law Q Rev 37.  
540 Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 240; 245.  
541 2009 1 AC 1391.  
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that the attribution rules developed in Meridian did form part of English law,542 it opted 
to rely on the conduct of a key individual who is the “embodiment” of the company, 
thereby continuing the metaphysical rhetoric criticised by Hart.543 Corporate criminal 
liability in the context of serious crimes involving mens rea is thus still dominated by 
the narrow identification doctrine.544 This continuous emphasis on the identification 
doctrine and the de facto immunity large companies with a diffused managerial 
structure enjoy, have led to the enactment of the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007.545 
4 3 Aggregation 
In terms of the aggregation doctrine, instead of identifying one particular officer 
whose mens rea can be attributed to the company, it seeks to aggregate the conduct 
and will of various persons in the corporation.546 Due to the difficulty of pin-pointing an 
individual responsible for both the conduct and necessary mens rea in a large 
company, this model seeks to overcome that hurdle. Although this reasoning has been 
rejected by English law in the Zeebrugge case, 547 it is generally accepted in the United 
States for holding corporations criminally liable.  
4 3 1 The aggregation dilemma 
Section 332(1) of the CPA requires that an offence, be it a statutory or a common 
law crime, needs to be committed by a director or servant for a company to be held 
criminally liable. However, this does not mean that a prosecution or conviction of a 
natural person is a requisite to prosecute the juristic person.548 The dilemma of this 
                                             
542 According to Davies and Worthington these special rules of attribution do not necessarily solve the 
uncertainty surrounding who should be the relevant person within the hierarchical structure for purposes 
of the identification rule. Following the contextual approach, it could range from any agent or employee 
acting within the scope of their authority (similar to the vicarious liability rules) or could be limited to 
senior managerial positions or merely the board itself. It is argued that the special rules can only apply 
in the absence of the primary rules. Moreover, its application is limited to a context specific analysis of 
a particular rule. Gower 183-184.  
543 Ferran (2011) Law Q Rev 240.  
544 246.  
545 The application of this Act, as well as the Bribery Act 2010, as an alternative model of attribution will 
be discussed in part 5.1. 
546 E Emeseh “Corporate responsibility for crimes – thinking outside the box” (2005) 1 U Botswana LJ 
28 46.  
547 R v P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd 1990 93 Cr App R 72 (“P&O European Ferries“). 
548 In SA Metal the appellant appealed against its conviction of contravening section 37(1) of the 
General Amendment Act 62 of 1955. Therefore the Supreme Court of Appeal had to whether the 
appellant lacked the reasonable for belief as required by the abovementioned provision. According to 
section 37(1)(b) the lack of proof to the contrary is sufficient evidence of the absence of reasonable 
cause. The employee (De Klerk) whose conduct was attributed in terms of section 332(1) of the CPA, 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
 90 
requirement, is the fact that an individual’s conduct might not amount to meet the 
necessary standard to impose criminal liability. Consequently, neither the company, 
nor the individual could be held liable. In terms of the principle of aggregation the 
conduct of various actors is combined in order to prove the different elements of a 
crime and meet the standards to enforce criminal liability. This principle relates to the 
common purpose doctrine, however, its applicability within the section 332(1) context 
remains uncertain.549 Du Plessis states that the person committing the offence, is the 
one whose fault is relevant.550 It is argued that the actor responsible for the conduct 
cannot be distinguished from the person in whom the fault resides, because the 
unlawful act and fault are inextricably interwoven.551 Furthermore there remains 
uncertainty whether different mind-sets could be combined to establish negligence or 
a particular form of intent or even the conduct of different individuals.552  
Bearing in mind the current opposition to the individualistic model, aggregation 
might prove to be an alternative approach to holding large corporations criminally 
liable. Even if it is not a full departure from the individualistic model, it is pragmatic and 
would lead to effective prosecution of large entities. Legislative intervention is thus 
necessary to award legal certainty, specifically to enlighten the aggregation 
dilemma.553  
5 Alternative models influenced by realist theory 
As an alternative to the models of attribution influenced by nominalist or individualist 
theory, England and Australia have enacted legislation which resembles a shift from 
                                             
was originally convicted by the Regional Court, Kempton Park. However, this conviction was set aside 
by the South Gauteng High Court. Despite the innocence of De Klerk, the court still held that the 
appellant’s conviction should stand. Therefore, the question before the Supreme Court of Appeal, was 
whether the High Court erred in its finding, as stated in para 3 of the judgment. The court stated in para 
13, that De Klerk was identified as the employee whose conduct was necessarily attributed to the 
appellant, thus there was no indication that the net was being cast wider. Accordingly, the court erred 
in holding the appellant criminally liable and it was held that there was a reasonable belief that the 
contraband was lawfully obtained. In reaching this conclusion, the aggregation dilemma is illustrated. 
Had the prosecution aggregated the conduct of various individuals, the conclusion may have differed.  
549 If multiple persons are involved in committing a crime, it is presupposed that all participants share a 
common purpose and the conduct of any persons involved is attributed to both the whole group and 
the company. Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 641; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 463.  
550 Du Plessis (1991) TSAR 641. 
551 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 462.  
552 In the aftermath of Uitsaaikorporasie this uncertainty became poignant. The court proceeded in 
making certain assumptions based on the evidence and facts at hand, however the particular individual 
who committed the unlawful conduct could not be identified.  
553 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 463.  
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this theory to a more realist approach which incorporates the notion of corporate 
culture.  
5 1 The English solution: Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 
2007, the Bribery Act 2010 and beyond 
In Meridian it is clear that a departure from the identification model occurred.554 In 
terms of statutory crimes, these special rules of attribution focusing on a contextual 
analysis have dominated the attribution of corporate liability. However, in terms of the 
common law crime of manslaughter by gross negligence, the Court of Appeal rejected 
the Meridian approach.555 Therefore if a company were to be held liable for corporate 
manslaughter, the prosecution had to identify a responsible individual whose conduct 
and will could be attributed to the company by way of the directing mind and will test.556 
After the Zeebrugge ferry disaster in 1986, where a ferry overturned and 193 people 
lost their lives, a case was brought against P&O Ferries Ltd, accusing the company of 
corporate manslaughter. 557 Although Turner J dismissed the case, stating that it would 
be impossible to hold a company criminally liable for corporate manslaughter, he 
emphasised the need to identify a controlling mind of the company whose conduct 
would fulfil the requirements for manslaughter in order prosecute the company 
successfully.558 A company could only be guilty of manslaughter if one of its agents 
was guilty of manslaughter. Furthermore, this agent had to form part of the directing 
mind and will of the company.559  
Due to the shortcomings associated with the identification model, it was impossible 
to hold large companies with intricate organisational structures accountable. Instead, 
only small companies could be held criminally liable if serious fatalities occurred.560 In 
1996 the Law Commission of England and Wales advanced the concept of 
organisational fault, which would serve as an alternative to the then current model.561 
Instead of identifying a particular individual guilty of manslaughter, management 
                                             
554 Davies and Worthington Gower 183.  
555 185.  
556 Re Attorney’s General’s Reference (No 2 of 1999) 2000 QB 795 CA.  
557 P&O European.  
558 P&O European Ferries 84.  
559 Kershaw Company Law in Context 164.  
560 Davies & Worthington Gower 185.  
561 Law Commission Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter  Law Com No 237 HC 
171 1996.  
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failure would be sufficient cause to hold a company criminally liable. In light of the 
criticism against the doctrine of identification as being too restrictive and biased, the 
flexibility of a systemic and policy-based approach was welcomed.  
Although a laborious legislative process followed, the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (“CMCHA”) was eventually enacted, which provides an 
organisational approach to a statutory offence of corporate manslaughter.562 Contrary 
to the method used to impose liability on individuals, the CMCHA creates an offence 
for companies if the activities of the company are managed and organised in such a 
way as to result in a person’s death.563 Additionally, for liability to arise, the way in 
which these activities are managed or organised should amount to a gross breach of 
the duty owed by the company to the deceased.564 In the absence of a gross breach 
of the duty of care, the corporation cannot be held criminally liable. 
There is no need to identify an individual whose conduct amounts to manslaughter 
and whose knowledge and will are attributed to the company. Organisational fault on 
its own will be sufficient to convict a company, irrespective of individual guilt.565 
However, a rule needs to be identified by which certain persons’ organisational failings 
can be attributed to the company.566 In establishing these rules, the emphasis is 
placed on senior management – an approach likened to the identification model.567 
According to section 1(3) of the CMCHA corporate guilt arises “only if the way in which 
its activities are managed or organised by its senior management is a substantial 
element in the breach.”568 If such failure is present at a subordinate level, the company 
cannot be guilty. One could argue that a significant failure in lower-level organisational 
structures will ultimately reflect that senior management had to be aware of these 
failings.569  
                                             
562 In England, Wales and Northern Ireland the felony is referred to as corporate manslaughter, while 
Scotland opted for corporate homicide.  
563 S 1; Davies & Worthington Gower 185.  
564 The gross breach of duty owed to the deceased is similar to the common law crime of manslaughter 
by gross negligence. Davies & Worthington Gower 185-186. 
565 Burchell states that the CMCHA is an improvement on the restrictive directing mind doctrine, 
however, the emphasis remains on individual rather than corporate fault and the scope of its application 
is limited to senior officers instead of the systemic failures within the corporation. Principles 463.  
566 Davies & Worthington Gower 186.  
567 In terms of section 1(1)(a)-(b) senior management has a duty of care to prevent any death resulting 
from a dangerous situation.  
568 Thus the manner in which the company is governed by senior management is crucial in determining 
if a breach has occurred or not. Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 688. 
569 Davies & Worthington Gower 186.  
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The CMCHA draws a distinction between the role of the presiding judge and the 
jury in respectively determining the existence of a duty and whether the breach was 
gross.570 In terms of section 1(1), the presiding judge should decide whether the 
organisation bears a duty of care.571 A gross breach is governed by section 1(4)(b); 
which requires that the company’s activities were managed in such a way that falls 
short of what can reasonably be expected from the company in such particular 
circumstances. The question of a gross breach of duty should be decided by the 
jury.572 In determining the occurrence of a gross breach or not, it should be considered 
whether health and safety measures were complied with or not, the significance of 
non-compliance and the inherent risk of non-compliance.573 Moreover, the jury may 
determine the corporate culture of the company, with reference to the attitudes, 
policies, structures and common practices within the company which could have 
motivated the non-compliance with the set health and safety requirements.574 
Additionally, any other matter which might be relevant could also be considered by the 
jury.575 It is clear that the jury is granted a wide discretion to determine if a gross breach 
occurred, incorporating various factors into the analysis.  
A holistic approach, influenced by the notion of organisational fault, is apparent in 
the CMCHA. Instead of considering a certain level of management, the organisational 
procedures and activities of the corporation as a whole are examined.576 Nonetheless, 
section 1(3) provides that a substantial part of the breach should be present at senior 
management level, which is defined as those persons playing a crucial role in deciding 
how a whole or substantial part of the company’s activities are to be conducted or who 
are involved in managing or organising a whole or substantial part of these activities.577  
Although the CMCHA attempts to embody the modern concept of an organisational 
model, it is still unsure whether an employer has a duty to prevent harm if a third party 
commits an unlawful act.578 Especially in the case where the employer facilitated the 
                                             
570 186.  
571 The relevant duty should be encompassed by the law of negligence and categorised in section 2 of 
the CMCHA, which has a widely defined list of categories.  
572 S 8(1)(a)-(b).  
573 S 8(2).  
574 S 8(3)(a).  
575 S 8(4).  
576 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 689.  
577 S 1(4)(c).  
578 Van der Bijl (2014) TSAR 770.  
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harmful conduct, the question arises if it would result in a novus actus interveniens, 
thereby breaking the chain of causation. In terms of English law, the employer could 
still be held liable as an accomplice.579  
Despite the effort to entrench the application of organisational fault in the CMCHA, 
it is limited to crimes of manslaughter or homicide.580 Thus, there is still a need to 
develop the theoretical model beyond this limited application, either through legislation 
or a systemic change in the court’s approach to corporate criminal liability.581 Whether 
courts would be robust enough to depart from existing foundational principles is 
uncertain.  
The Bribery Act 2010 (“BA”) is another innovative development in legislation to 
incorporate the organisational model.582 The act represented a significant departure 
from the traditional identification model for crimes involving mens rea and instead 
opted for the respondeat superior approach followed by the federal courts in the United 
States.583 In terms of section 7 of the BA, a company will be held liable if an employee 
or an associated person bribes someone with the purpose of gaining a business 
advantage on behalf of the company and can offer no defence.584 Contrary to the 
position in South African legislation, the company will not be held liable if a defence is 
raised, in other words if adequate measures were implemented to prevent 
contravention of the BA.585 A further development in the realm of corporate criminal 
liability, was the introduction of the deferred prosecution agreements (“DPA”) for 
economic crimes, including bribery, fraud, tax evasion and money laundering in 
2013.586 Although the DPA as a tool of enforcement have been criticised,587 it provides 
an innovative solution to ensure corporate retribution.  
                                             
579 A Ashworth Positive Obligations in Criminal Law (2013) 79. 
580 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 689.  
581  As seen in the Meridian judgment. 
582 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Working Group on Bribery 
found that the identification model for corporate criminal liability was inadequate in realising the UK’s 
obligations in terms of the OECD’s anti-bribery convention. Therefore another model for imposing 
liability was sought in terms of the Bribery Act. See the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions 1997. 
583 C Wells “Corporate failure to prevent economic crime – a proposal” (2017) 6 Crim L Rev 426 426. 
584 In Serious Fraud Office v Rolls-Royce plc 2017 Lloyd's Rep FC 249, where a deferred prosecution 
agreement was reached, Leveson J in para 44 reiterated the role of compliance procedures and ethics 
in establishing guilt in terms of the BA. 
585 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 690-691; Wells (2017) Crim L Rev 426. 
586 Wells (2017) Crim LR 426.  
587 Especially by anti-corruption groups in the case of Rolls-Royce; Wells (2017) Crim L Rev 431. 
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Similarly, the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (“CFA”) provides that corporate criminal 
liability will be imposed if a company fails to prevent the facilitation of foreign tax 
evasion, thereby reiterating the need for sound corporate compliance to prevent 
criminal conduct. The CFA follows the same rationale of the BA, whereby a company 
will be held criminally liable if it failed to have procedures in place to prevent its 
employees or associates from facilitating tax evasion. A company may raise a 
defence, if it properly assessed the risk of facilitation of tax division and subsequently 
developed a framework whereby the identified risks will be mitigated.588 Although such 
a risk assessment may be deemed excessive and burdensome, the legislature aimed 
to broaden the duty of corporate compliance.589 
Although both the BA and the CFA impose corporate criminal liability for the 
facilitation of certain offences in the absence of adequate preventative measures, 
Wells categorises these “offences” as an attribution model or mode of participation.590 
Thereby, reiterating the importance of ethical corporate culture as endorsed by the 
realist theory. 
Whether England and Wales will ultimately introduce a new corporate criminal 
offence of failure to prevent economic crime, is still to be considered by the legislature. 
However, it would result in a significant expansion of the scope of corporate criminal 
liability in English law, should it be adopted.591 
5 2 Australia’s Criminal Code  
The most ambitious framework for regulating corporate criminal responsibility is 
found in part 2.5 of the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 (“Code”). Even though a 
federal system is followed in Australia and criminal law is normally governed under 
state law, the Commonwealth retains legislative power in particular criminal matters. 
The Code was promulgated to give effect to this overarching legislative power to 
govern certain criminal law matters. 
                                             
588 A Tuson “Criminal Finances Act 2017: key issues for assessing risk and implementing controls” 
(2017) 6 Comp & Risk 2 2.  
589 Even in South Africa, King IV stresses the importance of tax compliance. It states that a company 
should ensure that it is compliant with the applicable laws by introducing a tax policy. Moreover, 
preventing tax evasion is congruent with responsible corporate citizenship as purported by Principle 3 
of King IV. 
590 Wells (2017) Crim L Rev 428. 
591 Wells (2017) Crim L Rev 427; Tuson (2017) Comp & Risk 2. 
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Similar to other Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, an individualistic model for corporate 
criminal liability was initially followed in Australia, whereby vicarious liability and the 
doctrine of identification were followed. As a result of the criticisms raised against 
these modes of attribution, it was found that allocating the directing mind and will was 
particularly ineffective to regulate corporate criminal liability.592  Accordingly the 
legislature opted to create a regulatory framework for corporate criminal liability which 
accommodated modern corporate realities. An organisational model which imposed 
personal corporate liability, based on independent corporate fault and individual 
corporate culture was developed.593  
The Code draws a distinction between the physical and mental elements of an 
offence. In terms of the actus reus, the focus remains on an individual’s conduct.594 In 
section 12.1(1) of the Code, express mention is made that criminal liability should be 
imposed with reference to individual liability, bearing in mind the various modifications 
embodied in the Code.595 If an employee, agent or officer of the company was acting 
within his or her scope of employment or upon instruction whilst committing the 
offence, the physical conduct would be attributed to the company.596 This provision is 
similar to section 332(1) of the CPA and could be rationalised in the sense that a 
company cannot commit the actus rea itself, due to its abstract nature. Both positive 
conduct and omissions would be included in the physical element.  
In terms of the mental element, the Code provides for offences requiring either 
negligence or subjective fault.597 Offences of intention, knowledge or recklessness are 
provided for, which could be attributed to the company.598 Intention could be ascribed 
to the company, if it can be proven that the corporation sanctioned the committing of 
the offence, be it expressly, tacitly or impliedly.599 Authorisation or permission could 
be found in one of three ways, as proposed by the Code.600 The influence of the 
doctrine of identification is clear in the first two instances, which emphasises the board 
                                             
592 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 63; Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 696. 
593 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 63.   
594 64.  
595 At a first glance, it would seem that this is the point of departure, however, if one considers the 
emphasis on true corporate fault in terms of mens rea, this section should be read in context.  
596 S 12.2.  
597 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 63.  
598 63.  
599 S 12.3(1).  
600 S 12.3(2), 
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of directors601 or a high managerial agent.602 Either the board of directors or a high 
managerial agent’s intention could be imputed to the company if they directed or 
tolerated the conduct.603 A high managerial officer is typically an employee, agent or 
officer whose conduct may be assumed to reflect the corporate policy and ethos, due 
to the responsibilities they assume.604 Although these methods are akin to the directing 
minds doctrine, it is a variance on the traditional model, because the corporation could 
raise a defence. If it can be shown that the company exercised due diligence in 
preventing the conduct, authorisation or permission of the high managerial officer, it 
may not be held liable.605 In respect of the board of directors, however, this defence 
cannot be raised.606 The availability of a due diligence defence, is a positive 
development, which could be incorporated into South African law to prevent arbitrary 
imposition of criminal liability in certain instances.  
The third method is notably a revolutionary step in corporate criminal liability, for it 
is underscored by the realist theory. It should be proven that “a corporate culture 
existed within the [company] that promoted, encouraged, tolerated or led the non-
compliance with the relevant provision.”607 The company itself created an environment 
and ethos which sanctioned the commission of the offence. Furthermore, if the 
company “failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required compliance 
with the relevant provision”608 mens rea can be established. The Code defines 
corporate culture as an “attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice” which 
exists in the company as whole or in the relevant part where the offences are being 
committed.609 Additionally, the notion of corporate culture is extended, by listing 
various factors to consider in establishing whether or not the corporate identity or 
culture has been blemished.  
Firstly, if the high managerial agent authorised the commission of an offence of the 
same or similar nature as the conduct in question, it would be indicative of a corrupt 
corporate culture. Secondly if a reasonable expectation by an employee, agent or 
                                             
601 S 12.3(2)(a). 
602 S 12.3(2)(b).  
603 S 12.3(a)-(b).  
604 S 12.3.6. 
605 S 12.3(3).  
606 Jordaan (2003) Acta Jur 64.  
607 S 12.3(2)(c). 
608 S 12.3(2)(d).  
609 S 12.6.  
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officer exists that their unlawful conduct would be sanctioned by the high managerial 
officer, it is presumed that the corporate culture is corrupt.610 
In instances where crimes of negligence occur, the Code introduces the principle 
of aggregation as a model for attribution, whereby the company’s conduct in its entirety 
is examined.611 Furthermore, if inadequate corporate control mechanisms exist to 
supervise management and conduct of employees to a substantial degree, it might be 
sufficient evidence to find negligence on the company’s part.612 The failure to provide 
proper systems which convey information to the relevant stakeholders, would be a 
further indication of negligent conduct.613 Therefore with regards to the negligence 
inquiry, the Code follows an organisational approach, focusing on the systemic 
safeguards to prevent unlawful conduct rather than an individualistic theory.  
Strict liability is characterised by the absence of the fault element in imposing 
liability. However, the Code (unlike the South African legislation) provides for a 
defence of reasonable mistake of fact. If the employee, agent or officer of the company 
made a reasonable mistake of fact, which lead her to believe that the conduct did not 
amount to an offence and the company proves due diligence on its part by having 
preventative measures in place, it might be successful.614 Despite the possibility of 
raising a defence, the company would not easily be acquitted. Systemic failure to 
manage, control, supervise or convey relevant information to employees would negate 
the due diligence defence. However, the incorporation of the due diligence limit on 
possible liability, expresses a paradigm shift towards the realist theory in corporate 
criminal liability.  
Although the Code still acknowledges the role of human agency, specifically in the 
context of attributing the physical element of the offence to the corporation, the main 
focus is on the attitudes, procedures and practices within the corporation.615 Though 
the formal structures are considered, the unwritten rules or ethos could be a valuable 
indicator of the corporate identity and character. Hence the unique corporate identity 
of a company should be the focal point in ascribing personal criminal liability on 
                                             
610 S 12.4(a)-(b).  
611 S 12.4(2).  
612 S 12.4(3)(a).  
613 S 12.4(3)(b).  
614 S 12.5(a)-(b).  
615 Borg-Jorgensen & Van der Linde (2011) TSAR 698.  
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corporations. However, these underlying moral values within a company might be 
difficult to prove from an evidentiary perspective.616 Thus the Code permits the 
examination of any relevant facts which could indicate a morally dubious corporate 
culture. Due the possible uncertainty pertaining to corporate culture, the Code still 
enforces a hierarchical approach to systemic failure with reference to high managerial 
actors. 
Regardless of the vagueness relating to corporate culture, the Code is the most 
sophisticated framework for corporate criminal liability from a realist perspective. 
However, it is argued that it bears little practical significance.617 
6 Too big to jail? 
Garrett describes a corporate prosecution as a battle between David and Goliath, 
where the federal prosecuting system is the so-called little guy, despite its potential 
ability to hold a corporation criminally liable for the conduct of a single employee.618 
Ultimately, the cost of prosecution is too high to be cost-effective, which leads to many 
crimes being unsolved or undetected. One of the reasons for inefficient prosecution, 
is the fact that imposing a fine is not necessarily the optimal sanction for corporate 
criminal behaviour.  
Coffee argued that imposing a fine is an inefficient means to hold an organisation 
liable for corporate crimes. He suggested an alternative system, where the individual 
decision-maker is the focus of corporate criminal liability, as well as a system of 
competitive bids regarding the choice of a fine as an alternative form of punishment.619 
Another option proposed by Du Toit, is that of a share fine, where a company is not 
sanctioned by way of a heavy fine, but a certain number of shares should be issued 
to the state. This would water down the value of shares, but the proceeds from the 
shares could be used to compensate the victims of crimes. Although a monetary 
sanction is imposed, the liability is not to the detriment of employees or creditors.620  
                                             
616 698.  
617 Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 143.  
618 BL Garrett Too big to jail: how prosecutors compromise with corporations (2014) 1.  
619 JC Coffee “Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal 
Sanctions” (1980) 18 Am Crim L Rev 419 419.   
620 Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 190.  
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In the social sciences rigid models tend to be short-lived, however, certain 
perspectives endure. Thus, Coffee advocates that no single economic theory can be 
developed to analyse criminal sanctions, but the failure to develop a single approach 
does not condemn the economic analysis of law. The various economic models have 
an enduring relevance which transcends its original purpose and create a flexibility for 
creative analysis.621   
The Chicago scholar, Professor Gary Becker, developed a modern economic 
theory for the optimal use of criminal sanctions.622 The cost minimisation model 
recognises three types of costs which are associated with crime, namely (1) the social 
cost that arises from the illegal conduct; (2) the cost of punishment that result from the 
imposition of a sanction on the (corporate) offender; and (3) the transaction costs 
incurred by the judicial system for the apprehension and punishment of offenders.623 
Although other costs could be relevant, the three types of cost identified in the Becker 
model makes the basic assertion that an optimal system of criminal justice reduces 
the aggregate of these three costs to a minimum, hence the reference to the “cost 
minimisation” model.624 Inherently, an optimal system requires certain trade-offs to 
reach an efficient equilibrium. If the cost to victims (ultimately included in the social 
cost) reduces, the aggregate costs of criminal sanctions will not decrease if another 
cost component is increased by more than the corresponding margin. Ultimately, this 
leads to problematic incentives, especially if the costs of apprehension and criminal 
sanctions are higher than the harm suffered, thereby not justifying the prosecution of 
the criminal activity. This creates a public perception that engaging in certain criminal 
activity has a low risk of being held accountable. Moreover, Coffee argues that one 
could draw “obvious policy conclusions” from the model suggested by Becker and 
provide economic justification thereof.625 The theory of optimal use of criminal 
sanctions which Becker proposes, (also referred to as the Free Market Model)626 has 
three basic principles, namely (1) the preferred form of sanction, (2) the appropriate 
cost-bearer and (3) the certainty-severity trade-off. In terms of the preferred form of 
sanction, fines are regarded as the optimal form of punishment and more efficient than 
                                             
621 Coffee (1980) Am Crim L Rev 420. 
622 Coffee (1980) Am Crim L Rev 420.  
623 GS Becker “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 J Pol Econ 169 180, 207.  
624 Coffee (1980) Am Crim L Rev 421.  
625 421.  
626 421.  
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incarceration, because the additional social cost of a fine is lower.627 Secondly, the 
appropriate person should bear the cost of the criminal sanction. If crimes are 
committed on behalf of an organisation, as in the case of corporate criminal liability, 
the organisation and not the individual engaging in the criminal conduct should pay 
the fine.628 Lastly, certainty-severity trade-off assumes that high penalties are 
preferred to vigorous law enforcement. It is more cost efficient if the severity of a 
sanction is raised instead of the probability of conviction. The reason being that it is 
cheaper to impose a higher sanction than apprehend additional offenders.629  
Coffee opposes the Free Market Model, stating that it is merely an economic theory 
and not the only economic theory of criminal sanctions.630 If the rational-actor model 
is introduced for the “criminal choice” decision, as Coffee recommends, the policy 
conclusions would differ from those proposed in the Free Market Model. It is argued, 
that a nuanced difference in the premises would ultimately alter the policy conclusions. 
Firstly, the threat of incarceration will have a greater deterrent effect than the threat of 
a fine. Secondly, penalties focused on individuals and not organisations will have a 
greater deterrent value. Lastly the certainty of a sanctions and not its severity, is crucial 
in deterring criminal behaviour.631 
Du Toit alleges that the various models used to attribute liability rules on juristic 
persons may have various theoretical premises, but two assumptions are found in 
every model, namely that a single individual cannot be identified who bears 
responsibility for corporate conduct and fault and effective deterrence occurs if the 
corporation instead of the individual is held criminally liable, thereby differing from 
Coffee’s departure from the Free Market Model.632 Being an abstract being, the 
individuals comprising a company should not be ignored in the corporate criminal 
liability inquiry, however, they should not be the centre of the investigation (especially 
                                             
627 Imprisonment is costly to society, because it is mainly funded through state resources (or ultimately 
the tax-payer) and it inhibits the offender’s productive capacity.  
628 The underlying reason for imposing a fine on the organisation and not the individual, is the 
assumption that the organisation will discipline the individual or agent acting on its behalf if it is in its 
interest to do so. Whether internal disciplinary procedure is sufficient to prevent future criminal conduct 
is uncertain. 
629 Posner argues that the costs incurred for raising the likelihood of conviction outweighs the cost of 
imposing a longer prison sentence, or in the case of corporate offenders, a larger fine. RA Posner 
Economic Analysis of Law  9 ed (2014) §24.1; Coffee (1980) Am Crim L Rev 421.  
630 Coffee (1980) Am Crim L Rev 422.  
631 422-423.  
632 Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 120.  
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with regard to corporate fault), but merely an instrument thereof.633 This approach 
does not account for the way in which individuals are influenced by corporate 
structures and culture of companies and what incites unlawful conduct. The role of 
individuals in corporate criminal liability should not be overlooked, but the influence of 
corporate structures on individuals’ conduct is crucial.634  
Schrager and Short define organisational crimes as the following: 
“[They] are illegal acts of commission or omission of an individual or a group of 
individuals in a legitimate formal organization in accordance with the operative goals 
of the organization, which have a serious physical or economic impact on employees, 
consumers or the general public.”635 
According to this working definition developed by Schrager and Short, the influence 
of corporate culture and corporate structure on the conduct of individuals within a 
company is illustrated. Du Toit, however, criticises the definition as being too narrow, 
because corporate criminal liability is limited by the degree of seriousness of the 
offence. He argues that any prohibited conduct (unless it amounts to a de minimis non 
curat lex) should be regarded as criminal, irrespective of the nature of the offence.636  
6 1 Are corporations still too big to jail in light of the CMCHA? 
As an alternative model to corporate criminal liability, the CMCHA also proposes a 
deterrence mechanism. According to section 1(6) of the CMCHA, if a company is 
found guilty, it could be liable for an unlimited fine. Davies and Worthington pose the 
question if this sanction is in line with the deterrent aims found in criminal law?637 The 
reason for their cynicism is that the shareholders and not the senior management 
responsible for corporate failure will be punished. By imposing a large fine, 
shareholders’ equity will be reduced and share prices might plummet due to the 
reputational harm caused by corporate crime.638 Another disincentive for corporate 
wrongdoing, is that shareholders’ conduct could be adversarial to director’s interest, 
                                             
633 120.  
634 LS Schrager & JF Short “Toward a Sociology of Organizational Crime” (1978) 25 Soc Probs 407 
410.  
635 Schrager & Short (1978) Soc Probs 411-412.  
636 Du Toit Strafregtelike aanspreeklikheid 121.  
637 Davies & Worthington Gower 186.  
638 The economic efficacy of imposing a fine as a criminal sanction will be discussed in more detail in a 
following chapter. It is argued that not all crimes would discourage customers from supporting certain 
companies nor show that directors did not act in shareholders’ best interest, for example international 
fashion brands using child labour.  
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for example removal from the board. However, whether or not shareholders will be 
proactive in holding management accountable depends on the internal structures of 
the company. Although the CMCHA was designed to combat corporate manslaughter 
in larger organisations, the involvement of shareholders in these companies are often 
neglected.639 Davies and Worthington speculate that shareholders might be pressured 
to take action, if a company could be excluded from a particular part of business as 
part of the criminal sanction.640 However, once again this sanction will place a heavier 
burden on shareholders than those at fault, namely management.  
It is argued that a better deterrent effect is the reputational harm a criminal 
conviction will impose on management, especially if it is their conduct which leads to 
the company being guilty of corporate manslaughter.641 The court also has the power 
to order a company to give publicity to the fact of its conviction. In terms of section 10 
of the CMCHA, non-compliance with a publicity order is a criminal offence in itself. Du 
Toit mentions that publicity orders might have a necessary deterrent effect in South 
Africa, rather than imposing larger fines which burden shareholders.642 
Lastly, the court may order a convicted company to take steps to remedy the breach 
leading to the death. In addition, any shortcomings in terms of health and safety 
regulations in the company’s policies, systems or practices should be rectified within 
certain timeframe.643 To ensure that the organisation abides with the order, a relevant 
enforcement agency may require evidence that steps have been taken.644  
7 Conclusion 
There is a need to hold companies criminally liable, however, the mechanism of 
holding them liable is not necessarily efficient. As a point of departure, the legal nature 
of a company has been a key factor in determining the model of attribution to be 
followed.  
                                             
639 Shareholders are more likely to play a passive role in decision-making processes. Therefore the only 
actors who would pressure senior management, might be institutional investors.  
640 Gower 186.  
641 Davies & Worthington Gower 186.  
642 PG Du Toit “Publisiteitsbevele as vonnisopsie vir regspersone” (2016) 19 PELJ 2-18.  
643 S 9.  
644 An example would be the Health and Safety Executive. These regulatory bodies are given no greater 
monitoring role in relation to management in terms of the CMCHA, but they could conduct general 
inspections more readily. Davies & Worthington Gower 187.  
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In terms of the individualist or nominalist theory, there is a historic reluctance to 
impose criminal liability on corporations due to a lack of consciousness and inability to 
commit unlawful conduct. Nevertheless, the vicarious model followed in South Africa 
attempts to address the artificial nature of the company by imputing the conduct and 
will of an individual who is either a director or servant of the company, provided that 
the relevant individual was at fault and acted within the scope of her employment. 
Another theory flowing from the nominalist or individualist theory, is the doctrine of the 
directing mind and will. This model is the dominant theory in English law, however, its 
narrow function and inability to impute liability for large corporate failure has been 
criticised.   
As an alternative approach to corporate criminal liability, the organisational model 
determines fault by focusing on the corporate culture in a company, thus its internal 
policies, decision-making framework, corporate ethos and monitoring systems. The 
Australian model is regarded as the most sophisticated framework to determine 
corporate criminal liability. In order to overcome the inefficiencies of the identification 
or directing mind doctrine, English law has promulgated various legislation which 
incorporates a realist or organisational approach to corporate criminal liability. 
Nevertheless, the corporate law reform is focused on regulating non-compliance and 
does not necessarily address the hurdle of crimes involving mens rea.  
The possible constitutional scrutiny of section 332(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 
has been explored in this chapter, especially due to the absence of a due diligence 
defence. Imposing criminal liability upon a corporation which has not condemned the 
offences, would not only be unfair, but is in violation of the constitutionally entrenched 
presumption of innocence. In turn this could lead to the thwarting of shareholders and 
employees’ expectations. In this regard, the legislative reform in England and Wales 
could be used as a guideline to determine what the ambit of such a due diligence 
defence would be.  
In South Africa, the theory of corporate personality and the need for a realistic 
understanding of corporate responsibility is in need of review. However, another 
obstacle to ensure corporate criminal liability, is the limited option for corporate 
retribution and punishment. Conservative theory relies on penalties as the effective 
means to sanction corporations. As seen in this chapter, a fine is an inefficient means 
to hold a company criminally liable. Other creative penalties are available, such as 
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publicity orders, corporate probation or deregistration and the judiciary should explore 
these possibilities.645 
There is a current trend in corporate criminal liability theory towards corporate 
failure to prevent economic crime, as seen with the promulgation of the BA and the 
CFA in England and Wales. One of the rationales for this shift, is that blameworthiness 
is easier to determine if the enquiry is limited to the public policies in a company. 
Whether South African law will follow suit is yet to be determined.  
 
 
  
                                             
645 Burchell Principles 469. 
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Chapter 5: Economic considerations 
1 Introduction 
Economic considerations have been part of company law since the inception of 
modern company law.646 Modern corporate law is focussed on solving the perceived 
agency problems between shareholders as owners and management as agents 
caused by the separation of ownership from control in companies.647 Watson argues 
that the ultimate purpose of corporate regulation should be to address these agency 
problems.648  
During the eighteenth century, Adam Smith in his seminal work The Wealth of 
Nations originally characterised the agency problem as follows: 
“The directors of such [joint stock] companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be well expected that they should 
watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private 
copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are 
easily apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their own master’s honour 
and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and 
profusion, therefore, must always prevail in the management of the affairs of such a 
company.”649  
The rules of attribution as described by Lord Hoffmann in Meridian form the legal 
framework whereby either criminal or delictual liability can be imputed to the 
company.650 Furthermore, these rules of attribution are key to the operational structure 
of a company and it is imperative that the basic principles are clearly understood and 
applied in case law.651  
Although certainty and consistency in legal rules are pivotal, the distinction between 
the rules of attribution and the agency problem remains a grey area and a nuanced 
approach is needed. Moreover, the current legal framework developed for regulating 
                                             
646 KJ Hopt “Comparative Company Law” in Reimann M & R Zimmermann (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Comparative Law (2006) 1161-1191 1184.  
647 S Watson “How the company became an entity: a new understanding of corporate law” (2015) 2 JBL 
120 120, 122.  
648 Watson (2015) JBL 120.  
649 A Smith The Wealth of Nations (Cannan) 5 ed (2003) 941.  
650 A Griffiths Contracting with Companies (2005)2.  
651 S Worthington “Corporate attribution and agency: back to basics” (2017) 133 Law Q Rev 118 143. 
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corporate liability should have a balanced approach to address the inherent agency 
problem.   
2 Law and economics: addressing the agency problem 
The importance of law and economics in the reform of company law, has been 
reiterated by the Law Commission of England and Wales Consultation Paper of 
1998,652 in which it emphasised the economic importance of directors acting within 
clear guidelines.653 Uncertainty leads to unnecessary opportunity costs and inhibits 
efficient decision-making. Furthermore, as a functional area of law, company law must 
facilitate commercial realities and enable all stakeholders to reap the benefits of 
corporate activity.654 The rationale was to assess if the existing legal rules promoted 
allocative efficiency, which in conjunction with dynamic efficiency would ultimately 
provide for innovation in achieving efficiency.655  
In essence, the Law Commission of England and Wales (“Law Commission”) stated 
that agency costs are key to law reform. Agency costs are those costs which are 
associated with having one’s affairs or property managed by someone else and is an 
inevitable result of the separation between ownership and control in large 
corporations, as envisaged by Berle and Means.656 The notion that these agency costs 
could be minimised through legal mechanisms which promote efficiency, are 
regrettably based on the assumption that shareholders are actively involved in 
decision-making and monitoring management activities in large corporations.657 If one 
deflects from a legal understanding of the principal/agent relationship and instead opt 
for the economic concept, where the agency costs are associated with costs arising 
from delegation and not the precise juridical relationship, true company law reform can 
occur.658 Thus, the juridical relationship is disposed of as a mere legal fiction and 
substituted by an economic approach to agency.  
                                             
652 Law Commission Company directors: regulating conflicts of interest and formulating a statement of 
duties Law Commission Consultation Paper No 153; Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper No 
105 5.  
653 LE Talbot Critical Company Law (2008) 176.  
654 Talbot Company Law (2008) 176.  
655 176-177.  
656 177. 
657 177.  
658 177.  
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In its proposal for law reform by means of addressing agency costs, the Law 
Commission stated the following: 
“[E]fficiency will be increased if an incentive structure can be put in place which will 
align the interests of the parties as far as possible. This set of incentives may be 
thought of, in a loose sense, as a contract or governance structure which is the result, 
in part, of bargaining between the parties, even though not all aspects of the 
arrangement would be regarded as contractual in the juridical sense of constituting a 
legally binding agreement.”659 
The contractarian theory underlying the Law Commission’s reasoning above, is 
based on the law and economics scholars’ theory of the firm, as originally developed 
by Ronald Coase in his seminal work The Nature of the Firm.660  Coase characterised 
the corporation as a set of transactions between those involved in the business, which 
forms the basis of the contractarian theory.661 Contractarian scholars applied Coase’s 
model of the corporation as a set of arrangements (or contracts) between individuals 
and the corresponding denial of the corporation as an entity, thus reducing the 
corporation to a mere “nexus of contracts”.662 The nexus of contracts model, as 
developed by Jensen and Meckling, provides that individuals within a business 
engage in private contracts, which contracts are overseen by management.663 
According to Talbot, the company remains a legal fiction, as the discussion regarding 
the corporate personality of a company is a matter of convenience rather than 
reality.664 Given its fictional nature, managers will act as an agent for the shareholders 
of the company and not the company itself.665  
Although the theory of the firm has been an integral part of law and economics, 
Jensen and Meckling argue that it is rather a theory of markets of which firms are 
important participants.666 The firm is pivotal in organising inputs and outputs in such a 
manner as to maximise profit, as well as present value.667 However, the problem 
                                             
659 Law Commission Company directors 31.  
660 RH Coase “The Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economica 386. 
661 Talbot Company Law (2008) 125.  
662 125.  
663 125. 
664 Talbot at 125, relying on FH Easterbrook & DR Fischel “The corporate contract” (1989) 89 Colum L 
Rev 1416 1426. 
665 Talbot Company Law (2008) 125. 
666 MC Jensen & WH Meckling “Theory of the firm: managerial behaviour, agency costs and ownership 
structure” (1976) 3 JFE 305 306.  
667 Jensen & Meckling (1976) JFE 306.  
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remains how conflicting objectives of individuals can be brought together to find an 
optimal solution.668 In large companies, shareholders are often desensitised from the 
company, which results therein that shareholders rely on the integrity and skill of 
managers. This situation poses a risk that managers act in their own self-interest and 
not those the principal. Inevitably, the traditional theory of the firm ignores the social 
responsibility vesting in firms. 
Corporate law has two functions, namely to regulate the structure of corporate form 
and the ancillary rules needed to support these corporate structures, as well as 
controlling the conflicts of interest existing among corporate constituencies.669  The 
conflict of interest existing between “insiders” and the “outsiders” (as described by 
Armour, Hansmann and Kraakman)670 is regarded as the most important conflict which 
corporate law seeks to regulate. Controlling shareholders and top managers are 
typically described as the “insiders”, while minority shareholders and creditors form 
part of the “outsiders”. 671 The conflict which arises, is referred to as the agency 
problem or principal-agent problem.  The nature of the agency problem rests on the 
principle that one party, namely the “principal” relies on the actions of another party 
(the “agent”), which would ultimately affect the principal’s welfare.672  
Ultimately corporate law seeks to reduce agency costs by realigning the interests 
of managers and shareholders. Typically, these costs are borne by the shareholders 
and are not easily quantifiable. Agency costs will result in lower dividends or a 
decrease in share prices, however, to prove an actual loss on the shareholders’ part 
will be difficult to determine.673 Nevertheless, markets (especially the financial market 
and labour market) ensure that managers are incentivised to reduce agency costs. In 
terms of the contractarian approach, the rules of corporate law within the market will 
be positioned in such a way as to ensure an optimal solution is found.674 
                                             
668 Jensen & Meckling (1976) JFE 307.  
669 J Armour, H Hansmann & R Kraakman “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in J Armour, RR 
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670 Armour et al “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in Anatomy29.  
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argue, that the answer depends on the hierarchical structure of the corporation and where the employee 
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672 Armour et al “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” in Anatomy 29. 
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3 Risk-bearers, agency problems and the theory of the firm  
The separation between ownership and control in companies is an important 
characteristic in modern company law, however, this separation did not always exist. 
In the mid-nineteenth century there was no expectation from shareholders that their 
liability towards third parties would be limited, for a company operated similarly to a 
partnership.675 The shareholders managed the company and thus had direct control 
over its exposure to risk. Locke argues that the risk to these shareholders was less 
than to shareholders in modern companies.676 This direct control has gone missing in 
the structure of large modern companies, where the board of directors is responsible 
for the business and affairs of the company.677 Despite the importance of the 
separation between ownership and control in modern companies, the incentive 
problems arising from this separation remain problematic and in need of redress.  
According to Fama, the incentive problems that arise where decision making in a 
firm falls within the management activities of the board of directors who are not the 
firm’s shareholders are central in law and economics scholars’ research.678 
Management and risk bearing are central in both the Jensen-Meckling and the 
Alchian-Demsetz analyses of the firm.679 According to Alchian and Demsetz the 
essence of the classical firm can be identified in the nexus of contracts theory.  The 
contractual structure is characterised as follows: (1) joint input production; (2) several 
input owners; (3) a common party to all the contracts of the joint inputs; who has the 
(4) right to renegotiate any input’s contract independently of other input owners’ 
contracts; and who ultimately (5) holds the residual claim; as well as the (6) right to 
sell the central contractual residual status.680 The common party or central agent is 
the firm’s owner and the employer.  
                                             
675 N Locke “The Approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal to the Enterprise Reality in Company 
Groups” (2012) 23 Stell LR 476 477. 
676 Locke (2012) Stell LR 477.  
677 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act states that the “business and affairs of a company must be 
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Locke (2012) Stell LR 477.  
678 EF Fama “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” (1980) 88 J Pol Econ 288 288;  
679 Fama (1980) J Pol Econ 290.  
680 AA Alchian & H Demsetz “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization” (1972) 62 
AER 777 794.  
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Fama states that, to understand the modern corporation, the manager and the 
owner of the firm should be separated.681 The manager is described in points 3 and 4 
of the Alchian-Demsetz definition, whilst the owner, as the ultimate risk-bearer, is 
described in points 5 and 6. According to Fama, retaining the concept of an 
entrepreneur as both the manager and the owner, prevents a perspective of 
management and risk bearing as separate factors of production.682 If one separates 
these factors of production, it is possible to analyse the various markets for these 
factors of production separately. Each factor, be it management or risk bearing, has a 
market for services that offer alternative opportunities, which in the case of 
management is a performance incentive.683 The contractual structure enables a 
particular firm to compete with other firms with similar cooperating factors of 
production. In modern corporations, the residual risk bearers have markets for their 
services, namely the capital markets, which enable risk bearers to diversify their 
production factors with relatively low transaction costs and to hedge against the 
corporate failure of a particular team (or firm).684 The optimal portfolio for any investor 
is a diversified portfolio across the securities of many firms. However, a diversified 
portfolio lessens the involvement of an investor in one specific firm and reduces the 
need for personally overseeing the detailed activity in any of the portfolio firms. Fama 
concludes that the efficient allocation of risk bearing implies the separation of 
ownership and control in a firm.  
Following this reasoning, it is clear that the managers of a firm are not the owners 
of capital, but rather the owners of the human capital invested in the firm. The rental 
rates at which they supply their human capital, will depend on the success or failure 
of the firm, as well as the managerial labour market.685 In turn, success and failure is 
measured by the efficacy of management to fulfil its function to oversee the contracts 
among the factors of production and to ensure the long-term sustainability of the firm.  
In ensuring that management’s and owners’ incentives are aligned, it is necessary 
to determine if the signals provided by both the managerial labour market and the 
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capital market (including other market-induced mechanisms) are sufficient to discipline 
managers?686 
3 1 Striking the right balance 
According to Fama, the external labour market exercises various direct pressures 
on the firm to categorise and compensate managers according to performance. Firstly, 
a successful firm will be a participant in the market for new managers. Potential new 
managers will be concerned with the key performance measures in the firm and will 
seek information about the system’s responsiveness to reward performance. If the firm 
is not on par with the competitive managerial labour market, especially its reward 
system, the firm will lose managers. Furthermore, an internal monitoring of managers 
will develop as higher-ranking managers will monitor the productivity of lower-level 
managers. Although the internal monitoring system is typically noted as a top-bottom 
approach, the inverse monitoring should also be appreciated.687 Therefore, all 
managers (irrespective of hierarchical level) realise that the managerial labour market 
uses the performance of the firm as a measure to determine each manager’s external 
opportunity wage.688  
Having gained control of the board, top management may realise that collusion and 
expropriation of shareholder wealth will be more advantageous than competing with 
one another.689 It is argued, that the appointment of independent non-executive 
directors will reduce the probability of such collusion and simultaneously, the function 
of the board as a “market-induced mechanism for low-cost internal transfer of control” 
might be levered.690 Independent non-executive directors will oversee and (to a certain 
extent) manage the competition among a firm’s executive committee.691 It is deduced 
that the disciplining of management occurs through both internal and external 
mechanisms.692 Although Alchian and Demsetz originally commented on these control 
mechanisms, they alluded that the task of disciplining management remains primarily 
with the risk bearers, thus the shareholders. Although the managerial labour markets 
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and the possibility of a change of control by way of a fundamental transaction assist 
in monitoring and disciplining managerial behaviour, the ultimate risk bearers still have 
the primary disciplinary function.  
Despite Alchian and Demsetz’ comment, Fama states that if management and risk 
bearing are viewed as separate factors of production, risk bearers will be more likely 
to diversify their portfolio and would not be interested in directly controlling the 
management of a single individual firm. Therefore, those models of the firm advocated 
by the scholars Alchian and Demsetz, as well as Jensen and Meckling, which focus 
on the risk-bearers as the primary control mechanism of management, are not 
effective in addressing the incentive problems arising from the separation of ownership 
and control, in other words the agency problem.693  
Rather, the managerial labour market as the primary control mechanism to 
discipline and control management, is more viable for the disciplinary function of 
management in large corporations, where the separation between ownership and 
control is a reality. If the managerial labour markets are efficient in disciplining 
managers both internally and externally, the need for a market for hostile takeovers 
will be a disciplinary mechanism of last resort.694 Furthermore, if the wage revision 
process is sufficient in managing the incentives of management, wage changes will 
offer another mechanism for disciplining and controlling managerial behaviour.695  
In conclusion, Fama remarks that if the weight afforded to the wage revision process 
is the equivalent of the full ex post settling up, the agency problem could be resolved.696  
However, the desired outcome where the wage revision process results in a full ex 
post settling up on the part of the manager, is not necessarily achieved.697 Instead, 
there are instances where the weight of the anticipated future wage changes does not 
offset the potential benefits arising from illicit behaviour, for example the gains from 
criminal conduct which is not accounted for ex ante in a manager’s employment 
                                             
693 The expensive mechanism of an outside takeover, as proposed by Manne, does not offer a viable 
alternative for the control of management either, as stated by Fama (1980) J Pol Econ 295.  
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wage revision process could be influenced by fluctuations in wages owed by other firms in the market.  
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contract. Ultimately, whether the wage revision process is effective in imposing ex post 
settling up, remains an empirical issue.698 Nevertheless, the general phenomenon is 
vital to the efficient economic organisation of modern corporations, where ownership 
and control are separated and incentives are misaligned.  
One of the instances where the misalignment between the incentives of ownership 
and control is evident, is corporate failure and in particular corporate criminal liability. 
Due the nuanced distinction between the rules of attribution and that of agency, the 
role of the agency problem in corporate criminal liability should be explored.  
4 Agency theory and the criminal liability of organisations 
According to Macey, the conventional assumption, particularly among law and 
economics scholars, that corporate shareholders ultimately benefit from corporate 
crime is misplaced. Although it is true that corporate shareholders do benefit ex post 
if corporate crime is undetected, the ex ante benefit flowing from corporate activity is 
uncertain.699 Macey argues that the agency cost perspective indicates that the 
deviation of interests between managers and shareholders (especially in modern 
corporations) serves as the best justification for corporate crime.700  
In modern company law, agency theory plays a pivotal role in theoretical analysis. 
In applying basic principles of agency theory to corporate criminal behaviour, one can 
firstly deduce that corporate actors are typically risk averse.701 Criminal activity, on the 
other hand, assumes risk-taking behaviour.  If criminal sanctions have a deterrent 
effect, it might increase a proclivity to risk aversion on the part of corporate actors. 
However, excessive criminal enforcement could suppress innovation and creativity, 
which has a negative impact on social wealth.702 The second insight relates to the crux 
of agency theory, namely that corporate actors will not engage in criminal behaviour 
to benefit the firm, but rather for their own benefit. A firm’s benefit from corporate 
criminal activity will merely be incidental. Although shareholders will have an ex post 
benefit flowing from the criminal activity, the misalignment in firm- and self-interest, 
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will not have an ex ante benefit for the shareholders.703  The question arises if the 
primary criminal sanction should not be imposed on the corporate actor herself rather 
than the firm?704  
Macey reasons that imposing criminal liability on a firm is not a “bad idea” however, 
the dilemma of the agency theory in corporate criminal liability should not be 
ignored.705  
The assumption held that corporations are risk-neutral in the context of corporate 
crime should be reviewed. Due to the reasoning that the ultimate decision-makers, 
namely the board of directors, are typically risk-averse, the corporation should rather 
be viewed as risk-averse.706 If the assumption of the risk-neutrality of a corporation 
continues, the criminal sanctions imposed will be inefficient.707 
Although risk-aversion among corporate actors, specifically the board of directors, 
is preferred, excessive risk-aversion could lead to unnecessary agency costs.708 
Macey argues that a basic implication of the agency theory, is that corporate criminal 
behaviour becomes exceedingly rare. Despite elaborate managerial incentive 
schemes, corporate actors will have to share the benefit arising from corporate 
conduct with shareholders. Simultaneously, the board of directors could face severe 
personal liability if it is convicted of engaging in criminal activity.709 Ultimately, Macey 
states that it is mostly small firms engaging in criminal activity and not large, public 
companies, but given the contemporary examples of Enron, Volkswagen and 
Steinhoff, this conclusion may need to be reconsidered.710 Albeit outliers or 
exceptions, the greater societal impact of these corporate scandals are detrimental. 
However, given the difficulty of prosecuting corporate criminal behaviour, one should 
bear in mind the complexity of modern organisational structures and the difficulty of 
proving corporate fault. Therefore, the low conviction rate for large, public 
organisations is merely an indication of the impact of risk-aversion and not necessarily 
the reality of corporate criminal behaviour.   
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Given the assumption that corporate actors are risk-averse, there are certain 
instances where the assumption does not hold.711 In the case of insolvency, the board 
of directors may be pressured to engage in illegal activity to ensure the financial 
survival of the company. The corporate culture in the company’s industry could be to 
promote criminal conduct, thus illegal activity becomes standard practice. 
Furthermore, corporate criminal transgressions could be the result of mistake on the 
part of the board of directors. Especially in the case of regulatory offences, the 
company might misinterpret or miscalculate the legality of a certain transaction or the 
likelihood of criminal prosecution is very low. According to Macey, a “changing political 
climate [could] transform a seemingly benign act into a criminal event.” Therefore, 
corporate compliance is of utmost importance to ensure the legality of corporate 
conduct.  
Managers of firms on the brink of insolvency, might have a greater incentive for risk-
taking behaviour than under normal circumstances.712 Managers will attempt to protect 
the firm’s factors of production, specifically its human capital, as their human capital 
investment might devalue in the open labour market.713 Moreover, it might be difficult 
to offer their human capital to other firms in the market if they have a firm specific skill 
set.  
However, if there is a corporate culture among firms in the market to condone illegal 
behaviour, corporate managers will not be stigmatised if they follow the industry 
norm.714 Especially if corporate actors believe it is impossible to succeed in a particular 
industry without engaging in illegal activity.715 Although this illegal conduct could be a 
mild transgression of a legal rule, a lax approach could set a precedent of condoning 
illicit behaviour. 
5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter the role of economic considerations in modern corporate law has 
been explored, especially in light of the perceived agency problem in corporate law. 
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One of the primary functions of modern corporate law is to address the agency 
problem and to seek corporate reform.  
Simultaneously, the rules of attribution as a means to overcome the artificial nature 
of the company create a disconnect with the agency problem. Therefore, it is 
paramount that legal framework regulating corporate liability has a balanced approach 
to also address the inherent agency problem. In South African law, section 332 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act focuses on directors and servants to impute both conduct and 
will to impose corporate criminal liability. Moreover, the notion that during prosecution 
these directors or servants are merely authorised representatives is stressed in 
subsection (2).716 
As a means to ensure that legal rules promote efficiencies, a proper understanding 
of agency costs is instrumental. However, the regulatory framework will remain 
ineffective if the sole purpose of corporate activities is to promote shareholder wealth, 
thus if shareholder primacy prevails. A solution lies in an economic understanding of 
the agency problem instead of a juridical relationship one. Once again, as seen in 
Chapter 2, a functional alternative to the traditional approach to corporate personality 
is proposed. The foundation of this paradigm shift is based on the contractarian theory. 
In terms of this approach, the incentives of risk-bearers being the owners of the firm 
and managers should be aligned in such a way as to minimise agency costs. 
Ultimately, corporate law should function to resolve the conflict and not to maintain it.  
5 1 Addressing risk allocation efficiently 
Although law and economics scholars seek to solve the agency problem, the 
inherent problem of risk allocation is not necessarily addressed. Due to the separation 
of ownership and control in modern organisations and the proposal that the markets 
for corporate owners (risk-bearers) and managers differ, it should be determined 
whether these markets operate efficiently. Moreover, these markets should be 
sufficient to discipline managers.  
                                             
716 332 (2) In any prosecution against a corporate body, a director or servant of that corporate 
body shall be cited, as representative of that corporate body, as the offender, and 
thereupon the person so cited may, as such representative, be dealt with as if he were 
the person accused of having committed the offence in question: Provided that-  
if the said person pleads guilty, other than by way of admitting guilt under section 57, 
the plea shall not be valid unless the corporate body authorized him to plead guilty.  
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Based on the assumption that managers are risk-averse, the outcome in the 
markets for managers are not necessarily efficient. In this respect, markets fail to 
regulate managers properly and the need arises for regulatory intervention to ensure 
ethical behaviour.  
As an alternative, by focussing on a regulatory environment which encourages 
compliance and ethical corporate culture instead of the directing mind and will of the 
company, organisational fault may be addressed more efficiently as the assumption 
of risk-aversion is removed.  
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
1 Introduction 
A company has no soul to be damned and no body to be kicked. Although this 
statement is a recurring theme in case law and academic journals regarding corporate 
liability, it also shows the dilemma of anthropomorphism. Throughout this thesis, the 
artificial nature of the company has been criticised as a fiction which is irreconcilable 
with modern reality. With a surge in corporate crime, including health and safety 
violations, environmental transgressions, tax evasion and corporate homicide, a need 
for a more robust theory of corporate liability is needed. Due to the difficulties in 
establishing wrongdoing, individual and corporate responsibility should be evaluated 
to reflect the true nature of unlawful conduct or omission and its consequences.  
In determining whether corporate liability should be imposed, the corporate 
personality and rules of attribution are a pivotal part of the inquiry. Nevertheless, as 
seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the theory of corporate personality and the rules of 
attribution are not set in stone. Moreover, the inherent blameworthiness traditionally 
required for criminal liability poses an inefficacy in imposing corporate criminal liability, 
due to the limitations of the individualist theory. In order to establish a comprehensive 
framework to govern corporate criminal liability, a more realistic concept of corporate 
liability based on corporate fault is needed. In such a regulatory framework, both 
collective and individual responsibility for corporate crime are relevant. Instead of 
limiting the inherent blameworthiness associated with corporate responsibility, a 
flexible approach which is not constricted to the limits of individualism is 
recommended. It is proposed, that a company may be held liable for its own fault 
based on a broad understanding of blameworthiness. Organisational fault is also not 
confined to the parameters of the directing minds doctrine, but offers a paradigm shift 
so as to include lower-level employees, internal policies and decision-making 
structures and corporate ethos. Ideally, a corporation is not akin to individuals, but 
there are similar characteristics.  
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2 Recommendations 
2 1 The rationale for corporate criminal liability 
Chapter 5 explored the dilemma of the agency problem, whereby the self-interest 
of managers is furthered at the expense of the company’s (or the shareholders’) 
interests. It is especially in light of the agency relationship that the need arises for 
efficient corporate governance to ensure that the interests of agents are aligned with 
those of the principal. One of the functions of corporate law is to address the conflicts 
of interests which arise as a result of the separation between ownership and control. 
The deviation of interests between managers and shareholders in modern 
corporations also serve as the best justification for corporate crime. The persistence 
of the agency problem in modern corporate law suggests that reform is needed. 
Therefore, as a solution a purposive approach is suggested whereby the focus is not 
on determining the nature of the company and the consequential need for attribution, 
but rather for what purpose corporate liability should arise.  
Macey argues that corporate criminal behaviour becomes rare if agency theory is 
properly aligned. The board of directors could face severe personal liability if it is 
convicted of engaging in criminal activity. Moreover, corporate actors will have to share 
the benefit arising from corporate conduct with shareholders, even if such benefit does 
not arise ex ante for shareholders.  
2 2 Nature versus function 
In Chapter 2, a departure from the semantic question of “what is a corporation” was 
suggested, as corporate criminal liability is often overshadowed by corporate 
personality theory. In order to avoid esoteric questions of corporate personhood, Hart 
suggests that one should rather determine for what purpose corporate liability must 
be imposed in a specific instance. Nevertheless, the rhetoric in case law presupposes 
the artificial or abstract nature of a company as a point of departure to determine 
corporate liability. Accordingly, there is a justification for applying the rules of 
attribution as determined in Meridian to impute conduct and will to a company for 
purposes of corporate liability. However, as seen in Chapter 3, the application of the 
rules of attribution are not consistent, but are driven by a contextual analysis to infer 
whether the primary, general or special rules of attribution should apply. Moreover, the 
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overemphasis on high-ranking managerial officers is not aligned with the reality that 
unlawful conduct or omission are not necessarily limited to these upper hierarchies.  
As an alternative approach to offer a solution to the inconsistent application of the 
fiction-aggregate-reality trichotomy, as well as the inefficiency of the modern 
approach, a functional approach to corporate personality is suggested in Chapter 2. 
The traditional approaches have often led to a debate about nothing, for the nature of 
the firm cannot be thoroughly explained in any theory. Therefore, the question “what 
is a corporation,” has proven to be one of endless discussion and little certainty. 
Although the rhetoric of jurisprudence on the matter seem to use this question as a 
point of departure, the outcome is often inconsistent, as the underlying values and 
policies of these traditional theories are arbitrary. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the functional approach is not to solve the dilemma of 
the nature of the firm, but rather an alternative legal framework to analyse these 
problems.  In criminal law, the functional approach would free courts and legislators 
from the restrictions of both the fiction theory and the real entity theory. The functional 
approach includes both economic and social considerations to create a framework 
whereby corporate liability may be imposed. Economic considerations, such as the 
internalisation of the total cost of production, and social considerations of public health 
and safety and environmental protection are explored to determine if a functional 
approach would suggest that a company be held liable for the misconduct of 
employees at all hierarchical levels.  A new approach to conceptualising a firm is 
proposed; a balanced or functional approach which focuses on the function of a firm 
instead of its nature. It is argued that this approach is more flexible and suitable to 
determine corporate rights and duties than the traditional theories. Moreover, a 
balanced or functional approach suggests that a company should bear responsibility 
for the harm associated with its business activity, which is independent of individual 
misconduct and the assumption that a company is incapable of possessing mens rea.  
2 3 Attribution versus agency 
The need for attribution stems from the fiction theory, whereby a company is 
regarded as an artificial being and therefore the law attributes the conduct and will of 
certain individuals, typically the directing mind and will of the company to it.  
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With an increase in misbehaving corporate actors, the description and application 
of the relevant rules have become uncertain, especially with regards to the question 
of whose acts could be contributed to the company and for what purposes those acts 
can be deemed to be the company’s. Although certain managerial positions are more 
susceptible to be regarded as the directing mind of a company, the directing mind 
need not always be that of the person or persons involved in general management 
and control of the company. If one considers the dicta of Meridian, a purposive 
approach to this question is important, thus whose conduct should be imputed to the 
company for a specific purpose. Ultimately, the application of the directing mind 
doctrine calls for a contextual analysis of the circumstances. 
Section 66(1) of the Companies Act provides that the board of directors manages 
the business and affairs of the company. This is a new development in South African 
company law, for the relationship between the company and its directors was 
previously described as one of agency. However, the remnants of this approach are 
still evident in the nominalist approach to corporate criminal liability, whereby the 
individuals within a company are instrumental to ascribe mens rea and actus reus in 
terms of section 332(1) of the CPA.  
2 4 Towards a modern alternative based on organisational fault 
Following the analysis and different interpretations of foreign law, one can criticise 
the current South African model as being archaic and surreal. Legislative intervention 
is needed to develop the corporate criminal liability model to reflect modern corporate 
reality and to conform to  international principles. If the legislature fails to incorporate 
organisational theory into its procedural framework, judicial scrutiny might declare 
section 332(1) of the CPA unconstitutional. As seen in Chapter 4, despite the proposal 
to limit the ambit of section 332(1)such limitation would still lead to incoherent 
consequences.  
King IV stresses the need for responsible corporate citizenship by way of 
implementing an ethical framework which promotes adherence to legal rules and 
regulations. To adhere to this plea, the primary liability mechanism should note the 
unique corporate identity and culture within companies and depart from the abstract 
fiction when imposing corporate criminal liability. As proposed by the Australian 
Criminal Code, the decision-making framework and internal monitoring systems are 
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important in establishing the corporate identity and culture within a company. 
Ultimately, whether corporate criminal liability should be imposed, should be based on 
the notion of corporate culture and identity instead of the abstract fiction theory. Given 
the need to hold corporations criminally liable, policy considerations should dictate 
how such liability should be imposed.  
By way of a combination of accomplice liability and organisational theory, corporate 
criminal liability should be regulated. Accomplice liability refers to the company’s role 
in supporting and encouraging the employee’s unlawful conduct. On the other hand, 
in terms of the organisational theory, the corporate ethos is considered with reference 
to the reactive or preventative measures in place, the corporate policy framework and 
objectives of the company, as well as the compensation of previous transgressions. 
Together with internal monitoring mechanisms, this self-identity model is held to be 
more effective in proving fault, since it relates to establishing the primary liability of the 
company. Moreover, in establishing whether there is a legal duty which has reasonably 
been broken, the objective criteria of corporate ethos, decision-making frameworks 
and internal monitoring and control measures, will aid in determining negligence.  
..  
A holistic approach to the nature of corporations would recognise the unique identity 
of each corporation, which is differentiated from its employees or shareholders. There 
is a need to progress from a strict individualistic approach, focusing on each 
individual’s contribution, to the question of fault and rather ascertain whether there 
was genuine corporate fault based on corporate culture and identity  
3 Conclusion 
The need to hold corporations criminally liable has become an undisputed fact. Due 
to the inefficacy of current corporate theory to address or solve the dilemma of 
corporate liability leads to an analysis which firstly seeks to offer an alternative 
approach to corporate personality, by following a functional approach based on 
economic and social considerations to impose corporate liability. Secondly, a 
contextual analysis for the rules of attribution is proposed which is not limited to the 
hierarchical understanding of a corporation. Lastly, to follow a holistic approach to the 
imposition of corporate criminal liability based on organisational fault is proposed.  
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As justification for these alternative approaches, the continued agency problem in 
corporate law is used as a justification to ensure that the conflict created by an artificial 
understanding of the company and the need for corporate attribution rules are solved. 
Whether South African law will be transformed by legislative reform is uncertain, 
therefore, given the importance of contextual analysis in the constitutional 
dispensation, it is advocated that courts should seek to change the rhetoric of 
jurisprudence as to include a notion of corporate blameworthiness when imposing 
corporate liability.  
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